In re: Drew Smith

District Court, S.D. New York

In re: Drew Smith

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 1:24-CV-9776 (LTS) IN RE: DREW SMITH ORDER LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Petitioner Drew Smith, who appears pro se and proceeds in forma pauperis (“IFP”), has filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF 4.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion. This action is being reviewed pursuant to the requirements laid out in the IFP statute,

28 U.S.C. § 1915

, that all IFP civil actions must be reviewed under. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). “Thus, before summonses are issued in this case, the district court must determine whether the action shall be dismissed (1) as frivolous or malicious, (2) for failure to state a claim, or (3) because the action seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” Staley v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, No. 1:24-CV-8265 (LTS),

2025 WL 1685233

, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2025) (citing § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)). Petitioner cannot properly seek summary judgment without having his opponent served with a summons and the initial pleading; that cannot happen unless and until the abovementioned statutory review and service of process is completed. Because this action is still undergoing the abovementioned statutory review, the Court’s deciding whether to grant Petitioner summary judgment is premature and inappropriate. The Court therefore denies Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF 4) without prejudice to his filing another such motion should this action proceed following the abovementioned statutory review and service of a summons and the initial pleading on Petitioner’s opponent. CONCLUSION The Court denies Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF 4.) The Court directs the Clerk of Court to terminate ECF 4. The Court denies Petitioner’s motion without prejudice to his filing another such motion should this action proceed following the abovementioned statutory review and service of a summons and the initial pleading on Petitioner’s opponent.

The Court certifies, under

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,

369 U.S. 438, 444-45

(1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: September 11, 2025 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge

Reference

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