UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK NELIN KEHOE, Plaintiff, 25-CV-8852 (LTS) -against- TRANSFER ORDER TAMRA WALKER, Queens Family Court Judge, et al., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who resides in Las Vegas, Nevada, brings this action pro se. She asserts claims under

and criminal statutes (

, 242, 2261, 2265). Plaintiff sues a Queens Family Court Judge and others employed at the Family Court in Queens County, New York. For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. DISCUSSION Under the general venue statute, a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See

(c)(1), (2). The general venue statute applies to Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff asserts that venue is proper in this district “because all defendants perform their official duties in Queens County, New York.” (ECF 1 at 2, ¶ 8.) Queens County, however, is in the Eastern District of New York,

(c); it is not in this district. Because Plaintiff

alleges that the events giving rise to her claims took place in Queens County, venue does not appear to be proper in this district under Section 1391(b)(2) based on the place where the events giving rise to the claims occurred. Venue of Plaintiff’s claims also does not appear to be proper in this district under Section 1391(b)(1) based on the residence of defendants. Plaintiff has not pleaded facts about whether all defendants reside in New York and whether any defendant is a resident of this district. Even if venue is proper in the district where a case is filed, a court may transfer the case “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice” to any other district where it might have been brought.

(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the

convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City,

(S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The underlying events occurred in Queens County, and it is reasonable to expect that all relevant documents and witnesses also would be in Queens County. The Eastern District of New York therefore appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,

(a); see D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener,

, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion

in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”). CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes the case in the Southern District of New York. The Court certifies, under

(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 27, 2025 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge