UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RAJIV P. RAMJAS, Plaintiff, 25-CV-9443 (LTS) -against- TRANSFER ORDER TAMARA KERSH, ET AL., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who resides in Queens County, New York, brings this pro se action alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights, as well as his rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and state law. For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. DISCUSSION Venue for Plaintiff’s constitutional claims under

, and his claims under the FCRA and state law, are governed by the general venue statute,

. Under Section 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See

(c)(1), (2). Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his claims occurred in Queens County, and, possibly, Nassau County, New York. Although Plaintiff does not provide addresses for all Defendants, he provides addresses in Queens County and Nassau County for many of them. (See ECF 1, at 4-5, 6.) Queens and Nassau Counties are located in the Eastern District of New York.

See

(c). Even if the Court did assume that at least one defendant resides in this District and that venue is proper here under Section 1391(b)(1), because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Queens and Nassau Counties, venue would also be proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of New York. Under

(a), even if a case is filed in a jurisdiction where venue is proper, a court may transfer the case to any other district where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.”

(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the

location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City,

(S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The underlying events occurred in Queens and Nassau Counties, where Plaintiff resides and where most Defendants also appear to be located. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the relevant documents and witnesses also would be in Queens and Nassau Counties. The Eastern District of New York appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

(a); see D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener,

, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District

courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”). CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. Summonses shall not issue from this court. This order closes this action in this court. The Court certifies, under

(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19, 2025 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge