District Court, S.D. New York, 2025

William C. Haley, Jr. v. Monroe County, et al.

William C. Haley, Jr. v. Monroe County, et al.
District Court, S.D. New York · Decided November 18, 2025
William C. Haley, Jr. v. Monroe County, et al.

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK WILLIAM C. HALEY, JR., Plaintiff, 25-CV-9534 (LTS) -against- TRANSFER ORDER MONROE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently resides in Rochester, New York, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his rights during Family Court proceedings held in Monroe County, New York. Named as Defendants are Monroe County, Monroe County Family Court, Monroe County Sheriff’s Office, Monroe County Public Defender’s Office, Monroe County Family Court Judge Kristine Demo-Vasquez, Morna Affronti (attorney for Plaintiff’s minor child), Amanda Oren (Family Court Attorney Referee), and John and Jane Doe Defendants 1-20 (employees of Monroe County). For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 to the United States District Court for the Western District of New York.

DISCUSSION Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

Under Section 1391(c), a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights during Family Court proceedings held in Monroe County. He does not plead the residence of the individual defendants, only asserting that the alleged events giving rise to his claims occurred in Monroe County Because Defendants are employed by Monroe County and the alleged events occurred in Monroe County, from the face of the complaint, it is clear that venue is not proper in this Court under Section 1391(b)(1), (2).1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, if a plaintiff files a case in the wrong venue, the Court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiff’s claims arose in Monroe County, which is in the Western District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 112. Accordingly, venue lies in the Western District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), and in the interest of justice, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further

1 This judicial district, the Southern District of New York, is comprised of the following New York State counties: (1) New York (New York City Borough of Manhattan); (2) Bronx (New York City Borough of the Bronx); (3) Westchester; (4) Dutchess; (5) Rockland; (6) Orange; (7) Putnam; and (8) Sullivan. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(b). without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes this case.

The Court waives Local Civil Rule 83.1, which requires a seven-day delay before the Clerk of Court may transfer a case. The Court leaves to the transferee court a determination regarding Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order.

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 18, 2025 New York, New York /s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.