Webster Bank, N.A. v. James D. Watson and Pamela L. Watson; James D. Watson and...

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

WEBSTER BANK, N.A., Plaintiff, v. JAMES D. WATSON, and PAMELA L.

WATSON, Defendants.

No. 23-CV-5427 (KMK)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL JAMES D. WATSON, and PAMELA L.

WATSON, Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. TWEED VP HOLDINGS LLC, Third-Party Defendant.

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge: Defendants James and Pamela Watson (“Defendants”) previously brought a Third-Party Complaint against Tweed VP Holdings, LLC (“Tweed”). (Dkt. 66.) On September 25, 2025, the Court granted Tweed’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Third-Party Complaint but granted Defendants thirty days to file an amended third-party complaint. (Dkt. 73.) To date, Defendants have not filed an amended third-party complaint or otherwise communicated with the Court.

This Court has the authority to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a case may be involuntarily dismissed if a plaintiff “fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order.” See id. Although Rule 41(b) expressly addresses a situation in which a defendant moves to dismiss for failure to prosecute, it has long been recognized that a district court has the inherent authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute sua sponte. See LeSane v. Hall’s Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962)).

While dismissal under Rule 41(b) is subject to the sound discretion of the district courts, see U.S. ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 250–51 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit has stated that a Rule 41(b) dismissal is a “harsh remedy to be utilized only in extreme situations,” see LeSane, 239 F.3d at 209 (quotation mark omitted) (quoting Theilmann v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 455 F.2d 853, 855 (2d Cir. 1972)). Before exercising its discretionary authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute, a district court should consider the following factors: [1] the duration of the plaintiff’s failures, [2] whether plaintiff had received notice that further delays would result in dismissal, [3] whether the defendant is likely to be prejudiced by further delay, [4] whether the district judge has take[n] care to strik[e] the balance between alleviating court calendar congestion and protecting a party’s right to due process and a fair chance to be heard . . . and [5] whether the judge has adequately assessed the efficacy of lesser sanctions.

Wood v. City of N.Y., No. 05-CV-2894, 2007 WL 2049686, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007) (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting LeSane, 239 F.3d at 209); see also Hibbert v. Apfel, No. 99-CV-4246, 2000 WL 977683, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000) (same). No single factor is dispositive. See Nita v. Conn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 16 F.3d 482, 485 (2d Cir. 1994).

The Court concludes that these factors weigh in favor of dismissal of Defendants’ Third- Party Complaint with prejudice. In the Court’s Order & Opinion granting Tweed’s Motion to Dismiss, Defendants were instructed that failure to file an amended complaint could result in their claims being dismissed with prejudice. (See Dkt. No. 73 at 14–15.) Despite this warning, Defendants failed to comply with this Order. Accordingly, Defendants’ Third-Party Action is dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute. See Lopez v. Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of N.Y., No. 00-CV-1247, 2001 WL 50896, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2001) (dismissing for failure to prosecute where plaintiff “ceased to prosecute [the] action at all” for three months).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 17, 2025 White Plains, New York ________________________________ KENNETH M. KARAS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE