Tamesha N. Boyd v. The Corporation of the State of New York et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK TAMESHA N. BOYD, Plaintiff, -against- 1:25-CV-169 (LEK/MJK) THE CORPORATION of the STATE of NEW YORK et al, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION On February 6, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Tamesha Boyd (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against Defendants the State of New York,1 Governor Kathy Hochul, the New York Department of Motor Vehicles, Division of Field Investigations (“DMV”), the DMV Commissioner, Katrina Turner, and Doe Union and/or Insurance Company Defendants, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”).

On June 30, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint. Dkt. No. 28 (“Motion”). Plaintiff filed a response, Dkt. No. 31 (“Response”), and Defendants filed a reply, Dkt. No. 32.

For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part, and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND The following facts are set forth as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, her Response, and the exhibits attached to it.

Plaintiff is an African-American woman with a disability, who, “at all relevant times, was employed by the [DMV].” See Compl. at 2, 12. She alleges “a pattern of racial and disability discrimination, retaliation, defamation, and violation of [her] constitutional rights . . . . perpetrated by the [DMV], various [DMV] employees . . . , and governmental institutions tasked with providing access to justice.” Id. at 4.

Outside of work, Plaintiff writes under the pseudonym, Zalaina Carpenter, “to safeguard [her] privacy, freedom of expression, and mental health.” Id. She alleges her supervisor, Katrina Turner, and “others in [her] workplace, misuse[d] and misinterpret[ed]. . . [her] personal writings under the pseudonym.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff says, “that in the work place it seemed [she] was ‘defamed’” because of the personal views she expressed on “issues of racial discrimination, identity, and self-expression.” Id. Turner “retaliated against [her]” by spreading defamatory statements about Plaintiff amongst colleagues, excluding her from career opportunities, creating a hostile work environment where Plaintiff felt unwanted and “discriminated against due to racial biases,” and telling her to “utilize the team email set up to communicate with [her] co workers and to share work related ‘content’ to complete[] work task[s]!” Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff believes this was done in “bad faith” and that Turner’s statements subjected her to the “false beliefs that [she], as a Black woman, was somehow unprofessional or unworthy of the opportunities others were afforded.” Id. at 6–7.

Later, after recovering from an illness, Plaintiff was further subjected to “retaliation and a hostile work environment.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff overheard her colleagues “suggesting [she] was a racist” and mention she “would be fired soon.” Id. at 10. Moreover, on several occasions Plaintiff was “subjected to verbal abuse” by Turner and explains that she felt Turner “deflected” Plaintiff’s concerns. Id. Plaintiff further alleges “the DMV and its employees have deprived [her] of [her] 14th Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.” Id. at 9. She explains that the DMV maintains a practice of “including racial profiling, discriminatory treatment, and defamation” that has “hindered [her] ability to perform [her] job.” Id. Plaintiff attempted to “facilitate a complaint from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and other governmental institutions” but they failed to “investigate or adequately address [her] complaints of discrimination and retaliation.” Id. at 10–11.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges Turner denied her reasonable accommodations under the ADA.

Id. at 9, 12, 14–15. Plaintiff is the “mother of a disabled child, [who] requested reasonable accommodations to attend necessary meetings regarding [her] child’s education.” Id. at 14–15.

Turner’s denial of Plaintiff’s accommodations caused her “additional stress and harm.” Id. at 15.

Plaintiff requests $100,000,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief in the form of, inter alia, requiring the EEOC and other government agencies to “reform their processes [in order to] ensure adequate protection for individuals who experience discrimination and retaliation.” Id. at 23. She also requests the Court engage in ‘Systemic Reforms,’ including a Court ordered “implementation of anti-retaliation policies for employees with disabilities.’ Id. Courts in the Second Circuit are required to show special solicitude to pro se litigants, especially those raising civil rights claims, as Plaintiff does here. Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 2003)). As best the Court can understand, Plaintiff brings the following claims for relief: 1) employment discrimination claims against all Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”), 2) employment discrimination and hostile work environment claims against all Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), 3) ADA failure to accommodate, employment discrimination, and retaliations claims against all Defendants, 4) Title VII claims for racial discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment against all Defendants, 5) state law Defamation claims against all Defendants, 6) NYSHRL claims against all Defendants for discriminatory practices, 7) Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress against all Defendants, and 8) a state law Negligence claim against Katrina Turner. See Compl. at 7, 9–16.2 III. LEGAL STANDARD To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court must accept as true the factual allegations contained in a complaint and draw all inferences in favor of a plaintiff. See Allaire Corp. v. Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249–50 (2d Cir. 2006). A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears that there are not “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plausibility requires “enough fact[s] to raise a

The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Supreme Court has stated that “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the pleader has not demonstrated that she is entitled to relief and the action is subject to dismissal. Id. at 679.

Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must “construe the complaint broadly, and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests.” Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). Nevertheless, “dismissal of a pro se complaint is…appropriate where a plaintiff has clearly failed to meet the minimum pleading requirements.” Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F.Supp.3d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1997)). The Court’s “duty to liberally construe a plaintiff’s complaint is not the equivalent of a duty to re-write it.” Geldzahler v. N.Y. Med. Coll., 663 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (cleaned up).

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted).

However, for pro se plaintiffs, the Court may consider “materials outside the complaint to the extent that they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” Alsaifullah v. Furco, No. 12-CV-2907, 2013 WL 3972514, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013) (internal quotations omitted), including, “documents that a pro se litigant attaches to his opposition papers,” Agu v. Rhea, No. 09-CV-4732, 2010 WL 5186839, at *4 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2010), “factual allegations made by a pro se party in his papers opposing the motion,” Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013), and “documents that the plaintiff[ ] either possessed or knew about and upon which [he or she] relied in bringing the suit,” Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000). Finally, “the sufficiency of a complaint is a matter of law that the court is capable of determining based on its own reading of the pleading and knowledge of the law.”

McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322–23 (2d Cir. 2000).

IV. DISCUSSION A. Federal Law Claims Plaintiff’s federal claims for relief suffer from several pleading deficiencies. The Court addresses each in turn.

1. Sovereign Immunity Defendants aver that Plaintiff’s claims against the State of New York, the DMV, and the individual Defendants in their official capacity should be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Mot. at 8–11. The Court agrees.

The Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen from bringing a suit against her own state in federal court. See U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment also immunizes States against suits for damages against state officials acting in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); see also Keles v. Davalos, 642 F. Supp. 3d 339, 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (explaining that Section 1983 official capacity suits are considered “de facto monetary suits against the state and are barred by sovereign immunity.”) (internal quotations omitted). “This immunity extends to ‘. . . state instrumentalities.’” Clark v. Schroeder, 847 F.

App’x 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429–30 (1997)). The DMV, of course, is a state instrumentality. See Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2004).

Eleventh Amendment immunity is lost only if Congress unequivocally abrogates states’ immunity or a state expressly consents to suit. See Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 365–66 (2d Cir. 2009). It is well-settled that Congress did not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity through Section 1983. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (“There can be no doubt, however, that [a Section 1983] suit against the State . . . is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”). Moreover, New York has not waived its immunity from suit on the claims for monetary damages asserted in the Complaint. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 38–40 (2d Cir. 1977).

Therefore, as an initial matter, all of Plaintiff’s claims against New York State, the DMV, and the individual Defendants in their official capacities, are clearly barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed with prejudice.3 Plaintiff “invoke[s] Ex Parte Young” in her Complaint as a means of “addressing violations committed by state officials, including the Governor and other related parties, in their

However, Plaintiff’s invocation of Ex Parte Young is patently erroneous. Ex Parte Young only allows for prospective relief against state officials, not state agencies. See Silva v. Farrish, 47 F.4th 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2022). Therefore, the limited exception the Supreme Court recognized in Ex Parte Young is inapplicable as against both the DMV and New York State. See Clark, 847 F.

App’x at 93–94. And to the extent Plaintiff identifies “prospective injunctive relief” 4 against the DMV’s Commissioner, Governor Hochul, or Ms. Turner, any argument for future relief would fail because Plaintiff lacks the standing to do so. See Cozayatl Sampedro v. Schriro, 377 F. Supp. 3d 133, 145 (D. Conn. 2019) (“To have standing to seek an injunction, Mr. Sampedro ‘must assert a likelihood that [he] will be subjected to a similar [constitutional] violation in the future.’”) (citations omitted). Plaintiff is neither employed by the DMV, nor does she seek reinstatement, and thus lacks standing to seek such relief. Compare Compl. at 11, 13 with Cassells v. Univ. Hosp. at Stony Brook, No. 86-CV-698, 1987 WL 3717, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.

12, 1987) (“[P]laintiff, as a former employee, can no longer benefit from any prospective injunctive relief the court might grant, and thus she does not have standing.”) (citing Simon v.

Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 43 (1976)). Accordingly, because Plaintiff lacks standing, any claims she has for prospective injunctive relief are also dismissed with prejudice.

In sum, Plaintiff’s claims for damages and any claims for prospective injunctive relief against New York State, the DMV, and the individual Defendants in their official capacity, are barred on sovereign immunity grounds and dismissed with prejudice.

2. Personal Involvement Further, Defendants argue that any Section 1981 or 1983 claims must be dismissed against Governor Hochul and the DMV Commissioner for lack of personal involvement. See Mot. at 28.

“An individual may be held liable under §§ 1981 and 1983 only if that individual is ‘personally involved in the alleged deprivation.’” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 314 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (for Section 1983 claims)); Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir. 2004) (for Section 1981 claims). A plaintiff can establish personal involvement by demonstrating either that: (1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference . . . by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.

Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 314 (citing Back, 365 F.3d at 127).

The Court notes that it is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks to sue the individual Defendants in their individual capacity or their official capacity. In the Complaint, Plaintiff appears to sue the Governor and DMV Commissioner in their official capacities only, while she sues Ms. Turner in both her individual and official capacity. See Compl. at 2–3. In her Response however, Plaintiff seems to amend her allegations to include a suit against the Governor and the DMV Commissioner in their individual capacities as well. See Resp. at 1, 6, 9, 13; Dkt. No. 31-1 at 2.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s pro se status, and the special solicitude owed to pro se litigants in this Circuit and because “individual-and official-capacity claims are not mutually exclusive,” Rodriguez v. City of Rochester, 624 F. App’x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2015), the Court will assume Plaintiff intended to sue the Governor and the DMV commissioner in their individual capacities as well.5 Plaintiff fails to allege any plausible theory that either the Governor or the DMV Commissioner were personally involved in the actions alleged in the Complaint. See generally Compl. Instead, the Complaint merely cites the state officials in the case caption, and as parties to the Complaint, but is otherwise bereft of the “tangible connection” the law requires to establish liability for even supervisory officials. See Burrell v. DOCCS, 655 F. Supp. 3d 112, 124 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986); Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020)). “[A] plaintiff must plead and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, [including supervisors,] through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.’” Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 618 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the Governor and the DMV Commissioner are dismissed for lack of personal involvement. See Cipriani v. Buffardi, No. 06-CV-889, 2007 WL 607341, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007) (“Dismissal is appropriate where a defendant is listed in the caption, but the body of the complaint fails to indicate what the defendant did to the plaintiff.”).6 3. Title VII Plaintiff brings Title VII retaliation, hostile work environment, and discrimination claims against New York State, the DMV, and the individual Defendants in their official and personal capacities. Compl. at 9, 12. Defendants aver, inter alia, that this Court has cannot hear Plaintiff’s Title VII claims because she has not received a “right to sue” letter from the EEOC and therefore her claims should be dismissed. See Mot. at 11–13. Defendants further aver that by Plaintiff’s failing to rebut these arguments, they are entitled to dismissal of her original claims. Reply at 3– (citing Lopez v. Wright, 2007 WL 388919 *1–2 (N.D.N.Y. 2007)).

After carefully considering the matter, the Court agrees with Defendants on this latter point. “Plaintiff had due notice of [her] duty to oppose such legal arguments if [s]he wished them to be considered by the Court as challenged.” Johnson v. Lew, No. 13-CV-1072, 2015 WL 4496363, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2015); see also Dkt. No. 3; NDNY L.R. 7.1(b)(3). “In this District, when a non-movant willfully fails to oppose a legal argument asserted by a movant, the movant’s burden with regard to that argument is lightened, such that, in order to succeed on that argument, the movant need only show that the argument possess facial merit.” Id. This burden is a “modest” one. Id. “Here, the Court finds that Defendants have, at the very least, met this

Further, Plaintiff alleges that she felt “discriminated against due to racial biases,” targeted for her expression, heard someone say she “would be fired soon,” that her colleagues suggested she “was a racist without justification,” and that she was subject to verbal abuse by her supervisor. Compl. at 6, 9–10. But again, states no facts to support a claim against the DMV for a hostile work environment leaving the claim subject to dismissal. Boza-Meade v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 170 F. Supp. 3d 535, 547 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (dismissing a hostile work environment claim where plaintiff made “vague allegations that co-workers made fun of her . . ., with no additional supporting factual information as to the context and frequency of this conduct.”); Nugent v. St. Lukes-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 303 F. App’x 943, 945 (2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing a hostile work environment claim because “derogatory language,” “dismissive comments by management,” and “intense scrutiny” of an employee are “insufficiently severe and pervasive” to state a claim for relief); see also Alvarado v. Mount Pleasant Cottage Sch. Dist., 404 F. Supp. 3d 763, 781–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (explaining that Title VII “does ‘not prohibit employers from maintaining nasty, unpleasant workplaces, or even ones that are unpleasant for reasons that are due to the protected characteristic.’”) (quoting Carrington v. Mota, 16-CV-8061, 2017 WL 3835883, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2017)).

Finally, any racial discrimination claims under Title VII that Plaintiff may be alleging, Compl. at 5–7. 9–10, must fail because she provides no facts to infer discriminatory intent on behalf of her employer. Oliver Cyrus v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 22-CV-4115, 2025 WL 964016, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025), reconsideration denied sub nom. Cyrus v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 22-CV-4115, 2025 WL 1638056 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2025) (dismissing a racial discrimination claim under Title VII because “[t]he plaintiff does not allege that any defendant referred to her race, criticized her work ‘in ethnically degrading terms,’ or made ‘invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group.’”) (citing Tieu v. New York City Econ. Dev. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 3d 305, 321–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)).

4. ADA Plaintiff brings discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate claims under the ADA against all Defendants for the actions alleged in the Complaint. Compl. at 9–15. To the extent she alleges ADA discrimination and retaliation claims, they rely on largely the same theory as her Title VII claims against the DMV. Id. at 6–7, 9–15. As to her failure to accommodate claims, she brings these on behalf of herself and her disabled son. Id. at 12, 14–15.

But, as Defendants correctly note, Plaintiff’s employment discrimination and retaliation ADA claims cannot proceed against New York State, the DMV, or any of the individual Defendants.

See Mot. at 29–30; Yerdon v. Poitras, 120 F.4th 1150, 1153–55 (2d Cir. 2024) (explaining that ADA claims brought under either Title I or Title V are barred against the DMV and state officials acting in their official capacity); id. at 1155–57 (explaining that “neither Title I nor Title V of the ADA permits claims against individual[s]”). Thus, the only remaining claim would be Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim. But this too must fail because Plaintiff has simply alleged no facts to support it. a. Failure to Accommodate Plaintiff’s Disability Defendants aver that Plaintiff cannot establish she was disabled as defined by the ADA.

See Mot. at 31.

“To establish a prima facie [failure to accommodate] case under the ADA, a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) [her] employer is subject to the ADA; (2) [s]he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) [s]he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) . . . [her] employer refused to make a reasonable accommodation.”

Tudor v. Whitehall Cent. Sch. Dist., 132 F.4th 242, 246 (2d Cir. 2025) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Woolf v. Strada, 949 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam)).

After carefully reviewing the Complaint, the Court agrees with Defendants that it is “devoid of any allegation that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.” Mot. at 31.

Plaintiff does not explain her specific disability, how it qualifies as a disability within the ADA. or describe the “reasonable accommodations” she sought for herself. See generally Compl.

Rather, Plaintiff merely describes herself as a “disabled individual.” See, e.g., id. at 16; Resp. at (“I am not just any citizen: I am a disabled professional leader.”) (emphasis in original).

These statements are conclusory and thus do not state a claim for relief, let alone a plausible one.

Tillman v. New York City Dep’t of Hum. Res. Admin., No. 22-872-CV, 2023 WL 2770218, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2023). b. Plaintiff’s Associational Discrimination Claim Plaintiff also alleges the Defendants failed to accommodate her “reasonable accommodations to attend necessary meetings regarding [her] child’s education.” Compl. at 14– 15. Defendants aver this fails to state a disability discrimination claim under the ADA. See Mot. at 31. The Court agrees.

To state a claim for associational discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege: “1) that she was qualified for the job at the time of an adverse employment action; 2) that she was subjected to adverse employment action; 3) that she was known at the time to have a relative or associate with a disability; and 4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference that the disability of the relative or associate was a determining factor in the employer’s decision.”

Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 432 (2d Cir. 2016).

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege any elements of an associational discrimination claim. Specifically, as described supra Part IV (A)(3)(c), Plaintiff does not describe any adverse employment action taken against her, or moreover, that anyone’s disability was the reason for that action, see generally Compl. Therefore, this claim must be dismissed.

5. Section 1981 Plaintiff brings a Section 1981 damages claim against all Defendants for “subjecting Plaintiff to discriminatory actions and harassment based on race and disability.” Compl. at 11– 12. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claims should be dismissed because, inter alia, Section 1983 provides the constitutional remedy she seeks. Mot. at 22–26. The Court agrees.

In Duplan, the Second Circuit held that Section 1981 claims against state actors are barred because “[Section] 1983 already provides a remedy against state actors.” Duplan, 888 F.3d 612, 620–21 (2d Cir. 2018). Thus, a Section 1981 claim against New York State, the DMV, and the individual Defendants (in either their individual or official capacities) “would not be the appropriate vehicle for suit, and such claims must be dismissed.” Perry v. Clement, No. 23-CV- 1573, 2025 WL 2592189, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2025); see also Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989) (explaining that “the express cause of action for damages created by [Section] 1983 constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in [Section] 1981 by state governmental units.”); Gonzalez v. City of New York, 377 F. Supp. 3d 273, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The Supreme Court’s holding in Jett has been interpreted to encompass not only governmental entities, but also individuals sued in their individual capacities who are also state actors.”).7 Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claims as Section 1983 claims against all Defendants. In re New York City Dep’t of Educ., No. 15-CV- 7150, 2019 WL 1433163, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (“Following the Second Circuit’s approach in Duplan, the Court will construe the [Section] 1981 claims as causes of action brought under [Section] 1983.”) (collecting cases).

6. Section 1983 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims because they are either barred by sovereign immunity or otherwise fail to state a claim. Mot. at 26–29.

The Court observes it might be helpful to identify which of the Defendants is subject to liability under Section 1983 given the procedural bars to Plaintiff’s claims. First, any Section 1983 claims against New York State, the DMV, or any of the Defendants in their official capacity must fail because they are clearly barred by sovereign immunity. See supra Part IV(A)(1). Moreover, Plaintiff cannot seek prospective injunctive relief because she no longer works at the DMV, nor does she seek reinstatement. Id. Finally, based on the analysis supra Part IV(A)(2), Plaintiff’s Complaint is currently devoid of any facts which allege that either the Governor or the DMV Commissioner were personally involved in her alleged constitutional violation. Thus, the only viable Defendant to whom a Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims might apply is Ms. Turner. But those too must fail. a. First Amendment Claim Construed liberally, Plaintiff’s allegations raise a First Amendment retaliation claim against Ms. Turner. Compl. at 8.

“The speech of a public employee is protected by the First Amendment when the employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern, rather than pursuant to his employment responsibilities.” Specht v. City of New York, 15 F.4th 594, 600 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420–21 (2006)). To state a claim for relief, a Plaintiff must allege that they have (1) “engaged in protected First Amendment activity; (2) . . . suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Smith v. County of Suffolk, 776 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2015). “Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to matters of political, social, or general interest to the community or value and concern to the public.” Specht v. City of New York, 15 F.4th 594, 600 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011)). Courts “consider the motive of the speaker, cognizant that ‘speech on a purely private matter does not pertain to a matter of public concern’ and, conversely, that an individual motivated by a personal grievance can simultaneously speak on a matter affecting the public at large.” Golodner v. Berliner, 770 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).

Defendants aver Plaintiff’s claim fails because she has not alleged that her speech was a matter of public concern or that an adverse employment action was taken against Plaintiff by Ms. Turner. Mot. at 32–34. Defendants further aver that by failing to rebut these arguments, Plaintiff waives her original claims. Reply at 7 (citing Lopez, 2007 WL 388919 *1–2 (N.D.N.Y. 2007)).

After carefully considering the matter, the Court agrees with Defendants on this point, and for the same reasons set out supra Part IV (A)(3), the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden with regard to these arguments. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is dismissed. b. Equal Protection Claims Plaintiff also alleges Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims against Ms. Turner for, inter alia, “racial discrimination or creating a hostile work environment based on race, ethnicity, or other protected characteristics.” Compl. at 9. Defendants, in turn, argue that Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claims against Ms. Turner (the facts of which are nearly identical to her Title VII claims) must fail because, among other things, they are premised on the same actions underlying her Title VII claims. See Mot. at 28–29 (citing McBeth v. City of New York, No. 23-CV-10389, 2025 WL 951439, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025)); supra Part IV (A)(3).

Moreover, in their Reply, they aver that Plaintiff has not “address[ed] the validity of this claim” in her Response. Reply at 6.

Upon reviewing Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion, and carefully considering the matter, the Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to oppose Defendants’ argument for dismissal on her Equal Protection claims. See generally Resp.; Dkt. No 31-4. Although the Court did not reach the merits of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims due to a jurisdictional defect, the Court explained supra Part IV (A)(3)(c) that those claims would fail in any event because the Complaint alleges only conclusory allegations. Here, Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claims rely on the same facts and suffer the same pleading deficiencies. The Response does nothing to dispute Defendants’ arguments that the Complaint fails to plausibly allege facts that show “discrimination, hostile work environment [or] retaliation” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Mot. at 15–22, 28–29; Reply at 6. Instead, Plaintiff’s Response merely restates the same conclusory allegations against Ms. Turner that Plaintiff made in her Complaint – i.e., that Ms. Turner’s “conduct contributed to a hostile work environment and violated Plaintiff's rights under the ADA” and that her “allegations are sufficient to survive dismissal at the pleading stage.” Compare Dkt. No. 31-4 at (emphasis in original and citations omitted) with Compl. at 5–10.

Given the overlap in Defendants’ arguments against Plaintiff’s Title VII and Equal Protection claims, the fact that they remain unrebutted in Plaintiff’s Response, and that they are indeed meritorious, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim for the same reasons laid out above. Supra Part IV (A)(3)(c); Johnson, 2015 WL 4496363, at *5.

B. State Law Claims Given that the bases for this Court’s federal question jurisdiction have been disposed of, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [pendent state law claims] if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 158 n.6 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[A] district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state and local law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”).

Accordingly, any state law claims Plaintiff wishes to bring against Defendants are dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.8 However, because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, and the Court cannot say at this time that amendment would be futile as to certain claims, limited leave to amend is appropriate, so long as it is consistent with the case law outlined in this Memorandum-Decision and Order.

Accordingly, it is hereby: ORDERED, that Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No, 28, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s complaint, Dkt. No. 1, is DISMISSED with prejudice, as to: 1) any claims for damages against New York State, Governor Hochul, in her official capacity, Katrina Turner, in her official capacity, and the DMV Commissioner, in their official capacity; 2) any Title VII claims against New York State or the individual Defendants; 3) any ADA discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate claims against New York State and the individual Defendants; 5) any claims brought under Section 1981; and 6) any Section 1983

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 22, 2026 Albany, New York AWRENCE E. KAHN United States District Judge