McKeefry v. O'Hara
Opinion of the Court
This is a summary proceeding brought by a landlord against his tenant and an under-tenant to recover possession of premises known as No. 675 Sixth avenue, borough of Manhattan, on the ground that they hold over and continue in possession of the demised premises after the expiration of the term without the permission of the landlord. The answer of the tenant, in addition to general denials, contains a plea to the jurisdiction of the court and defenses predicated upon an alleged estoppel in pais by reason of a former adjudication.
TTpon the trial the landlord produced a written lease,
The assignment was dated on January 7, 1914, and was duly recorded. The last note paid was on July 1, 1920. The balance unpaid on said mortgage indebtedness at the time of the'trial was $12,541.12. McKeefry entered into possession of the said lease under the said assignment and executed to the tenant, O’Hara, the lease in suit, which expired on February 29,1920.
The tenant admits the making of the said lease, and produces another lease, dated January 26, 1915, for the term of eleven years and eleven months, beginning March 1, 1920, and terminating on January 31, 1932, at an annual rent of $2,500 a year, executed by the estate of Frank B. McDonald, James E. McDonald,, executor, but not signed by the tenant, Frank O’Hara, or by a witness. The tenant claims that McKeefry, the landlord herein, delivered both leases" to him and, in answer to a question as to what was the meaning of the two leases, stated that his jurisdiction would be up on the property at the expiration of the five-year lease, and that he kept one copy of each lease and delivered the other copy of each lease to the tenant. The tenant admitted that he had not paid any rent to the landlord, McKeefry, since March 1, 1920, and that he had not demanded any rent from him since that date. The tenant stated he- had mailed a
The landlord herein, McKeefry, denied that he had ever given the lease for eleven years and eleven months to the tenant, O’Hara, or that he had ever known of it until last fall, probably November, 1919, and that he had ever known that McDonald had made leases, and he denied that he ever had the conversation with the tenant about giving him two leases. He admitted that he had received from the McDonald estate a check from the tenant for the rent for March, 1920, and had returned it to the tenant, with a letter dated March 16, 1920.
The determination of this proceeding does not involve the title to real property, but the right to the possession of real property, and the court is given jurisdiction of this proceeding by statute. Code Civ. Pro. § 2231; McAdam Landl. & Ten. (3d ed.) 80 and cases cited. The relation of landlord and tenant existed between McKeefry, the landlord herein, and O’Hara, the tenant herein, by virtue of the lease between them for five years, which expired on February 29, 1920, and the said McKeefry was authorized to maintain these proceedings by the said lease and by the mortgage and assignment from the McDonald estate, which he held pending the payment of the mortgage indebtedness to him. There can be no question that by the said mortgage and the said assignment the McDonald estate did give and grant unto McKeefry the right to enforce his right of possession by entering into possession, leasing the premises and, as they became vacant, to make other or further leases and thus obtain the rentals therefrom to extinguish his debt. McKeefry had a direct conveyance and assignment of the lease, which is the entire right of possession from Silleck to Buareon, to be defeated only
A tenant may not acquire a title antagonistic to that of his landlord without a prior surrender of the demised premises. Jones v. Reilly, 174 N. Y. 97; Willis v. McKinnon, 37 Misc. Rep. 386; affd., 79 App. Div. 249. The mortgage and assignment to McKeefry having been executed and recorded prior to the lease from the McDonald estate, the lessee claiming thereunder was bound by the terms of these instruments, even if the landlord herein, McKeefry, be considered merely a mortgagee in possession. Derby v. Brandt, 99 App. Div. 257. Estoppels are not favored in the law. Pierrepont v. Barnard, 5 Barb. 364. The alleged statement of the landlord herein, McKeefry, at the time of the delivery of the lease from the McDonald estate, if given its utmost effect, amounted to the expression of an opinion, upon which in no event an estoppel could be predicated. Akin v. Kellogg, 119 N. Y. 441. No consideration was claimed to have been rendered by the tenant in return for the lease from the McDonald estate, and it is not contended that in reliance thereupon or the statement made by the landlord herein, McKeefry, at the time of the alleged delivery thereof, he changed his position, and, therefore, there is a total failure on the part of the tenant to establish his defense of an estoppel in pais as against the legal rights and equities of the landlord herein, which were prior in time and to which his claim is subordinate.
The tenant sought to offer in evidence the summary proceedings instituted by the tenant, O’Hara, against his under-tenants to recover rent or possession of part the premises herein, but these proceedings cannot be deemed binding upon the landlord herein as he was
The landlord is, therefore, entitled to a final order awarding to him the possession of the premises, with five days’ stay of execution of the warrant.
Ordered accordingly.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.