Pollack v. Jackson
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff brings this action to recover the sum of $1,225, representing the amount of eleven Liberty bonds of the face value of $1,000 with coupons, deposited by the plaintiff with the defendant as security under a lease dated September 19, 1919, between the plaintiff as tenant and the defendant as landlord for a term expiring October 1, 1924. The lease provided that the security was to be retained by the landlord until the expiration of the term. In May, 1924, before the lease expired, the property was sold subject to the lease to one Max Gottnick, who in the same month sold the property to the present owner, Ida Levy, and assigned the lease to her. The defendant in this action admits that he has the Liberty bonds demanded in the complaint, but that he is holding them for the benefit of the present owner, who has made a demand upon him for them, claiming the sum of $515 as damages for the breach by the plaintiff of various covenants of the lease while she was the landlord. Two parties claiming the security, the defendant moves under section 287 of the Civil Practice Act to have the present owner, Ida Levy, substituted as a defendant in his place and stead upon his depositing the Liberty bonds which he holds in such manner as the court may direct. It has been well established that a covenant to repay security deposited under a lease is a personal covenant and does not run with the land (Sanford v. Zimmern, 76 Misc. 434); that where the lease provides that the security is to be retained until its expiration the tenant is not entitled to its return prior thereto although his landlord has in the meantime sold the premises (Seletzsky v. James, 69 id. 612); that a new landlord, although taking subject to the lease, is not entitled to receive the security from his grantor (Mauro v. Alvino, 90 id. 328), and that in a suit by the tenant against his original landlord for a return of the security after the expiration of the lease the landlord cannot in his own right counterclaim for damages for breach of the covenant of the lease occurring after the assignment of the reversion. (Knutsen v. Cingue, 113 App. Div. 677. See, also, Lewis Leases, 445-452, and cases there cited.) In Mauro v. Alvino (supra) the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First Department, by Lehman, J., went a step further and in a dictum held: “ The grantee who takes subject to a lease should also, on principle, obtain the benefit of
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.