Siegel v. Goldstein
Opinion of the Court
This is a dispossess proceeding brought for nonpayment of rent for the months of July and August, 1955, at $125 per month, due and payable on the first of the said respective months, the total rent in arrears amounting to $250. The testimony of the landlord was that the tenant occupied the premises for business purposes after the expiration of a lease which expired July 31, 1953. On July 21, 1955, a fire occurred
The tenant relies on section 227 of the Real Property Law which reads as follows: 1 ‘ Where any building, which is leased or occupied, is destroyed or so injured by the elements, or any other cause as to be untenantable, and unfit for occupancy, and no express agreement to the contrary has been made in writing, the lessee or occupant may, if the destruction or injury occurred without his fault or neglect, quit and surrender possession of the leasehold premises, and of the land so leased or occupied; and he is not liable to pay to the lessor or owner, rent for the time subsequent to the surrender. Any rent paid in advance or which may have accrued by the terms of a lease or any other hiring shall be adjusted to the date of such surrender.”
The landlord claims that the premises were not destroyed or so injured by the fire as to be untenantable and unfit for occupancy and accordingly section 227 of the Real Property Law does not apply. The tenant controverts this and contends that
The tenant has moved to dismiss the petition upon the following grounds: First, that a judgment may not be entered for arrears in rent because there was no personal service of the precept. The tenant’s attorney cites in support the case of Fourteenth St. & Broadway Realty Corp. v. Deutsch (136 Misc. 50). This case is not in point because it holds that where the precept fails to contain a notice that demand is made in the petition for a judgment for rent in arrears and that the precept be served at least five days before the return day thereof, the court has no jurisdiction to award a judgment for rent. However, such notice is contained in the precept in this case. Furthermore, although there was no personal service, yet the defendant has voluntarily appeared (Matter of McDonald, 225 App. Div. 403, 406, 407). Accordingly the motion to dismiss the petition in this respect is denied.
Secondly, the tenant claims that inasmuch as the landlord was paid the rent by his insurance company that the said insurance company is the real party in interest. However, the policy produced by the landlord merely provides that the company ‘ ‘ may ’ ’ require from the insured an assignment of all rights of recovery against any party for loss to the extent that payment therefor is made by the company. There is no proof that the company has required such an assignment or that an assignment has been made. Furthermore, payment of all or part of the loss is no bar to this action. (Brewster v. Silverstein, 133 N. Y. S. 473.) Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the petition upon this contention is denied.
Thirdly, the tenant further moved to dismiss the petition upon the basis of section 227 of the Real Property Law. However, the fire clause of the lease which is projected into the statutory tenancy (par. 11 of the lease) takes the case out of the operation of section 227 of the Real Property Law and the rights of the parties are measured thereby (Butler v. Kidder, 87 N. Y. 98). This clause provides as follows:
The court finds that the premises were rendered wholly untenantable by the fire. Accordingly, the last portion of paragraph 11 applies. Although there is no testimony as to whether or not a notice was given to the tenant of the landlord’s decision the landlord testified that “ reconstruction work ” was begun the week of August 21st. Accordingly, the landlord decided to rebuild and the delay of three weeks occasioned by the efforts of both parties to adjust the fire loss was not an unreasonable time within which the tenant was required to remove his property from the premises. (Bassett v. Dean, 34 Hun 250; Decker v. Morton, 31 App. Div. 469, appeal dismissed 159 N. Y. 572.) It may be inferred from the testimony that the landlord made no objection to the surrender by the tenant and on the other hand he testified he received the keys to the store on August the 15th. It was thus unnecessary for the landlord to serve the notice provided by paragraph 11. The contention of the tenant that he is liable for rent only up to the date of the fire, July the 21st, is not sustained. Nothing is said in the last portion of paragraph 11 as to any abatement of rent up to the time of surrender and so the obligation to pay rent up to that time is not affected (cf. Playfair Card & Toy Shop v. Landon Holding Corp., 134 N. Y. S. 2d 651). Even on the basis of the tenant’s contention that section 227 of the Real Property Law applies, the rent upon that theory would be payable up to the time of surrender. The question then arises whether the total monthly rent for both July and August is payable or whether the rent may be apportioned up to the date of surrender, -namely August 13th. However, such apportionment is applicable by operation of section 227 of the Real Property Law and inasmuch as the lease takes this case out of the operation of the statute the total rent is payable for both the months of July and August. This is the
The court finds that the counterclaim interposed by the tenant for the return of the deposit, with interest from the date of the deposit namely from the 1st day of August, 1949, is sustained. (Cf. 2710 8th Ave. v. Forman Pharmacy, 180 Misc. 376; 2300 Concourse Realty Co. v. Klug, 201 Misc. 179, and Real Property Law, § 233.) It is conceded that the amount of $250 has been held by the landlord as security.
Accordingly, the court finds that the tenant is entitled to the sum of $250 upon the counterclaim, with interest from the 1st day of August, 1949.
Final order landlord. Rent payable $250, with interest from August 1,1955. Counterclaim of tenant sustained in the amount of $250, with interest from August 1, 1949. Stay ten days.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.