People v. Rose
Opinion of the Court
OPINION OF THE COURT
Simplified Traffic Informations and Supporting Depositions
The DWI charges in these cases were commenced by filing simplified traffic informations and supporting depositions rather than misdemeanor informations. Under our law as it applies in this case, such a simplified information is
“a written accusation by a police officer . . . filed with a local criminal court, which charges a person with the commission of one or more traffic infractions and/or misdemeanors relating to traffic, and which, being in a brief or simplified form prescribed by the commissioner of motor vehicles, designates the offense or offenses charged but contains no factual allegations of an evidentiary nature supporting such charge or charges. It serves as a basis for commencement of a criminal action for such traffic offenses, alternative to the charging thereof by a regular information, and, under circumstances prescribed in section 100.25, it may serve, either in*202 whole or in part, as a basis for prosecution of such charges.”2
As noted by the Court of Appeals, “[t]he simplified information is a statutory creation designed to provide an uncomplicated form for handling the large volume of traffic infractions and petty offenses for which it is principally used. It need not provide on its face reasonable cause to believe defendant has committed the offense.”
If requested, sworn facts will be provided in a supporting deposition from the arresting officer which must “contain! ] allegations of fact, based either upon personal knowledge or upon information and belief, providing reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense or offenses charged.”
It is within this legislative and common-law context that, as the millennium approached, several segments of state government began thinking about the opportunities presented by maturing computer technologies. The New York State Police and Department of Motor Vehicles started studying e-tickets and the efficiencies of data entry, transfer and retrieval which they presented.
The advent of the Electronic Signatures and Records Act (ESRA),
State law predated federal legislation in this area
Accordingly, the court finds no difficulty in accepting the statutory propositions that “[t]he use of an electronic signature shall have the same validity and effect as the use of a signature affixed by hand,”
Development and Processing of E-Tickets Following ESRA
During the hearing, it became clear that in early 2001, the New York State Police, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), the Office of Court Administration (OCA), the State Magistrate’s and Court Clerk’s Associations among others became involved in a project to explore the possibility of using e-tickets to replace handwritten uniform traffic tickets.
Under the TRACX system, the police car must be equipped with a computer terminal, a printer and a bar code scanner
Through cross-examination at the hearing it became apparent that e-tickets differ in a number of important respects from UTTs.
The fourth difference, however, is more problematic: the e-ticket is “signed” before any information regarding the traffic stop is placed on the ticket. Thus, the arresting officer is signing an essentially blank document. If a simplified information was required by law to be verified, this distinction alone would be fatal to an e-ticket since the signature affirms only what appears before it in the document.
While the simplified informations charging these defendants with DWI are sufficient, it is respectfully suggested that the Legislature and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles work with dispatch to address some of the concerns raised by this opinion. While the bill recently passed by our State Senate may be a first step in this process,
Recommendations For Regulatory and Legislative Action Regarding E-Tickets
Since the Criminal Procedure Law and Vehicle and Traffic Law defer in great measure to the Motor Vehicle Commissioner’s rule-making authority, the most expedient changes may be accomplished by amending the rules relating to e-tickets.
While such rule changes may be sufficient where prosecutions are based on simplified informations alone, they may not go far enough in those cases where a supporting deposition is prepared to accompany the e-ticket. In those cases, the court respectfully suggests that the Legislature needs to make a number of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law and Vehicle and Traffic Law. First, since the more restrictive definition of “electronic signature” was deleted from ESRA solely because of compatibility concerns in commercial applications, that or similar language should be incorporated into a Criminal Procedure Law definition of “electronic signature” to appear in section 1.20.
Obviously, the most important facet of an electronic signature used in our criminal courts must be the insistence that the electronic signature can be affixed only by a knowing and purposeful act by the person intending to sign the document. That could be accomplished by clicking on a form notice indicating the signer’s acknowledgment that “false statements made therein are punishable as a class A misdemeanor pursuant to section 210.45 of the penal law.”
Conclusion
Until the suggested changes to the TRACX protocol regarding the timing of electronic signatures being affixed to supporting depositions are made, prosecutions by electronic ticket using only such signatures on supporting depositions may be seriously flawed. At the very least, in cases such as these wherein a conviction becomes a predicate for a felony prosecution with its attendant potential for civil disabilities (such as the loss of the right to vote), general orders for troopers and arresting officers should require them to send a hard copy of the supporting deposition to the court with a second handwritten signature affixed following the perjury notice and just before or after the electronic signature. While our laws should be flexible enough to account for technological innovations which foster greater accountability, increased information availability and fiscal responsibility, our common-law traditions dictate that a defendant’s due process rights deserve at least an equal footing.
Because the supporting depositions filed with the court in each of these cases bear original signatures, the motions to dismiss the DWI charges are denied.
[Portions of opinion omitted for purposes of publication.]
. Although rarely used, the Criminal Procedure Law does provide for the possibility of a factual hearing where the insufficiency of a local court accusatory instrument is alleged. GPL 170.45, 210.45 (6).
. CPL 100.10 (2) (a); see also CPL 1.20 (2), (5); 150.50 (1).
. People v Nuccio, 78 NY2d 102, 104 (1991) (citations omitted).
. CPL 100.25 (1); see also People v Nuccio, at 104.
. CPL 100.10 (3), (4), (5); see also CPL 100.30 (1). Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Law, the Court of Appeals held that allowing prosecution for a misdemeanor DWI based on a “mere unverified summons” denied a defendant “an essential guarantee . . . of a fundamental right, namely, that he be not punished for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation.” People v Scott, 3 NY2d 148, 153 (1957). In this court’s view, however, the precedential value of this holding was vitiated by the CPL’s new statutory framework which provides a right to a verified supporting deposition.
. CPL 100.25 (2); see also CPL 150.10 (2).
. CPL 100.20.
. People v Hohmeyer, 70 NY2d 41, 43 (1987). A valid accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid local court prose
. Matter of Neftali D., 85 NY2d 631, 635-636 (1995) (citations omitted).
. Matter of Neftali D. at 636; compare People v Holmes, 93 NY2d 889, 890-891 (1999) (in verifying an accusation the complainant must appreciate the significance of that act) with Matter of Shirley v Schulman, 78 NY2d 915, 917 (1991) (“[i]nasmuch as neither the notice of violation nor the complaint violation was verified pursuant to CPL 100.30, they were not valid as accusatory instruments”). In a case prosecuted by simplified information, if a supporting deposition is requested in a timely fashion, the failure to provide one within the established time frame “renders the simplified information insufficient on its face.” CPL 100.40 (2).
. According to Lieutenant Casper’s testimony before this court, the New York State Police recognized in early 2000 that with over 3.9 million handwritten uniform traffic tickets having been issued the year before, advances in computer technology could offer some real benefits to law enforcement, the Department of Motor Vehicles and the courts. Transcript of proceedings on June 25, 2005 at 22-23.
. This part of the State Technology Law became effective on March 27, 2000.
. State Technology Law § 302 (1).
. 9 NYCRR 540.1 (c).
. 9 NYCRR 540.1 (f). The statutory business record exception, CPLR 4518, was amended to incorporate ESRA’s provisions and ESRA incorporates its provisions by reference into our rules of evidence under the CPLR. State Technology Law § 306.
. State Technology Law § 302 (2).
. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 USC § 7001 et seq.).
. Laws of 2002 (ch 314, § 1).
. State Technology Law § 302 (3). Before the change, such an electronic signature also included an
“identifier, including without limitation a digital signature, which is unique to the person using it, capable of verification, under the sole control of the person using it, attached to or associated with data in such a manner that authenticates the attachment of the signature to particular data and the integrity of the datatrans*205 mitted, and intended by the party using it to have the same force and effect as the use of a signature affixed by hand.”
This portion of the law was deleted from State Technology Law § 102 (3), the predecessor statute to section 302 (3), in 2002 (L 2002, ch 314, § 2).
. State Technology Law § 304 (2).
. State Technology Law § 305 (3).
. Transcript at 22-24, 73.
. Transcript at 20.
. It appears TRACX, which was originally developed in Iowa with federal support, is now in use in 24 states and two Canadian provinces and is utilized by 156 law enforcement agencies here in New York State. Transcript at 20, 23, 31.
. Transcript at 31.
. Transcript at 33.
. Transcript at 39-43.
. Transcript at 32-33. Absent those documents, the trooper enters the information manually.
. Transcript at 44-46.
. Transcript at 47-49, 77.
. Transcript at 87. The TEACX administrator is the only person able to alter information at that point. Id.
. Transcript at 82.
. Two flow charts were entered into evidence showing the electronic trail of a simplified information. The New York State Police (NYSP) substation computer transmits the informations and depositions entered by each trooper to a NYSP secure network. From their central computer it is then made available to the New York Statewide Police Information Network (NYSPIN), a secure network. From the NYSPIN it is transferred to a secure state repository or gateway server. From there it is made available to OCA and DMV secure networks, DCJS and the Department of Transportation database. The OCA network then makes the simplified informations and supporting depositions available to the courts.
. See generally 15 NYCRR part 91 — Uniform Traffic Ticket.
. See Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 207, 215.
. 15 NYCRR 91.21 (c).
. CPL 100.40 (2).
. Compare People v Smith, 258 AD2d 245, 250 (4th Dept 1999) (preprinted seal and signature on blank DMV abstracts provide insufficient authentication), lv denied 94 NY2d 829 (1999).
. 15 NYCRR 91.18; see also 15 NYCRR 91.11 (a).
. Lieutenant Casper testified that the only computer generated depositions with electronic signatures used by the State Police at that time were filed in speeding cases. Since depositions filed in conjunction with simplified informations must by law be verified, such electronically presigned depositions may be juris (fictionally invalid.
. 2005 NY Senate Bill S 4022.
. 15 NYCRR 91.21.
. The notice regarding failure to appear would seem to be especially important to prosecutors in light of recent rulings regarding proving knowledge of license suspension in aggravated unlicensed operation cases. See People v Pacer, 21 AD3d 192 (4th Dept 2005).
. The Lieutenant was asked:
“Is there any reason that you know, given your background in technology, why you couldn’t create the program that says ‘okay, we validated everything first round, everything is correct, now, Trooper, either you’re going to sign it or decide that you’re not going to sign the ticket.’ Any reason you couldn’t do it at that point?”
He replied, “No sir. No reason at all.” Transcript at 54.
. See the language quoted in n 19, supra at 204.
. See CPL 100.30 (1) (d).
. See CPL 100.30 (1) (a), (b), (c), (e).
. The motions filed and the court’s oral decision encompassed a number of issues; this written decision, however, addresses only the sufficiency of the e-tickets charging DWI.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.