Best v. State
Opinion of the Court
The claimant presents a claim against the state alleging that his intestate was injured on June 15,1919, through the negligence of the state, from which injuries the intestate died, and which negligence the claimant asserts was caused by certain defects in a state highway while under the patrol
On the trial both claimant and the state consented that the court view the location where the accident occurred, and further consented that such view should be had in the presence of the attorneys for the claimant and in the presence of the engineers of the state. Pursuant to such consent and under the provisions of section 268.of the Code of Civil Procedure the court viewed the highway and the land surrounding and the conditions existing at the place of the accident.
The intestate was a boy of about seven years of age living with his parents at Philmont, N. Y. On the day in question he was a passenger on an auto bus which carried passengers between Hudson and Philmont, Columbia county, N. Y. At that time the bus was traveling from Hudson to Philmont going in a westerly direction, and while approaching Mellenville, and a few feet east of the place of the accident the steering gear of the bus broke and the driver of the bus could not guide or control it.
At this point the highway was eighteen feet in width, substantially straight and level, running east and west. Further west from the place of the accident there was a slight curve towards the north, the beginning of which was oyer one hundred feet westerly from the place where the accident occurred. At the beginning of this curve the land adjoining on each side of the road was substantially level with the road, and up to that point the road was straight and level. The highway had fourteen feet of macadam surface, and on each side of this macadam surface there was four feet of dirt surface. The dirt part of the road wore away from use, and to prevent an abrupt shoulder and to make it safe for travel the state from time to time placed gravel on the dirt road to bring the surface of
When the steering gear of the bus broke the driver of the bus lost control of it so that it could not be guided." He applied both his foot and emergency brakes, but the momentum carried the bus along for some distance, and while so moving his left front wheel ran on the hard surface of the macadam road and the right wheel ran on the loose gravel part of the road, and this deflected the course of the bus toward the north edge of the road. It continued its course very slowly, and when it got to the edge of the road had almost stopped, but still had momentum sufficient to bring the right front wheel over the edge of the road, and at that moment the bus overturned and dropped to the bottom of the embankment in the field adjoining. In going down it struck the top of the retaining wall and tore some of it out. The intestate was caught between the top of the seat in the bus and the bottom of the embankment, and was so injured that within a short time after the injury the child died from the effects thereof. The claimant asserts that the state road at the point of the accident was defective because the state had placed loose gravel on the side of the road and failed to erect a guard or barrier along the north side or edge thereof; and that by reason of these defects the accident occurred from which the deceased received his injuries which caused his death.
The state asserts that the deceased was guilty of
It was not negligence for the state to place loose gravel on the surface of the dirt road for the purpose of bringing it up to the level of the macadam. It could not permit the dirt roadway adjoining the macadam road to wear down so as to make an abrupt shoulder as this would make it dangerous for ordinary travel and we do not think it was negligence for the state to fail to roll or pack this gravel down as no amount of packing or rolling would prevent a heavy vehicle from cutting into it.
Originally there was no liability on the part of the town for any defects in its highways and under the common law the commissioner of highways or officers exercising similar function were held liable for damages if they failed in their duty in keeping highways reasonably safe for public travel when they had sufficient funds to repair such highways.
'The legislature by section 74, chapter 30 of the Laws of 1909 made towns liable for damages sustained by reason of defects in highways sustained by persons traveling over such highways and which statute creating such liability reads as follows: “ Every town shall be liable for all damages to persons or property sustained by reason of any defect in its highways or bridges, existing because of the neglect of any town superintendent of such town.”
Primarily the state is not liable for negligence and
By section 176 of the Highway Law, being chapter 30 of the Laws of 1909, and amendments thereto, the state assumed liability for defects in its highways where the state highway was under the patrol system and the statute assuming such liability reads as follows: “ The state shall not be liable for damages suffered by any person from defects in state and county highways, except such highways as are maintained by the state by the patrol system, but the liability for such damages shall otherwise remain as now provided by law, notwithstanding the construction or improvement and maintenance of such highways by the state under this chapter. ’ ’
■Section 74, chapter 30 of the Laws of 1909, being the Highway Law, wherein the town was made liable for damages, created liability only where injury was caused by reason of defects in its highway and the state when it assumed liability by an enactment through the legislature assumed such liability only for defects in its highways under the patrol system, so that in each case in giving a right of action the legislature predicated the right to recover upon defects in the highway; and it must be assumed that when the state, through its legislature, assumed liability and used the word “ defect ” in the statute, that this language was to receive the same interpretation and construction as had been given to the word li defect ” by judicial interpretation and construction of the act holding town? liable for Refects • of highways. Tho
There can also be no question that when two causes combine to produce injury to a traveler upon a highway both of which are in their nature proximate, the one being a palpable defect in the highway and the other some occurrence for which neither party is responsible, the defendant is liable provided the injury would not have been sustained but for such defect. Bing v. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83; Sweet v. Perkins, 196 id. 482; Thompson v. Town of Bath, 142 App. Div. 331.
But before this rule is applicable to this case it must be established that the state was guilty of negligence by permitting defects to exist in its highway. We have examined many authorities where, under the statute holding the towns liable for defects, towns were held liable for failure
This rule was followed in Lane v. Town of Hancock, 142 N. Y. 510; Coney v. Town of Gilboa, 55 App. Div. 111.
In the case on trial the roadway was twenty-two feet in width. It was perfectly straight for a long distance, was substantially level with the lands adjoining on one side and with an embankment of about twelve feet at the deepest point on the other side, and as the state can only be held liable where the same state of facts
There are many authorities in this state which hold where the conditions are similar to those in the case on trial and where an emergency occurred which caused an accident, that such condition was not a defect and it was further held that it was not negligence on the part of its commissioner to fail to erect barriers at such places.
It has recently been decided by the Appellate Division, third department, where the circumstances were the same as they are in this case where the plaintiff was driving an automobile truck upon an improved macadam highway, smooth and level for twenty feet in width, and the automobile locked wheels with a passing buggy, and in doing so the automobile turned at right angles to the road and went head over the embankment, that the commissioner of highways was not negligent in failing to erect barriers at a location of this kind. And it was further held that he was under no duty to anticipate such an emergency. Dorrer v. Town of Callicoon, 183 App. Div. 186.
Under the former rule where the commissioner was liable, and after the enactment of the statute making the town liable for defects in the highway, it has frequently been held that the town was not an insurer of the safety of persons traveling upon the highway, but was only required to use ordinary prudence and care; and the commissioner and town were held to the sensible rule which required them to exercise ordinary care, and at no time was the commissioner expected to anticipate some unusual and unforeseen
We do not think that the fact that there was loose gravel on the dirt part of this road, placed there by the state, was anything which would call upon a commissioner if he had charge of the road to anticipate danger by reason thereof. It was a part of the duty of the state to make that portion of the road safe for travel and not allow it to wear down, and in doing this the state was not negligent in failing to anticipate the emergency that occurred at the time of the accident in this case. The authorities cited hold that the conditions as they existed at the time of the accident to the claimant were not a defect. The claim of the claimant should, therefore, be dismissed.
Ackersok, P. J., concurs.
'Claim dismissed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.