Schwandt v. State
Opinion of the Court
The instant claim flows from claimant’s arrest on or about July 15, 1999 by the Niskayuna Police Department allegedly based upon a bench warrant issued by the Troy City Court for failing to pay a fíne. Claimant alleges the warrant should have been vacated or recalled upon her payment of a fine to the Troy City Court on April 14, 1998. Following her transfer from the Niskayuna Police Department to the Troy Police Department, claimant was brought before a judge of the Troy City Court on the morning of July 16, 1999. According to claimant, the judge dismissed the charges and apologized to her (verified claim, U 21). By decision and order dated December 14, 2001, the court granted claimant permission to late file a claim for the alleged negligence of the defendant in not recalling or vacating the warrant.
The court conducted a bifurcated trial and this decision addresses only the issue of liability.
At the start of the trial, the parties entered into stipulations which provided the core facts giving rise to this claim.
On February 12, 1996, claimant was issued tickets by Troy Police for passing a red light (Troy City Code § 28-7) and for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [2]) and arrested. On April 18, 1997, claimant entered a guilty plea to a reduced charge and was fined $200 with a $25 surcharge and was given until September 1, 1997 to pay the amount due. The amount due was not paid; consequently, on March 12, 1998, an arrest warrant was issued by Troy City Court. On April 14, 1998, claimant paid the fine to the Troy City Court and the warrant was to be cancelled. However, the warrant was not cancelled on the NYSPIN (New York State Police Information Network). Diane Hulett, Chief Clerk of the Troy City Court, accepted the payment from claimant on April 14, 1998 and her initials (DAH) appear on the computerized receipt. Deputy Clerk Eugenia Robillard marked the arrest warrant “cancel paid in full 4/98” followed by her initials “ERR.” The Niskayuna Police Department arrested claimant on the warrant on July 15, 1999 at approximately 11:30 p.m. and transported her to the Troy Police Department where claimant was placed in a holding cell at 12:30 a.m. on
Claimant called to testify Diane Hulett, Chief Clerk of the Troy City Court since 1989, and Eugenia Robillard, Deputy Chief Clerk for the city courts located within the Third Judicial District. She was assigned to all city courts in the Third Judicial District since 1988. Finally, claimant called to testify Sergeant William F. Wade a 30-year employee of the Troy City Police Department and long time supervisor of the record section. The court personnel testified to their customary procedures for issuance and cancellation of warrants and their actions regarding claimant’s warrant. Sergeant Wade testified to Troy Police Department procedures for receiving and cancelling a warrant from Troy City Court, the operation of the NYSPIN computer and the processing of claimant on July 16, 1999.
Diane Hulett testified that approximately three times a year, the clerk’s office reviews its files and, using a computer generated form, prints warrants
Hulett had no personal recollection of the transaction involving claimant, although from the records she was able to ascertain that she accepted the payment. Hulett testified that the copy of the warrant (exhibit 7) in the court file indicated that it came from the police department as it had the police department’s warrant identifier number on it and Hulett surmised that at the time the warrant was initially issued, the clerk’s office had failed to make a copy for its file. Hulett’s “only explanation”
On cross-examination Hulett, after reviewing claimant’s docket card, reiterated that as far as the court was concerned the warrant was cancelled upon payment. As clerk, she had no authority over the Troy Police Department or what information was entered into the NYSPIN computer.
Eugenia Robillard also testified that she had no personal recollection of the events surrounding the cancellation of claimant’s warrant but acknowledged that it was her handwriting and initials on the cancelled warrant (exhibit 7). Robillard agreed that it was her responsibility to put the cancelled warrant in the basket and court file. As deputy chief clerk assigned to all the city courts in the Third Judicial District (which included, inter alia, Cohoes, Albany, Watervliet, Hudson) Robillard testified that the courts had different procedures for vacating warrants and that to her recollection, OCA did not issue procedures to follow when vacating warrants.
Sergeant William F. Wade testified that as record room supervisor the NYSPIN computer was under his auspices and explained that there is a NYSPIN officer who must use a code to access the computer. NYSPIN is used by police officers to run
Wade worked the midnight tour as desk sergeant on the night claimant was arrested. He testified, based upon review of the documentary evidence relating to claimant, that the warrant affecting claimant had not been cancelled by April 20, 1998. The copy of the warrant in his file did not contain any writing upon it indicating that it had been cancelled and to his knowledge the police department had not received a warrant marked cancelled (exhibit 7). He explained that the copy produced by the clerk’s office (exhibit 7) came from the police department as it contained the warrant number and year (281-98) which was placed upon the warrant when received and logged by the police department. Wade stated the warrant was not removed from NYSPIN “most likely because we were not notified ... by police court.”
It is settled that liability may flow from the negligence of nonjudicial employees in performing their ministerial duties (see Marx v State of New York, 169 AD2d 642 [1991] [housing court clerks lost file and failed to alert marshal; petition of dispossession dismissed]; Ostrowski v State of New York, 186 Misc 2d 890 [2001] [court clerk failed to note payment of fine resulting in improper arrest, strip search and confinement]; see also Boland v State of New York, 218 AD2d 235, 244 [1996] [there is ample authority for imposing liability upon the State based upon the negligent performance of a ministerial act]) and, as this court has held, from the State’s transmission of inaccurate information to police agencies (see Sankara v State of New York, Ct Cl, Claim No. 102035, Motion No. M-63054; [unreported decision, Sise, J.], June 13, 2001).
Defendant argues that the instant acts of the Troy City Police Court Clerks are cloaked with either judicial immunity or quasi-judicial immunity (defendant’s brief at 7) as such acts were “an integral part of the judicial process” (Weiner v State of New York, 273 AD2d 95, 98 [2000]). In Weiner, relied upon by defendant, the Appellate Division, after concluding the claim was precluded as a matter of law based upon Family Court Act § 216-c, offered that the actions of the clerk in assisting in the preparation of the petition constituted the processing of legal proceedings, which is generally viewed as “quasi-judicial” and therefore immune from suit. Here, however, the acts of the clerks were not the preparation of judicial process — for example the preparation of the warrant itself — rather, the at issue act was the transmittal of the already recorded cancellation to the police department. The judicial decision-making process had ended leaving the clerks with the ministerial duty to transmit information about a concluded proceeding to ensure an individual’s liberty would not be jeopardized. The transmittal of information, or the failure to do so, on these facts is not an integral
The testimony of the court personnel and police officer is credible and facially, as pointed out by defendant, would appear to lead to the conclusion that either party was responsible for the failure of the warrant to be recalled based upon their respective standard procedures. Such a result, as correctly noted by defendant would result in claimant having failed to sustain her burden of proof and the claim necessarily would be dismissed. However, the court finds that responsibility for claimant’s arrest on the warrant lies with the Troy City Police Court. Notwithstanding the presumption of regularity relied upon by defendant (see Gardam & Son v Batterson, 198 NY 175 [1910]; Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 3-120 [11th ed]), certain irregularities lead the court to find that the cancelled warrant was not transmitted to the police department for removal from the NYSPIN computer (A & B Serv. Sta. v State of New York, 50 AD2d 973, 974 [1975], lv denied 39 NY2d 709 [1976] [question of whether the letter was properly mailed would become, at most, an evidentiary question]). In the first instance, the regular procedure was not followed on April 14, 1998 as the person who accepted payment of the fine did not cancel the warrant. This deviation from the procedure was necessitated by another irregularity — the absence of a copy of the warrant in the court’s file as evidenced by the police department’s notations on the cancelled warrant produced by the police court. Morever, the court finds it more than curious that the warrant cancellation is merely dated “4/98” and does not bear a specific day as well. In the court’s view, a properly and timely cancelled warrant would bear the day of cancellation and not just the month. All of the foregoing is exacerbated by the failure of the court system to have a standard procedure in place in the city police courts for transmitting cancellation information to the police department. Given the liberty interest at stake, a uniform procedure with, at a minimum, a log to indicate that a cancelled warrant was placed into the police basket, would enable the courts to affirmatively establish its duty was discharged, and insulate the defendant from liability.
Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that claimant has established by a preponderance of the credible evidence that defendant owed a duty to claimant to transmit the warrant cancel
Let interlocutory judgment be entered accordingly.
All motions not previously ruled upon are denied.
. The parties also stipulated into evidence exhibits 1-14.
. The warrants were alternately called “bench” or “arrest” warrants. The court will simply refer to them as warrants.
. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from the court’s notes or the audio recording of the proceedings.
. The term “police court” is interchangeable with the term “city court” as used throughout this decision.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.