Moneypenny v. Sixth Avenue Railroad
Opinion of the Court
The first question is, whether the penal act of 1857 applies to city railroads incorporated under the general act of 1850, but whose fare for the transportation of passengers was fixed or regulated by contract with the city authorities, who bestowed the grant, and which contract has been confirmed by the legislature of 1854.
• The act of 1857, by its very terms, refers only to other than city companies. In Chase v. New York Central R. R. Co., (26 N. Y. Rep. 526,) the court say: “ The statute of 1857 has reference to statutes in which the rate for carrying passengers is fixed and allowed,” not to exceed two cents per mile, and has no reference whatever to city roads. Indeed, the language of the act shows that it could not have been intended to refer to companies whose fare was
The act was never intended to apply to a city railroad company, who are carriers of passengers only; this is manifest from the language of the statute, which provides, that every corporation formed under it shall have power “ to regulate the time and manner in which passengers and property shall be transported, and the compensation to be paid therefor; but such compensation for any passenger and his ordinary baggage shall not exceed three cents per rnile. It would, therefore, be impossible to apply it to a city railroad. The railroads of the interior have stations at fixed points, from and to Which, the fare is computable, and at which passengers get in and out of the cars. With our city roads a passenger gets on and off at all points; he pays his six cents and rides wherever he pleases. Moreover, if the act of 1857 had any application to city roads, these defendants might use “ steam,” (§§ 5, 7, 28,) and demand an extra five cents from passengers not purchasing tickets. (§ 87.) Suck companies are also obliged to erect'fences along their entire route, (§56,) and may take all the real property they require for the purposes of their business (a depot, for instance,) and acquire the legal title against the will of the owner. (§§ 13, 15, 32.) It is clear, therefore, that the general railroad act is not to be stretched beyond its reasonable application.
But while the act of 1854 ratified and sanctioned the agreement made between these defendants and the common council, and thus took the subject of fare out of the general statute of 1850, it did not make the fare fixed by that agreement a matter of statutory enactment; it did not make the fare “ allowed by law ” in the language of the penal act of 1857; it was still a fare regulated by contract. The act confirming the contract says nothing about fare; it leaves that as found and provided for, in the resolutions and contract between the city and the company. It made valid, if you please, a voidable contract, and gave legislative sanction to all its provisions, that of fare included. It follows, from all that has been said, that the fare of these defendants is regulated, not by the act of 1850, as claimed by the complaint in this action, but by the agreement with the city corporation; and it equally follows that the act of 1857 has no application to these defendants; therefore the penalties claimed in this action cannot be enforced.
There is an exception taken by the defendants to the
The remaining question, submitted without argument, was, whether, under the circumstances, these defendants had a right to receive the extra cent from passengers. Compacts, by whomsoever entered into, should be kept; that individuals and companies are equally bound by them is evident; but it is also evident that if one party performs not his part, the other is released from the performance of his. That proposition no one can dispute. Justice, right and reason require it, and the law of nature commands it-. Extraordinary occasions may now and then occur in which, perhaps, the happiness of a people may be better promoted by acting for a moment in opposition to a law than by strict observance of it. Here 'an occasion did arise. A crisis, it would seem, that could not be avoided. Although the interests of this company were but a mite, as it were, in the great drama enacted, yet they were drawn into its vortex, suffered by its effects; had to do as all other corporations did in the emergency, sustain -themselves as best they could. The calamities of a civil war broke upon the country; its people and territory were for a time divided; foreign nations looked upon that division as final and permanent, and asking credit abroad under the circumstances, was simply preposterous. Something had to be done, to save our institutions. A scheme was therefore adopted, and although it upset, in the minds of some, many of the old notions of statesmen and constitutional lawyers, it was a complete success; for it carried a people through the most fearful ordeal that ever a nation was subjected to, without their being dependent on any other power for the credit of a single shilling. I will say here that the scheme resorted
At the time this company received its grant, there was nothing but specie received as fare, and upon such a basis they obligated themselves to build the road for the accommodation of the public. In the necessity of the moment, the general government passsed laws creating paper currency, the effect of which was to withdraw coin as a circulating medium, and to make it an article of merchandise only, and to substitute the new currency; the five cents which the company charter enabled them to levy from passengers, was enhanced in value to twice that sum in paper; the consequence was that passengers declined to pay in coin, and this company, when they saw they could not obtain pay in that form, advanced their demand to six cents in paper.
How, this may have been done, if you please, to save the company from bankruptcy, but it was also to enable them to run their cars so as to accommodate our rapidly growing community. Under the circumstances, they were justified in the course they pursued.
In the ordinance conferring this grant, there is a promise required of the company to carry passengers for a certain price, and the consideration for that promise was that the grantees could levy five cents, in coin, from each passenger so carried, and I cannot find in the papers before me, that they violated that promise by refusing to receive the fare in specie; on the contrary, it appears that the public, under the pressure of the moment, compelled this company to receive in payment, instead of five cents in coin, to which they were entitled, a paper currency that was not equivalent at any time to the original fares fixed in their charter.
In this case I shall he plain, So that all can unnderstand, and there may be no bickering and breaches of the peace between the employees of companies and the passengers, until this question is disposed of in the court of last resort. I hold,
1st. That when the company secured its charter it was with the tacit understanding they could charge five cents in specie, that being the lawful currency then.
2d. That an extraordinary crisis arose compelling the government to issue a paper currency which enhanced the ' value of the original fare, and that they were justified in advancing one cent when paid in paper.
3d. That the law of congress, passed 1864, (Statutes at Large, Thirty-eighth Congress, p. 485,) justifies the companies in adding the additional cent to the fares, even if the paper currency had not depreciated the original fare, and that passengers are bound, if they wish to ride in these cars, to pay such additional cent.
4th. That the penal act of 1857 does not apply to city railroad companies, and that by operation of law the penalty sought for here cannot be recovered. Judgment must, therefore, be entered for the defendants, overruling the demurrer, with costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.