Gossler v. Lau
Opinion of the Court
The complaint sets forth that plaintiffs John Berenberg Gossler & Co., of Hamburg and Schulz & Ruckgaber of New York, for their common advantage, are engaged in business. That in February, 1890, they opened a credit for defendants, J. H. Lau & Co., of New York, to be availed of by Braun & Bloem, of Dusseldorf, Germany. Braun & Bloem are manufacturers of blasting caps, and sell goods to defendants. These are paid for by plaintiffs’ accepting and paying the manufacturers’ drafts accompanied by invoices and bills of lading. Defendants agreed to provide, previous to the maturity of said drafts, sufficient funds to meet the same, with a commission of one per cent.
Furthermore, all goods shipped, and the proceeds thereof, the bills of lading and the marine insurance (which defendants expressly agreed to secure) were pledged with plaintiffs as collateral security, with power to dispose of them at their discretion.
The defendants finally expressly guaranteed that any bills of lading and invoices accompanying drafts would be genuine and that they would represent actual shipments.
Braun & Bloem made a shipment, drew a draft for some marks—13,000—which was accompanied by an
The counter-claim pleaded, aided by the previous allegations of the answer to which it refers, alleges in substance : (1) That the drafts or bills to be drawn in pursuance of the credit were to be accompanied by the usual bill of lading showing the shipment of such merchandise to the amount drawn upon such credits. (2) That, according to the tenor and true intent and meaning of the agreement, the plaintiffs were not required to, and were not authorized to, accept any draft or bill of exchange on account of the defendants, or under said credit, except such bills as should be accompanied by an invoice and the usual and ordinary bill of lading, showing the shipment of the merchandise for the purchase price of which the bill of exchange was given, in the usual and ordinary manner, and without any qualification as to the mode of shipment, and without any limit of the usual liability of carriers -under bills of lading. (3) That, for several years prior to the opening of the credit referred to, the defendants had received numerous similar credits which had been used for the purchase of blasting caps from Braun & Bloem, which had been invariably shipped to defendants by a clean and unqualified bill of lading, which, in every case, accompanied the drafts which were accepted in pursuance of said letter of credit, and plaintiffs well knew that Braun & Bloem had no right or authority to receive for any shipment of blasting caps, any bill of lading stating the shipment to be made on deck or at shippers’ risk. (4) That on the 10th of April. 1890, defendants purchased of Braun & Bloem 40 cases of blasting caps to be shipped from Hamburg
The demurrer was upon three grounds: 1st, That the counter-claim does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 2d. That it is not a counterclaim of the character mentioned in section 501 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in that it is not a cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint, as the foundation of plaintiffs’ claim, or connected with the subject of the action. 3d. That the counter-claim is not of the character specified in said section 501, in that it does not appear to be an action on contract other than that set forth in the complaint and existing at the commencement of the action.
The demurrer was sustained at special term. The appeal is from the interlocutory judgment entered thereon.
Construing all the allegations of the answer as favorably to the defendants as the rules permit, the answer merely shows that the plaintiffs should not have advanced their money on the draft without first obtaining clean bills of lading, without any qualification whatever. The plaintiffs were not the shippers of the goods, did not obtain the bills of lading from the carrier, but from Braun & Bloem, from whom the defendants received the goods. The plaintiffs were not the agents of the defendants, in the sense that imposed on them the duty of seeing to the manner of shipment of the goods or to the phraseology of the bills of lading, or of communicating to the defendants the mode of shipment or contents of said bills of lading.
All these and such like things were matter of concern between Braun & Bloem, on the one hand, and the de
Sedgwick, Ch. J., and Freedman, J., concurred.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.