Beckles v. City of New York

Beckles v City of New York 2025 NY Slip Op 31987(U) June 4, 2025 Supreme Court, Kings County Docket Number: Index No. 515874/2022 Judge: Leon Ruchelsman Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication.

FILED: KINGS COUNTY CLERK 06/04/2025 01:11 PM INDEX NO. 515874/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 170 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/04/2025

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OFi<INGS ----------------------~ -------·-------------------~ ------~ -----.x JOHN BECKLES andJAMES PANZO, Plaintiffs; Index#: 515874/2022 -against Decision and Order THE CITYOF NEW YORK and PASQUALE PETRILLO, Defendants -------· -----·------ ·------· -- ·-- .------- ·---------------· . ---------x Motion Seq. #5, #6, & #7 PRESENT: HON. LEON RUCHELSMAN

Motion #5, was brought by the defendant Pasqµale Petrillo ("Petrillo"). Based oh defendant's PetriUo's claim that he is no longer: a party to this case; P.etrillo moves for an Order: {1} pursuant to CPLR § 5015 vacatingthe Court's Compliance Conference Order dated September 17; 2024, Which was issued on default of defendant Petrillo, and (2), scheduling a new Compliance Conference to be held between plaintiffs and defendant The City of New York (the ''City") only.

Motion #6Was also brought by defendant Petrillo: (l) for an order pursuant to CPLR § 2221 grantihg defendant Petrillo, permission to reargue the plaintiffs' Motion to Strike (NYSCEF motion #3) and defendant, City's Motion to Compel (NYSCEF motion #4), both of which resulted in the Order of this Court, dated September 25, 2024, and (2) upon reconsideration and reargument, reversing or modifying the said Order, dated September25, 2024, so as to remove any directive·requiri ng Petrillo to comply with the discovery demands niade to. defendah.t Petrillo~ Finally, Motion#7, is a motion by the defendantCityfor an Order: (1)pursuanttoCPLR § 3124, compelling defendant Petdllo to respond to the City's discovery dema.hds dated

March 29, 2024; and (2) pursuant to CPLR § 3124, compeUing defendant Petrillo, to appear fora deposition by a date certain.

These three motions all turn on the same basic question: under the circumstances described hereinbelow, does defendant Petrillo continue to be a party to this case, with the concomitant obligations of a partyto respondto discovery demands, or is Petrillo no longer a partyto this case, and notrequired to respond to discovery demands made to him in the mistaken beUefthcit heis a party.

Plair1tiffs,JohnBeckles and James Panza, commenced this action seeking to recover money damages for alleged bodily injuries sustained by plaintiffs stemming from a motor vehicle incident involving Petrillo whichallegedlyoccurred in December, 2021. The plaintiffs claim thEit Petrillo was driving a moto:r vehicle that allegedly injured thefll. The plaintiffs were employees of non-party New York City Transit Authority. The plaintiffs sued the City and Petrillo claiming that they were negligent.

Defendant Petrillo states that after the commencementof the case he settled the case with the plaihtiffs in 2022: that each of the· plaintiffs were paid $25,000, that in consideration of such payments each of the plaintiffs executed a Release in favor of the defendant Petrillo (NYSCEF .document #117 at pages 68-69h. and that plaintiffs· executed a Stipulation of Discontinuance as f.igainstPetrillo.(alone) (NYSCEF document#18).

Subsequently, on 9/17/2024, a Compliance Conference was held, and inasmuch as no one appeared on behalf of defendant Petrillo, an Order (NYSCEF document #105, #106) was issued on defa u Lt of defendant Petrillo, and Which, among other matte rs, required the deposition of Petrillo, as well as directing defe ndarit Petrillo to comply with Various discovery demands.

Ori 9/25/2024, in ruling on two moti.oris {motions #3 and .#4) an Order was made (NYSC EF document# 107), which confirmed thatall parties in this case were to com plyi/v'.ith the 8/17/2024 Comp l.i a nee Co rife re.nee. 0 rd er..

Defendant Petrillo argues that given that . he has received . the Releases . .. and. the .

Stipulation of Discontinuance, he should no longer be deemed a party to this case, should not be required to continue to participate in the case, and at any rate, should not be required to respond to discovery requests. Accordingly, Petrillo brought two motions [viz., #5 (for vacatur), and #6 (to renew/reargue)lseeking to be relieved of the obligations to cornplywith dlscovsry demands required by the above-mentioned Orders.

Defendant Petrillo relies on the provisions of the New York Consolidated Laws, General Obligations Law GOB§ 15-TOB, which states (in part) that: Release or covenant not to sue fa) Effect of release of or covenant not to sue tortfeasors. When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is given to one of two or more persons liable or claimed to be liable in tort for the same injury, or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms expressly so provide, butit reduces the claim of the releaser against the other tortfeasors to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration pa id for it, or in the amount of the released tortfeasor's equitable share of the damages under article fourteen ofthe civ1l practice law and rules, whichever isthe greatest. (b) Release of tortfeasor. A release given in good faith by the injured person to one tortfeasor as provided in subdivision (a) relieves himfrom liabilitytoany other person for contribution as provided in article fourteen of the civil practice law and rules.

(c) Waiver of contribution, A tortfeasor who has obtained his own release from liability ·shalt not be entitled to contribution from any other person ..

Petrillo argues that inasmuch as he has received the plaintiffs' Releases, and plaintiffs executed a Stipulation of Discontinuance in his favor; not only is he released from any further Jiability to plaintiffs, but that Urider GOB§ 15-1 OB(b) quoted above; even his co- defendant the City, can have no claim against hin, either. The case has thus been discontinued ai:i against him.

The City disagrees. The City points outthat in its Answer (NYSCEF document#20)it set forth various cross•c.laims against defendant Petrillo, and that th.e Stipulation of Discontinuance signed by plaintiffs and Petrillo should not preclude ttie City's cross¥claims against Petrillo. The City argues that under GPLR § 3217, a Stipulation of Discontinue nee can

The City concedes that because of the Releases and the Stipulation of Discontinuance, under GOB §15-108, the City cannot seek contribution from Petrillo.

However, the City argues, the said statute does not, by its language, foreclose seeking indemnification (actual or implied) from Petrillo. The City's cross-claim against co~ defendant Petrillo demands "... cdhtributioh on the basis of their equitable shares of responsibility, or for indemnity on the basis of a contract between them, actual or implied". (NYSCEF document# 20) The case law supports the City's position on this point. Thus, e.g., the Appellate Division has stated that; While General Oh_Ugatiq.r1__,,~-..J._aw__§ 1.§.~lOJ\ provides that \A/here, as here, one alleged tortfeasor has obtained a release in good faith from the plaintiffs, that defendant is relieved from liability to any other party for contribution (see .G.ru1_gJJ1l~Obj_ig~_tto.n~ Law_§ 15_-::1_013.), the law does not preclude claims based on _i ndemn ificati on (see Glas_er_y-EQltulJ.Qfi_:_of Vle.s1b.U(_ll_C.or12.....-1_LM:.Y2.d_Jt43"'··6.4.$_,_ §24..N£zct_,4_13.,._5.29 NYS2~ 59Jl9Jl8.])

Lui v. Town of E. Ham p..toJ:i, 117 A. D~3d 689 (2d Dept, 2014)

Defendant Petrillo has submitted an affidavit by an attorney representing Petrillo which claims that there is no actual indemnification agreement between the City and Petrillo, ahd that there is also no basis fora claim that Petrillo has an implied (or common law) iridemnification obligationtothe City. However, the attorney's affidavitis riot probative on this issue. It requires factual evidence (which may, to be sure., incl.ude affidavits) to E!Stablish that there is no .actual indemnification agreement between. the defendants~ and that t_here is no relationship between the defendants (or any otherbasis)thatwould give rise to an impliedJndemnification claim.

Accordingly, the Court rules that defendant Petrillo continues to be a party to this case at least to the extent that it must comply with all appropriate discovery demands.

Thus, with respect to motion #5, the Court denies defendant Petrillo's motion to vacate the discovery order, except that the defendant Petrillo's time to comply with the outstanding discovery demands contained in said 9/17/2024 Order is deemed to be extended so that Petrillo shall have sixty (60) days from the date of this Order to comply.

With respect to Motion #6, the defendant Petrillo's motion to reargue or renew, is granted, but upon such reconsideration, the Court adheres to its original dec ision contained in the Order dated 9/25/2024.

With respect to Motion #7, the defendant City's motion is granted to the extent that the parties shall (in good faith cooperate to) set a date certain for a deposition of the defendant Petrillo.

SO ORDERED.

ENTER.

DATED: June 4, 2025 Brooklyn, New York Hon. Leo Ruchelsman, J.S.C.