New York Supreme Court, 1856

Erben v. Lorillard

Erben v. Lorillard
New York Supreme Court · Decided September 8, 1856 · Clerke, Roosevelt
23 Barb. 82; 1856 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 141

Counsel

H. Smales, for the plaintiff., C. W. Sandford, for the defandant.

Erben v. Lorillard

Opinion of the Court

Clerke, J.

This is a motion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence. All the questions were clearly and directly submitted to the jury by the judge, viz. as to the performance of the services, and as to the value of those services. Although the compensation which they have allowed was large, they were much more capable than we can be, of correctly ascertaining the value of the services rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant. It would be mere speculation, on our part, to suppose that they took the expected lease into consideration in measuring the compensation, particularly when the judge expressly told them that they could not resort to the lease to determine the value of the services.” There is certainly nothing in the case to induce us to say that the jury clearly and palpably decided against the weight of evidence. And under no other circumstances can I ever consent to set aside the verdict of a jury.

Davies, J., concurred.

*87[New York General Term, September 8, 1856.

Dissenting Opinion

Roosevelt, J., (dissenting.)

The alleged contract, not in writing, to give a lease for a term of years, if made, was void by the statute of frauds. On this point there is no dispute. And yet the jury, in effect, have declared it valid and given damages for its breach. This they had no legal power to do ; and their verdict consequently, being against law, should not be allowed to stand.

As to any claim on the ground of the supposed value of the plaintiff’s services, independently of the alleged express agreement, it is a sufficient answer to it to say, in the language of one of the points made on his behalf, that the plaintiff is not a land broker, and was not employed to negotiate the purchase of the land in question for a pecuniary compensation.

There was no contract, as it seems to me from the whole evidence, verbal or written, made or intended to be made. There was not even an understanding. The utmost that can be said is that there was a misunderstanding. The plaintiff on his part bound himself to nothing, and it is equally clear that the defendant (whatever the plaintiff may have supposed) bound himself to nothing. There was a talk no doubt—perhaps several of them—there was precisely that kind of intercommunication from which disputes so often arise and against which (as matters of suit at law) the statute was intended to guard both the public and the parties.

The verdict is against law and evidence, and the order made at special term, setting it aside, and directing a new trial, should be affirmed.

Order appealed from reversed, and new trial denied.

Roosevelt, Davies and Clerke, Justices.]

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