Linsey v. Ferguson
Opinion of the Court
The note upon which this action was brought, was deposited as an escrow, to be delivered only on the performance of certain conditions, and was obtained upon a statement made by the plaintiff, which was untrue, that he liad procured the release, and acquired the title to one-eiglith of -the land according to the contract. Under ordinary eir
In Wheaton v. Barker (14 Barb., 594), it was decided, that a party who would disaffirm a fraudulent contract must act promptly, upon discovering the fraud, and he must return, or offer to return, whatever he has received upon it. He must rescind the contract in toto, and thus place the party in the position he was before the sale.
In Lewis v. McMillen (41 Barb., 420), it was decided, that before a purchaser can set up as a defence to an action on a note given as collateral security for an installment of the purchase-money, the inability of the vendor to give a good title to a portion of the premises, he must surrender the possession of the premises. In this case, the vendor could not convey a perfect title to one-fifth of the premises, and the court held, that although it might afford a reason for rescinding the contract by the purchaser, yet it furnished no ground for refusing all payment without rescinding; that the purchaser would be compelled either to affirm or disaffirm, and rescind in toto ; and that it could not be pretended, that the purchaser had rescinded so long as he held possession under the con
The principle established by these cases covers the present case, and the last case cited expressly decides the point here involved. I think it is controlling, and disposes of the question now raised. The defendant, by remaining in possession, and exercising acts of ownership over the property, has waived the performance of the conditions precedent, and is now estopped from insisting, that they should be enforced before the delivery of the note. (Sweetman v. Prince, 26 N. Y., 224, 227, 230; Tompkins v. Wyatt, 28 N. Y., 347; see also Masson v. Bovet, 1 Den., 69; Lamerson v. Marvin, 8 Barb., 9.) It follows, that there was no error in refusing the defendant’s motion for a nonsuit.-
As the testimony, as to the release of the verdict, the quitclaim deed from Ferguson, and wife, to the plaintiff, and the warranty deed from plaintiff, and wife, to the defendants, could have no bearing upon the question involved, and could not effect the final decision of the case, there was no error in its introduction.
The receipt introduced in evidence was not a technical release, which discharged the joint debtors. (See 5 Barb., 455, and cases cited.)
There was no error upon the trial, and the judgment must be affirmed with costs.
Jugdment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.