Stiner v. Stiner

The only ground upon which it can be held that a party obtaining a conveyance-or lease of land may be compelled to hold the same as trustee for another, is where such party stood in a confidential relation" to the other, and has used such relation to his own advantage. Wherever confidence exists, or is reposed, and one party has it in his power to sacrifice the interest of the party he is bound to protect, he will not be permitted to hold any advantage that he may have obtained personal to himself, to the injury of him to whom he owed a duty or trust. In such a case equity will compel him to give to the party injured the benefit he has obtained, even if no fraud is shown. But where no fraud is shown, in fact, and no relation exists between the parties in which either party owes a duty to the other, and no breach of trust or confidence is shown, then whatever advantage one man may gain over the other by a sharp bargain, or an over-bidding of another, cannot be interfered with.

If fraud was practiced in this case on Hasbrouck, the landlord, he might in equity have set aside the contract, *667but no such right accrued to the plaintiff, from the fact that he wanted the lease in question, which the defendant obtained; even though he concealed the fact, that he did not represent the plaintiff in his negotiations. The defendants owed the plaintiffs no duty, the plaintiffs had acquired no right to the lease, and between them there was no relation of confidence, which could create the obligations that arise from such trusts.

In fact there was no right on the part of the plaintiff to the lease, either from Hasbrouck or the defendant. He had no claim to it, in any view of the case, and there is no principle of equity which would allow the court to adjudge the defendant to stand in the relation of trustee to the plaintiff.

As to the facts on which the plaintiffs allege fraud to have existed, as proved on their part, the defendants have given evidence denying such fraud, and it became a question for the decision of the court, whether any such fraud had been committed. "Upon this point, the finding of the court is that the defendant did not intentionally or fraudulently divert the lease from the plaintiffs; nor did he know, prior to its execution, that the landlord meant it to be a lease to the plaintiffs; nor did he in any way fraudulently suppress the truth, in the premises. This finding is conclusive upon the question. 8

The exceptions as to the questions put to the witnesses, whether the defendant did acts to induce them to believe that he was the plaintiff, are not well taken. That inquiry was nothing more than to ask whether they did so believe from conduct which had been previously given in evidence; and a similar question to the defendant, whether he intended to personate the plaintiff, was admissible as to his intent. What he did do was fully in evidence, and inquiries as to the effect of these acts were not erroneous.

There is no good reason for interfering with the judgment appealed from.

I know of no principle of equitable jurisprudence under which the plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment, in this action. The plaintiffs never-had any legal right to a lease from the owners of the premises. ¡No terms of lease were ever agreed upon between the plaintiffs and the lessors. ¡No term, no rent; no covenant of any kind; no promise for a lease at all. There was simply an expression of a willingness to take a lease if the parties to it could agree. The owners were at full liberty, so far as any evidence in the case discloses, to refuse a lease to the plaintiffs. There was no payment. There was no absolute promise. There was no writing. There was no promise by the plaintiffs to take a lease. As far as the lessors are concerned, they were never obliged to execute a lease to the plaintiffs. "What, then, has the defendant Stiner said or done which gives the plaintiffs a right which they did not have at the execution of the lease? The Stiners were not friendly—were business rivals, and in the same business. The defendant Stiner did not represent the plaintiffs; told them he was doing business for himself; knew the premises, and would hire them. If he knew that the plaintiffs were willing to accept a lease on the same terms as were granted to him, he was under no legal obligation to refuse the lease. He told no lie. He suppressed no truth. He falsely personated no one. He did not represent himself as acting for any one but himself. The lessors were at full liberty to contract. He has taken nothing which the plaintiffs had a right to. He has taken nothing by any means which legally makes him a trustee for the plaintiffs. Assuming that the owners were mistaken in the defendant Stiner, that fact gives no right to either the plaintiffs or the owners to annul the lease, if the mistake was not produced by the defendant Stiner. That he did not cause the mistake, if there was one, is found by the court, and the finding is fully sustained by the evidence. Joseph Stiner is there*669fore without fault, in law. He is entitled to his lease, and this judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

It was error to allow the witness Solomon Henriques to answer the question whether Joseph Stiner “ assumed to personate the plaintiffs or either -of-them,” in his interviews with the landlords. It called for an opinion upon what Joseph Stiner did, instead of requiring the witness to detail what was said and done, leaving to the court to deduce the conclusion. And as the inquiry bore pointedly upon an important branch of the case, namely, circumstances tending to show whether a fraud had or had not been perpetrated by Joseph, we cannot say that the error was of such a character that it could not “have produced injustice in the general result;” and it is only when that can be said, that an erroneous ruling on the trial of a cause on the equity side of the court can be disregarded. (Forrest v. Forrest, 25 N. Y. 512.) The question to Joseph Stiner himself, whether “he personated” the plaintiffs may be upheld as calling for a fact, and a fact attributed to the witness himself; but the question to Henriques goes much further, and calls upon him to decide upon the point whether what occurred amounted to a personation of the plaintiffs. That was for the court, not for a witness to determine.

But I am not disposed to let my objection to this judgment rest upon a mere question of evidence. I want to put it plainly and distinctly upon the broad ground that the act of which Joseph Stiner was guilty was unholy in the law, and that no matter how adroitly it may have been accomplished, a court of equity, condemning it as a fraud, will treat him as a trustee1 of the property for the benefit of, and oblige him to transfer it to the plaintiffs. This is a principle of equity jurisprudence so well understood and recognized, that not only is it not necessary to cite authorities to support it, but it was not attempted to be disputed *670by the learned counsel who argued for the respondents. Indeed that distinguished gentleman, as might have been expected from one whose views of right and wrong are so accurate, did not hesitate to say that if the evidence on the trial led to the same result, as to the facts, which I reached upon the affidavits when the motion to dissolve the injunction was argued before me, the law as I laid it down in in the brief opinion I then pronounced, was unquestionably correct. I want no better authority in support of my law, and I shall proceed to show that upon the case as developed on the trial at the special term, the facts bring this matter directly within the principles I have mentioned.

The judge, at special term, has found that the lease was executed and delivered to Joseph Stiner under the belief on the part of the lessors that it was to and for the benefit of the person or persons on whose behalf one of the plaintiffs had called upon them at Hewburg, and the contrary thereof was not discovered by the landlords for some time thereafter. It is plain, therefore, that by mistake of the landlords the defendant Stiner has obtained what was designed for the plaintiffs; and if he has in any degree misled the landlords into the belief that in giving that lease to him they were doing the same thing as if they were dealing directly with the plaintiffs, then no matter how cunning the artifice to which he resorted, nor how little he did or said to produce that impression, if he did anything for that purpose it was a fraud, and he cannot be permitted to keep the fruits of it, if the plaintiffs elect to treat him as their trustee.

It was not necessary that he should say that he was a member of the plaintiffs’ firm. A shrewd man, bent upon getting an advantage like that which Joseph Stiner has taken of these plaintiffs, would undoubtedly avoid announcing, in so many words, that he was perpetrating a fraud. He would very likely say, as he claims he did, that he was not a member of the plaintiffs’ firm, but did *671business on Ms own account; but the question is, did he not say something else which led to the mistake of which he seeks to reap the benefit ? That he did, and that everything else which has been testified to or found in this case is consistent with the fact that his other statement, to which I shall presently allude, misled the landlords, I think I can easily demonstrate.

When Messrs. Eoe and Hasbrouck came to this city, they happened accidentally to call at a store of the defendant Stiner, which adjoined the one kept by the plaintiffs. They were in fact in search of the plaintiffs. When they saw Joseph Stiner, he was informed that he was not the person who had called upon Mr. Hasbrouck at Hewburg. How, that anybody can believe that Joseph Stiner, with that information, and with what transpired at that interview, did not know that his next door neighbors were the persons that had called upon Mr. Hasbrouck, and whom his visitors then sought, is incredible; and whether or not the law called upon him to tell them so, common honesty, as I have before remarked in this case, certainly did. But still, if he did nothing to deceive, perhaps his crime was not cognizable in a human tribunal. It is not necessary to say. But what did he do ? He told them that he was not the person that called upon them at Hewburg, “but that they could do the business with him.” What matters it that he did not personate one of the plaintiffs ? What matters it that he told the landlords he was in business on his own account, when at the same time—when admonished that he was not the individual they expected to see—he says, nevertheless, you can do the business with me. Was it not as much as to say, though I tell you I am in business on my own account; though I do not tell you that I am one of the persons who have called upon you ; yet I do tell you that you can do the business with me. And is that not as much as to say, it is just the same whether you see them or me ? That is why, though Jo*672seph Stiner did not personate one of the plaintiffs, the intelligent landlords who dealt with him were misled into the belief that the plaintiffs were getting the lease. Except for that statement, “yon can do the business with me,” can any one believe that the Messrs. Roe and Hasbrouck, in the face of the fact that Joseph Stiner did not personate one of the plaintiffs, and informed them that he did business on his own account, could have been misled into the belief that they were giving, as the judge has found, a lease to and for the benefit of the person or persons on whose behalf one of the plaintiffs had called upon them at Rewburg. Of "course Joseph Stiner did not say, I am “Jacob Stiner” or “ Mr. Moses” or one of the firm of Jacob Stiner & Co., but he said “ that makes no difference, you can do the business with me.” By that assertion he misled the landlords into giving to him a lease, believing it was being given to or for the benefit of the plaintiffs. By that assertion he misled the landlords into the belief that he was acting for the benefit of the plaintiff's; and having through that obtained this lease, his attempt to retain it is a fraud which a court of equity should not uphold.

The judgment below should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.

Judgment affirmed.

Ingraham, P. J., and Geo. G. Barnard, and Cardozo, Justices.]