Douglas v. Douglas
Opinion of the Court
In actions for limited divorce it is a matter of discretion, not of course, whether alimony shall be allowed. It should appear, from an examination of the proofs submitted, that there is a meritorious cause of action and a reasonable probability of the plaintiff’s success (Hollerman v. Hollerman, 1 Barb., 64; Bissell v. Bissell, Id., 430; Solomon v. Solomon, 28 How. Pr., 218; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 19 Id., 537; Boubon v. Boubon, 3 Robt., 715).
This application is marked by a decided conflict of evidence as to nearly all the charges on which the plaintiff’s case rests, and thus too much doubt is created of her ultimate success. It is well known, it is true, to our profession and to the judiciary, that a trial upon affidavits is very unsatisfactory, but the authorities cited show, and such is the general practice observed on motions of its kind in actions like this, that a quasi trial takes place. I yield to precedent and authority without expressing my views as to the propriety of distinctions on this subject between suits for divorce a -vinculo and a mensa et thora. When in addition to the doubt, however, it appears that the plaintiff has an income of her own sufficient for her support, although not in the style in which her own and her husband’s estate would secure, the duty to refuse an allowance pendente lite with proper regard to the rule which must govern is apparent.
I do not, however, entertain the same opinion in reference to the counsel fee. The case presented by the plaintiff is prima facie sufficient, and it may be arnpli
It being evident; that this will be a close litigation, I think the sum named for the object designated, should be one thousand dollars.
Ordered accordingly.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.