Bain v. Brown
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff’s testator, James Bain, was, in April, 1867, and for several years prior to that time, the owner in fee of two lots, and buildings thereon, in Fifth street, in the city of New York, and, also, of certain leasehold property on the same street, comprising three other lots and buildings thereon; and he continued to own the same until the 16th April, 1867, when a contract to sell the property to John Ludlow was executed.
The testator was a resident of Philadelphia; and the defendant was engaged in the business of a real estate broker in the city of New York. For some time anterior to the contract the defendant acted as the agent of the testator in respect of the property, had the care and management of the same, and collected and paid over to the testator the rents of the premises.
According to this testimony Bain could not have received the contract and returned to Hew York with it, so as to have signed it in Hew York earlier than the seventeenth or
The defendant denies that he told Frankenheim on the nineteenth of April that he had sold the property to Ludlow, and he denies that he told him he had sold the property for $25,000; but, giving the defendant the benefit of these denials, he does not deny the sale to Frankenheim & Kellner for $26,000, as stated by them; nor that the bargain with them was made on the nineteenth, and the contract executed on the twenty-second of April.
It appears that, on the same twenty-second of April, an assignment was made to the defendant by John Ludlow of his contract; and thereafter, on the 7th day of May, 1867, the defendant wrote to Bain stating that Mr. Ludlow had sold his purchase of the Fifth street property to a couple of Germans, Frankenheim and Ki'llner," that they wished to repair the property and did not like to do much until the title was passed ; and in that letter the defendant also uses this language: “ They therefore propose to take title before
The very statement of the facts of this case carries with it a cogent argument against the defendant. In his letter to Bain of the 7th of May, 1867, he treats Frankenheim and Kiliner as in privity with Bain, and says : “ Ludlow has sold his purchase to a couple of Germans, Frankenheim and Iíillner; they propose to take title before the first of June, and pay you the money due you.” There was no suggestion then that defendant had purchased Ludlow’s contract for himself, nor that the defendant was to receive payment for himself from Frankenheim and Killner; nor that the defendant, as principal, was to settle with Bain on the terms of the. Ludlow contract. The defendant was an agent of Bain in respect of the sale of the property ; and, having undertaken to act for him in the matter, could not act in the same matter for himself until his agency ceased. This principle is conceded by the counsel for the defendant, but he contends it has no application to this case for the reason that the agency of the defendant ceased on the execution of the contract with Ludlow.
But the facts of the case negative this assumption. The defendant himself did not act towards Bain nor write to him in such a way as that Bain could have understood the
It is clear that the defendant had a duty to perform, as the agent of Bain during all this time, in respect of the sale of the property, which duty had not terminated when he attempted to act for himself. His employer was entitled to all his skill and service touching the 'sale of the property, and to the benefit of any bargains he could make respecting it, as well as any advantages growing out of the agency. The defendant all the time, up to the execution of the deed by Bain, stood in such a relation of confidence to him as to impose upon the defendant the utmost degree of good faith ■ and fair conduct. “ Nemo potest in rem suam, auotor esse, gui negotia aliena geruntB There was a duty of fidelity to the confidence which Bain had reposed in the defendant, that was inconsistent with his becoming a purchaser and seller of the property for himself. The law delivers him from temptation in such a ease, and will not sanction a breach of the confidence which the defendant, has voluntarily assumed. Were the law otherwise, the door would be open .to much injustice; for the principal, without warning or notice of the change of relation of his agent, would not himself exercise the vigilance necessary to protect his interests. In such a case it is not necessary to inquire whether or not the agent was actuated by any fraudulent purpose. His fiduciary relation prevents him from assuming to himself any advantages of bargains touching the subject of his agency. (Conkey v. Bond, 36 N. Y., 427; Gardner v. Ogden, 22 id., 327.)
We think the judgment entered on the report of the referee should be affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.