Williamson v. Mayor of New York City
Opinion of the Court
The evidence in this case failed wholly to show that the petitioner was the owner of the lands affected by the assessment, at the time of filing his petition. Within the ruling of this court, In the Matter of the Petition of Phillips,
The court below treated the petition, containing the objection upon which its decision was based, as regularly before it. It did not appear that any prejudice had arisen from the fact that the copy served on the corporation counsel did not contain that objection. If it had appeared that further notice was necessary, the court would doubtless have ordered a corrected copy to have been served, and postponed the hearing for that purpose. We think the irregularity in the copy served cannot be urged on this appeal.
The Special Term made its order upon the ground that the sewers, for which the assessment was made, were not constructed in conformity to the “ general plan ” devised and adopted by the Croton aqueduct board for the sewerage of the particular district. The plan provided for but one sewer in Seventy-second street,
To ascertain the true construction of the act of 1865, its several provisions are to be read together. The prohibition of the eighth section must be considered in connection with the provisions of the fourth section, which declares the general plans to be “ subject to such modifications as may become necessary i/n consequence of alterations made in the grade of any street or a/uenue or part thereof in said dñst/rict, or otherwise.” The eighth section is to be read as though it inhibited constructions otherwise than in accordance with the general plan of the district, as affected by the modifications allowed by the fourth section. If this be not so, then the slightest variation in the location, course, size, grade, or depth below present surface or established grades of streets, all of which under the second section of the act are to be shown upon
When we consider the nature of the subject-matter of the law — the sewerage and drainage of a great city, by works to be constructed under ground, upon the efficiency of which must largely depend the health and well being of a great population—it can hardly be thought that the legislature meant to provide for plans and maps which should be so absolute and arbitrary in their character, that no sewer or drain could be lawfully constructed that did not, in all details and particulars, rigidly adhere to the exact indications of the plans and maps. Hence, the fourth section of the act provides for and authorizes such modifications in the sewerage (and not in the general plans) as the exigencies suggested therein may require. While “ the general plan ” is to be maintained, the special necessities that demand modifications in the work may be respected. There is no provision in the act that the modifications permitted by the fourth section shall be made to appear on the general plans or maps, or that new plans and maps showing them shall be filed; nor does there appear to be anything to prevent the proper department to provide for the modifications in and by the contracts that may be made, and indicate them in 'the plans and maps that may accompany such contracts. Where this appears to have been done in good faith and without fraud on the part of the contracting board, it should be presumed to have been rightly done, until the contrary is shown. In this case no evidence was given, except of the bare facts, that in a portion of Seventy-second street, in which the general plan showed one sewer in the center of the street, the contract was for the construction of two smaller ones on the sides of the street. Whether there was or was not such occasion for this “ modification ” in that particular part of Seventy-second street, was left altogether to conjecture. The court below presumed, in the absence of evidence, that the alteration was not made by the board, by a proper decision, at a regular meeting. This was shifting the burden of proof upon the city in a case where it belonged to the petitioner, and depriving the corporation of the benefit of presumptions which the law makes in its favor where the acts of public officers are sought to be annulled to its injury. The proceeding, it is not to be forgotten,
The act of 1872 is broad enough, we think, to cover and cure the irregularity complained of. The Croton aqueduct board, certainly, by their contract and the plans connected therewith made, approved the changes in the sewerage of Seventy-second street. At most, it can only be said or presumed, in the absence of evidence, that they omitted to do this in the more formal manner of a regular meeting to decide that the changes should be made, and to prepare and file a plan or map thereof. That this was an “ omission,” within the seventh section of the act of 1872,
Daniels and Barbett, JJ., concurred.
Ordered accordingly.
2 Hun, 212.
Laws of 1858, chap, 388, and Laws of 1874, chap. 313; Townsend v. Goelet, 11 Abb. Pr., 187.
Chap. 381, of the Laws of 1865.
Chap. 580, Laws of 1872.
In the Matter of Phillips; In the Matter of Keteltas; and see Opinion of Robinson, J., in Astor v. The City, in pamphlet.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.