Randell v. Van Ellert
Opinion of the Court
The section on which the difficulty arises, producing this application, requires the insertion in the referee’s deed of the names of all the persons whose title the referee’s deed proposes to convey.
The provision it seems to me impossible to comply with, as in law the sale conveys the title of all parties or persons, and all title which may have passed unto parties whose conveyances and liens have not been recorded. Should such names be left out in a deed naming the parties, it might be held their interests were not conveyed. Where, under the circumstances, it is impossible to perform the act required, the referee is discharged from doing it. The ordinary deed, it seems to me, is the proper one.
From this decision the purchaser brings this appeal.
The orders were made1 relieving the referee from the obligation of stating, in his deeds, whose title and interest in the land had been sold by him, because, in the language contained in them, it seemed impossible for the referee to give such deeds as the law required, and also comply with the new provisions contained upon this subject in the Code of Civil Procedure. Why this impossibility should be supposed to exist seems to be no farther indicated than it can be gathered from the provisions of the preceding statute, declaring the effect which the deed should have that might
The fact that the deed upon a foreclosure sale shall be attended with this effect, cannot disable the officer making the sale from also stating in it whose right, title and interest in the property has in fact been sold by him. Both provisions, and all the requirements made by each of them, are entirely consistent and may be wholly as well as conveniently observed. But if they could not be, that would not result in the nullity of the last provision enacted.
That is never the effect of inconsistent legislation. But the last enactment made is observed and executed, while that preceding it is regarded as repealed. The last expressed intention of the legislature is always the one to be enforced where it conflicts with others previously declared. For that reason, if the statutes could not both be enforced the provision made by the Code would be the one that, at the present time, would be obligatory. But, in fact, there is no conflict whatever in the laws upon this subject. The preceding statute requires nothing whatever to be stated in the deed upon the foreclosure sale inconsistent with this provision of the Code. And the declaration of the effect of the deed in no way prevents a statement from being made, showing whose right, title and interest has been sold. In effect, that would be the title of the mortgagor at the time of the execu
Davis, J., concurs.
Dissenting Opinion
I do not discover points on the part of the defendants, or any of them. The controversy seems to be between the referee and the purchaser, the plaintiff. The section of th°e Code considered is very, broad and leaves, perhaps, little room -for doubt, but its application must depend upon the decree. The deed should follow that, and the referee should not be required to determine whose interest was sold. If the decree is general so should be the deed, and if any other rule be adopted it should rest upon the decree, which should be required to state the interest in detail. The decree not being before us, I assume the order made was right.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.