People v. Gorham
Opinion of the Court
The prisoner, jointly with Warriner and Bowdish, was indicted for burglary in entering the stable of Shattuck and stealing a horse-brush, on the night of June fifteenth or sixteenth. He was tried separately. On the trial, Warriner, an alleged accomplice, was the principal witness for the people. His testimony tended to show that, on the afternoon of the sixteenth, he and Bowdish, with the prisoner’s consent, agreed to commit some robbery; and,
The prisoner denies all of this testimony. The principal question on this appeal is as to the admission of the testimony of Fanny Wood. She testified, under objection by the prisoner, that, on the night in question, Warriner came to her house and asked her to stay at homo; that she did not say much about it, and asked where he was going; that he told her he was going to Smithville Flatts with Bowdish, using language which implied that their pui-pose was robbery; neither the prisoner nor Bowdish were present.
Again, she testified under like objection, that on that same night, between two and four a. m., Warriner came to her house; and she asked him what made him so bloody; he said he was hurt, and asked her to get water to wash his head; she did so, and asked him where the injury occurred; he answered, “ down belowhere,” and said that the prisoner and Bowdish were with him. Neither of them were present. The prisoner’s counsel asked the court to charge that the jury should not take Fanny Wood’s testimony into consideration, as to where they were going that night. The court declined. The court spoke of her as a corroborating witness, and left the question of her credibility to the jury, to which
The counsel for the people insists that the evidence was proper, first, on the ground that Fanny Wood was a confederate in the conspiracy. * I do not see that this is proved as a matter of fact. There is nothing to show that the request to stay at home was consented to; nothing to show that if it had been consented to, it would have had anything to do with the plan for robbing. It was not proposed that the goods should be brought to her house. The relations between her and Warriner explain the request that she should stay at home. She told him that, if he went with Bowdish, she hoped. he would be caught.
I find no evidence in the case showing that she was a confederate. Again, it is insisted that this evidence was admissible, on the ground that Warriner, the prisoner, and Bowdish were confederates and conspirators. The prisoner’s counsel urges, on the other hand, that there is no evidence of a conspiracy to commit the act for which the prisoner is indicted, and that all of which there is any evidence is of a conspiracy to commit another crime, which was afterwards abandoned. And further, even if the proof of conspiracy pointed to this very crime, the prisoner’s counsel insists that the evidence was not admissible. “The evidence of what is said or done by the other conspirators must be. limited to their acts and declarations made and done while the conspiracy was pending, and in furtherance of their design; what was said or done by them before or afterwards not being within the principle of admissibility.” (3 Greenl. Ev., § 94.) Mr. Greenleaf properly says that this is the same principle of identity that governs in regard to the acts and admissions of agents when offered in evidence against their principal. And the rule in the case of agents, is that the declarations must constitute part oí a transaction in which the agent represents his principal. It must characterize the act of the agent. (White v. Miller, 71 N. Y., 118.)
Now there is nothing to show that the statement made by Warriner to Fanny Wood in the evening, was made in furtherance of the design. It was a mere statement of his own intention to commit a crime with Bowdish. And so after the alleged crime
The counsel for the people urge that the evidence was admissible, because on some subsequent days, as is claimed, the conspirators were trying to conceal the crime. But the difficulty is that this 'statement of Warriner’s was no part of the committing or of the concealing the crime. (People v. Davis, 56 N. Y., 102; Kelley v. People, 55 N. Y., 565.)
As Warriner had already testified to the fact that the prisoner was present at Shattuck’s, the proof of his unsworn statement to the same effect would probably not have been of much consequence, if it had not been made important by the charge. The learned judge spoke of Fanny Wood as a corroborating witness, and at the request of the counsel for the people charged that where an accomplice is corroborated as to material points, his evidence becomes entitled to consideration and weight with the jury. It is evident, therefore, that the evidence of Fanny Wood was intended as a corroboration of the accomplice Warriner. But proof of these statements of Warriner were no corroboration of his testimony.
“ The corroboration of an accomplice ought to be as to some fact or facts, the truth or falsehood of which go to prove or disprove the
Being of the opinion, then, that this evidence of Warriner’s statements was inadmissible and prejudiced the prisoner, without examining the other questions presented, we think that the judgment and conviction must be reversed, and the cause remanded to the Court of Sessions for a new trial.
Judgment and conviction reversed and new trial granted; case remitted to Sessions.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.