Marshall v. Lippman
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff demised to defendant Sternbergh certain premises in Ewen street, Brooklyn, for five years from 25th May, 1874. In June, 1874, Sternbergh assigned the lease to defendants Lipp-man and Shilberg, who entered into possession, and paid rent therefor in the name of Sternbergh for about three years. Sternbergh has assigned all his interest to the rents reserved by the lease to plaintiff. The plaintiff brings these actions for rent against Sternbergh, Lippman and Shilberg. The objection that the three defendants could not be joined in one action is too late. Unless such objection is taken by answer it is to be deemed waived. (Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 498, 499.) It is no answer to the
The objection that the papers were proven on the trial by proving the signature of the parties to them, by other evidence than the evidence of the subscribing witness, cannot be held error, because there was no such objection taken on the trial. By not taking this specific objection the defendants waived it. The inference is that, if taken, the subscribing witness would have been called. The question whether Levy occupied the premises in fact was immaterial, and, therefore, it was not erroneous to reject an offer to prove it. The question was whether Lippman and Shil-berg were liable. If they were, Levy was their tenant.
Judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.