Trustees of the Exempt Firemen's Benevolent Fund v. Roome
Opinion of the Court
From an early period in the history of this city and, indeed, until the establishment of the Metropolitan Fire Department, in 1865, by the legislature, the extinguishment of fires occurring here was done by volunteers, who were organized into companies and known as the firemen of the city of New York. The act of March 19, 1787, limited their number to 300, to be nominated and appointed by-the mayor and common council; and they were, by its provisions, enjoined to be ready at all times, as well by night as by day,to manage, control and use the fire engines to be provided, and were exempted from service as constables, jurors and militiamen,- and placed generally under the regulation of the city government. (1 Greenleaf’s Laws [ed. 1792], 412-414, chap. 58.)
In 1792 (chap. 9; see 2 Greenleaf’s Laws, 382) the number was increased to 450. In March, 1798, however, upon a petition of the firemen praying to be incorporated, the more effectually to enable them to provide adequate funds for the relief of disabled and injured firemen, and for the purpose of extinguishing fires, they were incorporated by the name of The Fire Department of the City of New York. The corporation thus created was authorized to receive cer
It has already appeared that the first legislation by which payments by the insurance agents were directed to be made to the treasurer of the plaintiffs’ predecessor for the benefit of the fund mentioned was the act of 1849, and the first legislation requiring such payments to be made to the present plaintiffs was the act of incorporation passed April 17, 1866, and the act under which they are now claimed is that of March 17, 1879. By the act of 1865 it was- provided that the members of the old volunteer fire department, if discharged by the new commissioners named in the act, were to be entitled to all the privileges and exemptions allowed by the laws as if they had served out the full term, and it was declared that nothing therein contained should be construed to deprive any such persons of their right to, or affect their interest in, the fund known as- the New York Fire Department Fund, or any part thereof, and
" It thus appears that irom the year 1798 down to and including
In 1854, and while the act of 1849 without amendment was still' in force, a contest arose as to the constitutionality of this act, -which imposed the payment of a certain per centage by every person who should act as an agent for individuals or associations of individuals not incorporated or authorized by the laws of this State to effect insurance against losses by fire or against marine losses and risks, and the question mooted was twice argued in the Court of Common Pleas of this city, and all the objections against the legislation which could be drawn either from the Federal or the State Constitution of 1846 were ably argued ; but they were overruled decisively and the judgment of the Common Pleas affirmed by that of the Court of Appeals (see Fire Department v. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith, 440; Fire Department v. Wright, same volume, 453), and the various acts of the legislature, subsequent to 1840 to which reference has been made, have recognized and reasserted the .constitutionality of that act.
It is urged on behalf of the defendant that the validity of the act of 1879 must depend upon the Constitution as it stands amended by the amendments adopted in 1874, which went into effect on the 1st of January, 1875, and he relies chiefly upon article 8, section 10, and upon article 3, sections 18, 20 and 21, and which are as follows :
Article Till, sec. 10: “ Neither the credit nor the money of the
Article III, sec. 18 : “The legislature shall not pass a private or local bill in any of the following cases:
“ Granting to any private corporation, association or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.”
Sec. 20. “ Every law which imposes, continues or revives a tax shall distinctly state the tax and the object to which it is to be applied. And it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such tax or object.”
Sec. 21. “ On the final passage in either house of the legislature of any act which imposes, continues or revives a tax, or creates a debt or charge, or makes, continues or revives any appropriation of public or trust money or property, or releases, discharges or commutes any claim or demand of the State, the question shall be taken by yeas and nays, which shall be duly entered upon the journals, and three-fifths of all the members elected to either house shall in all such cases be necessary to constitute a quorum therein.”
In the consideration of the question as to the liability of the defendant herein to pay the per centage provided for, it must be borne in mind that by title 21 of part 1 of chapter 20 of the Revised Statutes (1 R. S., 714), it was provided that no person, association or company of persons residing in any foreign country, and no incorporation established in a foreign country, nor any person in behalf of them or any of them shall directly or indirectly make any contract of insurance, or by way of insurance, against loss or injury by fire, upon any house, building or goods situate or being in this State; that by the second section a forfeit of $1,000 was provided for the use of the poor of the county where such illegal contracts should be made, against whoever should violate the provision referred to. And further that by section 3 it was directed that there should be paid into the treasury of the State, on the first day of February in each year, by every person who should act as agent for any indi
The tax or license fee, therefore, provided by the act of 1849, springs out of a general and not a local statute and was passed by three-fifths of the members of the legislature uniting for the purpose, and, as we have seen, was declared to be constitutional. The imposition of the license fee or tax accomplished by this act continues, this general statute never having been repealed, and the payment of it to the representatives of the old volunteer fire department has been continued by the statutes to which reference has been particularly made. This statement seems to be an answer to-the proposition that any of the provisions of the Constitution to-which reference has- been made are applicable. The act of 1879, continuing the appropriation of the tax or license fee provided for by the act of 1849, was neither a credit of the State loaned nor its money given to or in aid of any association, corporation or private undertaking, within the meaning of section 10 of article 18. The two per cent provided for is given by the act of 1849, to indigent and disabled firemen and their families, and for no other purpose, and therefore not bestowed upon any association, corporation or private undertaking.
It may be further said that the declaration contained in that section that it shall not apply to any fund or property now held or which may hereafter be held' by the State for educational purposes, embraces the fund in question, and which, by its appropriation to-disabled and indigent firemen and their families, may well be used for educational purposes amongst others.
The act of 1879, which only related to the general act of 1849, which provided that two per cent should be paid to the treasurer of the fire department fund created no new tax or burden, and was not therefore a private or local bill, and this seems to be an answer to the proposition resting upon article 3, section 18, by which the legislature are prohibited from passing a private or local bill granting to any private corporation, association or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever. And inasmuch as the tax or license fee was created by the law of 1849, under which it
The consideration of this case, which is not free from difficulty, has led to the conclusions herein stated. It must be admitted that potent arguments vigorously employed have been presented in favor •of the defendant by his learned counsel; so forcible indeed that the ■conclusions stated have been adopted with some hesitation, and with the conviction that their correctness is not free from doubt. From the general character of the statute, however, by which the obligation to pay for the privilege of insuring in the city of New York by insurance companies not incorporated by the laws of this State is ■created, its constitutionality and the fact that the plaintiffs, as the representative of what once was an administrative part of the city government, and' not a private undertaking, and employed for a meritorious purpose, have been made the recipients of the license fee or tax mentioned as a compensation for services voluntarily rendered, and which is continued for the benefit of those disabled in the service of their families and to none others, it is considered that ■the amendments to the constitution to which reference has been made were not designed to apply to any such organization or association •or class. The mischiefs which were in contemplation at the time of the adoption of such' amendments were accomplished by private legislation for special purposes, in aid of persons and corporations
The views thus expressed require that judgment should be ordered for the plaintiffs according to the statement of facts for the sum of $1,318.83, being two per cent upon the premiums received by the defendant as per his return, with interest thereon to be computed.
Daniels, J., concurred.
Judgment ordered for plaintiffs as directed in opinion.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.