People ex rel. A. Filkins Hose Co. v. Son
Opinion of the Court
The contest in this ease arises out of a disagreement as to the proper division and distribution of the funds received by the respondent, as treasurer of the fire department of the city of Amsterdam, from the agents of insurance companies, under the provisions of chapter 465 of the Laws of 1875, and the various amendments thereto. That act makes it the duty of every agent doing a fire insurance business within the limits of any city or incorporated village to annually pay to the treasurer of the fire department of such city or village $2 on every $100 of premiums received for insurance on property located in such city or village. The defendant, as such treasurer, received the sum in controversy under that law, and the relators insist that they, consisting of the various hose and hook and ladder companies of the city, shall each share that fund equally with all other engine and fire companies in that city. The statute under which this money is required to be paid to the treasurer of the fire department, or to the treasurer of the village or city when the fire department has no treasurer, does not indicate or direct how this fund shall be distributed among or be used by the fire companies, constituting the fire department of the cities or villages, to whose treasurer it is required to be paid. We must therefore look to the city or village charter, or to the authorized acts of the city government, or the fire department, for some ordinance, resolution, rule, or custom for the distribution of this fund. The answer to the alternative writ denies that all of the relators are members of, or constitute a part of, the fire department of the city of Amsterdam, and alleges that if the relators are duly incorporated, and do constitute a part of the fire department, they are not as companies to share equally in such fund with all the other fire or engine or steamer companies, and that such fund is not to be divided equally by companies, butyie?- capita, in proportion to the maximum number of men in each company, and that by regulation long es
By the charter of the village of Amsterdam (chapter 389, Laws 1854) the' trustees of the village were authorized to organize and establish a fire department. Subdivision 33, § 3, tit. 3 of the charter provides as follows: “The board of trustees are authorized to organize and establish a fire department to be composed of one or more fire, hook and ladder, bucket and hose companies-in said village, * * * and to prescribe the powers and duties of each of said companies, and of all the members thereof.” It is true that by this subdivision the maximum in each company was not to exceed 60 men, and we have not been' referred to any statutory authority conferred upon the board of trustees to increase the number in any case to 100. By chapter 582 of the-Laws of 1875 the treasurer of the fire department of the village of Amsterdam was made one of the officers of such village, and by section 3 of that act-he was authorized to collect and receive all moneys belonging to, or that may grow due to, that department, and pay the same over to the several companies composing said fire department as they shall be entitled to the-same. As there is no statute definitely defining the method of distribution of this insurance fund, and as the fire department was the creation of the-board of trustees, which, by the statute above referred to, had authority to prescribe the powers and duties of each of said companies, and all the members thereof, it was but a reasonable exercise of that power to direct the manner in which a subordinate officer of the village should distribute that fund. As we have seen, the referee finds as a fact that the board of village trustees assumed to and did exercise that power, and by resolution directed the payment of such money to the companies in proportion to their maximum mem
If we are right in our construction that the board of village trustees, under its general supervisory power of the fire department, could regulate the distribution of this fund so long as they acted in harmony with the general scope and purpose for which this money was given, which manifestly was to improve the efficiency of the various fire departments of the cities and villages of this state, then it follows that the resolution passed by that board must remain operative until the same is repealed, either by them or their successors in authority, the common council of this city. It has been held that the treasurer of the fire department should, under the directions of the trustees of the village or common council of the city, pay over all the moneys received or recovered under the first, second, and third sections of chapter 465 of the Laws of 1875, to the fire department of the city or incorporated village in which the department is located, (Trustees v. Roome, 29 Hun, 396,) and in' this case, on appeal to the court of appeals, that court, in discussing the relation which a fire department in a city or village bears to the municipality, use this language in speaking of firemen and fire companies: “Their duties were public duties; the service they rendered was a public service; their appointment comes from the common council; * * * they were liable to be removed by the authority which appointed them, and were intrusted with the care and management of the apparatus owned by the city; they are at least a public body, and perhaps are best described as a subordinate governmental agency.”
Tested by these reasons, we see no ground for holding in this case that the board of trustees of the village did not possess the power to make the order they did in relation to the distribution of these funds; and as that order has not been revoked or modified by the common council, it must be regarded as still in force, and the money should be disposed of by the defendant under its directions.
Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary to determine whether or not proceeding by mandamus was the proper remedy for the relators. The order denying the peremptory writ of mandamus, and quashing the alternative writ, must be affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. All concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.