Ernst v. Crosby
Opinion of the Court
The evidence justified the referee’s finding that the intention of both parties—lessor and lessee—in making the lease was that the premises should be used as a house of prostitution. ' The lessor, Morris, knew that the premises had been previously used by the Clarks for such purpose, and the intention was to keep them there in the same business, under cover of a lease for innocent purposes to Mowatt. It was simply a continuation of an existing device, for Mowatt was also lessee in the prior lease, and the receipts for rent (paid by the Clarks to the agent, Flanagan, during the existence of this prior lease) were given in his (Mowatt’s) name. Morris knew that Flanagan was agent for the Clarks’ landlord, whoever that landlord might be. He knew, also, on April 8, 1889, when he contracted for the purchase of the premises, that there was an existing lease thereof, which would expire on the 1st of the following month. This lease was referred to in the contract, although Mowatt’s name as lessee was not there specified. Thus, however, Morris had notice either that the Clarks themselves were such
O’BRIEN, J., concurs.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting.) This case arises out of a claim presented by the plaintiff for rent, against the estate of John Mowatt, deceased, of premises No. 154 West Thirty-Second street in the city of New York, which was disputed by the executors of said Mowatt, and, a reference having been ordered, the referee reported against the claim, upon the ground that at the time the lease in question was entered into between the lessor, one Morris, and the lessee, Mowatt, it was intended that said premises should be used as a house of prostitution; and the question presented upon this appeal is whether there is evidence sufficient to sustain this finding of the referee. It appears to be undisputed from the evidence that in 1888, 1889, and 1890 one Clark and his wife occupied the premises, and kept them as a house of prostitution; and that, on the 8th of April, 1889, Morris made a contract with the then owner of the house for the purchase of the same, which contract provided for the passing of the title on the 27th. of April, 1889, and was made subject to a lease of said premises, expiring on the 1st of May, 1889. On the 26th of April, 1889, Morris leased the premises in question to said Mowatt, by which lease it was expressly provided that the house should be used as a dwelling house only, and that the lessee should obey all lawful orders of the health department and all other departments of the city government. There is no evidence that Morris knew who the lessee mentioned in the lease expiring on the 1st of May, 1889, was. It further appears that subsequent to the lease by Morris the premises continued to be occupied by Clark and his wdfe, and used as a house of prostitution, and Morris visited the premises during this time. We have searched the record in vain for any satisfactory evidence going to show that at the time of the making of the lease Morris knew that there was any connection between the lessee, Mowatt, and the Clarks. It is true that Mrs. Clark swears that in a conversation with Mr. Werner, who was the attorney of Morris for the purpose of drawing up the papers, he said he could not make out a lease to Clark, or he would be held liable if he rented the place for that purpose; but this by no means necessarily proves that the lease was made to Mowatt as a cover for the occupation of the Clarks. It is true that Mrs. Clark swore that Morris agreed to give them a lease for five or ten years; but the evidence show that Morris refused to execute any lease to the Clar.ks, although he did execute a lease to Mowatt; and, as" has already been said, there is no evidence whatever that Morris knew anything about the connection between Mowatt and the Clarks. - Morris’ knowledge of the occupation of the premises subsequent to the execution of the lease could not invalidate the same if there is no evidence of an illegal intention at the time of the making of the lease. Great stress is laid by
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.