Bremiller v. Buffalo, R. & P. R.
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff, while attempting to cross the defendant’s tracks at a station near Ricevill, Cattaraugus county, was struck and injured by one of the defendant’s locomotives, and she brought this action to recover the damages she sustained. There was a verdict for $450. The defendant’s road at the place of the accident runs north and south, and crosses a highway which runs in an easterly and westerly direction. Four hundred and fifty feet south of this crossing was a curve and cut in defendant’s road, which obscured trains. Up to that point trains were visible to a person standing upon the highway crossing. There was a switch track westerly of the main track, extending from the highway southerly, the easterly rail of which was eight feet distant from the westerly rail of the main track. The highway crossed the railroad tracks at such an angle that along the highway the distance between these rails was about 14 feet. The station was on the easterly side of the railroad tracks and southerly of the highway. The plaintiff resided in a house on the westerly side of the railroad lands, and south of the highway. It was 65 feet from the door of her house to the center of the switch track. The plaintiff left her home on the 27th of February, 1892, to go to the station to take the train going north, due at the station at 9:50 a. m. The ground was covered with snow
“I see her when she went out of the door; and she went up and went across some cars; and some cars stood there; and went across them, and went on the railroad. I saw her when she got throwed off there, and she was right under the cars.”
Again, he said:
“I looked at her all the time. Did not take my eye off her till she got struck. I saw her struck."
In the light of this evidence it cannot with any propriety be claimed that the falling snow prevented the plaintiff from seeing the train. Kessler was standing at the end of the cars as plaintiff passed, but she did not see him. In trying to account for her not seeing him as she passed him she said:
“I did not look at him when I passed by the cars. I looked just where I want to go. When I came out of my house, he was there by them cars, around with his shovel. I cannot tell you if he was in the public road. He was doing something with his shovel by them cars that stood there. I saw him when I went out of the house. I did not look more. I did not look what he was doing there; not at all. I must have passed him when I went down to the railroad, because he works there by them cars; but I did not look at him, as I was bundled up, you know.”
Again, she said:
“My head was all bundled up.”
The plaintiff was entirely familiar with the running of the trains and with all the surroundings. She had lived for years near the station. She knew that the train was due, and was liable to arrive at any moment, for she was on her way to the depot to take it. She was, under the circumstances, called upon to be exceedingly vigilant in the use of her eyes, as she knew the wind was blowing, and that it might prevent her hearing the train. She walked from 12 to 14 feet after passing the cars upon the switch before she reached the main track, and, had she looked in the direction of the approaching train during that time, she would have seen it, unless the manner in which her head was dressed prevented it. Plaintiff was the only witness who testified that she looked in the direction of the train after she passed the cars. Her husband, who saw and carefully watched her from the time she left the house until she was struck by the engine, did not testify that he saw her look for the train. The plaintiff gave her testimony two years and more after the accident, and very likely believed she looked for the train after she passed the cars. The burden was upon plaintiff to show herself free from negligence contributing to her injuries. This we think she failed to do by a preponderance of evidence.
The judgment and order appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.
BRADLEY and DAVY, JJ., concur. WARD, J., dissents.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.