Ehrlich v. Pike
Opinion of the Court
In February, 1896, Sol Ehrlich, the plaintiff, and Annie Pike, the defendant, agreed to form a -copartnership under the name of A. Pike & Co., and entered into articles by which the plaintiff was to receive one-third and the defendant two-thirds of the profits of their future transactions. In February, 1902, though retaining her interest in that firm, the defendant embarked in another business with one Apfelbaum under the style of Pike & Apfelbaum and there, also, she secured two-thirds of the profits, leaving to Apfelbaum the remaining one-third. She then made a separate agreement with the plaintiff by which lie became entitled to one-third of her two-thirds share of the profits of Pike & Apfelbaum. That concern continued until January, 1904, when Apfelbaum retired and the defendant became the sole owner, the plaintiff acquiring a right to one-third of the profits. A year later the copartnership existing between the plaintiff and the defendant was dissolved and then disputes and differences arose in relation to an accounting. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had agreed, in consideration of plaintiff’s promise to continue to indorse notes for her accommodation, that his participation in the profits, which had accrued in the two concerns during the three years next preceding the dissolution, should be increased to one-half; and he complained that, though he had accordingly indorsed notes at her request, she refused to recognize his right to the increase. On the other hand, the defendant maintained that the original understanding had never been modified and that the plaintiff’s right to participate was limited to one-third. After ineffectual efforts to adjust or compromise their differences, the plaintiff sued for an accounting on the basis of the percentage
A very considerable part of the voluminous affidavits submitted is devoted to the rehearsal of facts bearing upon the main issue, the determination of which was confided to the arbitrators. Irrespective of the provision in the arbitration agreement that neither party “ shall have the right to appeal therefrom to any court or tribunal,” the finding of the arbitrators on the merits of the controversy is not subject to review. Even if it could be said that the award resulted
The first charge scarcely merits consideration. While it is literally true that the hearing proceeded in the absence of the defendant or her husband, it is established, apart from other evidence, hy the testimony of Erankl, the arbitrator selected by the defendant, that her husband was duly notified of the time and place of holding that session and that he declared his intention not to attend, on the ground that he did not desire to meet the plaintiff, whose testimony was to be taken on that occasion. Heither the defendant nor her husband attempts to controvert those facts, but they rest on the bare statement of their absence.
The second ground of complaint depends largely upon inference or conclusion. Hot a single instance of interruption or cross-examination is specified and the only reflection upon the defendant’s husband, by Vorhaus, occurred according to the testimony of Erankl after the hearings had been closed and at the final meeting of the arbitrators devoted exclusively to the consideration of the evidence adduced and the award to be made. The remark then made was in the course of the argument upon the merits of the controversy.
For two reasons the objection that a part of the testimony was not reduced to writing is groundless. The submission did not require the reduction of the testimony to writing;
Irrespective of the fact that a consideration of the fourth and fifth charges involves a review of the proceedings and of the method of computation adopted, those charges are refuted by the facts and circumstances disclosed. The arbitrator Holde is a public accountant. He was selected, according to Frankl’s own statement, for the express purpose of examining the books involved in the controversy and “ to save ” the other arbitrators “ that trouble.” It was, if not the express, the tacit understanding of the arbitrators and the parties that the examination of the books should be confided to Holde and that the result of such examination should be controlling. Furthermore, the opportunity to inspect was not restricted to Holde but was extended to his associates and to the parties, as the books were produced at the hearings and were not only accessible to inspection but were consulted in connection with testimony elicited. The only objection raised by Frankl relates to the refusal to give him possession of Holde’s memoranda of figures and computation. While there was a refusal to permit a removal of the memoranda there was an invitation extended and ample opportunity afforded to examine them before the award was agreed upon. This invitation was not only declined but its rejection was emphasized by Frankl’s statement that in no event would he agree to an award in favor of the plaintiff.
The remaining objection is equally without support.
The arbitrators are unanimous in the statement that at the last session, held on October 28, 1906, both the plaintiff and the defendant’s husband were asked if they intended to offer further evidence; that each replied in the negative and that thereupon the testimony was declared closed.' Frank],
This rather extended discussion may have magnified the gravity of the charges which are, however, of a frivolous nature.
At most the finality of an analysis of the facts reduces this application to an attempt to predicate misconduct and partiality upon an assumption of error in judgment. Such an assumption cannot he made the basis for a vacatur of the award. Perverse misconstruction or positive misconduct must be plainly established. Matter of Wilkins, supra.
But the defendant contends that, even if she has not shown misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, the award must be vacated for the reason that it was made on Sunday and is, therefore, void. This statement is misleading for, although the award was discussed and practically agreed upon on Sunday, it was not made, published nor delivered until the following day.
It follows that the motion must be denied, with ten dollars costs.
Motion denied, with ten dollars costa»
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.