United Traction Co. v. Monohan
Opinion of the Court
The respondent Frank Broomhead is charged with criminal contempt of court in having wilfully violated an order of this court signed by me in the above-entitled action restraining the respondent and his co-defendants from illegally operating so-called “ jitneys ” in competition with the plaintiff. The respondent was brought before me in a similar proceeding on September tenth last and at that time pleaded guilty to a violation of the same order. A fine of $100 was imposed and the respondent and a number of others who pleaded guilty at the same time were admonished by the court that a repetition of the offense would be more severely dealt with.
The court recognized the state of mind which had been permitted to prevail amongst the so-called jitney operators that even though the Appellate Division had held their acts to- be a crime, the processes of the criminal law were inadequate to punish them and that somehow they were above the law. So they continued to openly and flagrantly violate the law and held it in almost perfect contempt until it became apparent that the lawless of this section of the state were being schooled to become more lawless, the thoughtless
It thus becomes painfully evident that if justice is to be done in this community and the supremacy of the law upheld, it is the duty of this court to exercise its powers fully in that behalf. It was clear that the bold and fearless operators of jitneys must be taught that there is a remedy which is capable of reaching them without failure and without great delay. The fine promptly imposed, though moderate, was sufficient to carry this thought sharply to the minds of. the offenders.
It is the policy of the law to deal more gently with first offenses wherever possible, but the wilful renewal of the offense cannot be tolerated. It must be dealt with sternly and the charge made here against the respondent Broomhead is that he has repeated the offense at least twice since receiving punishment and kindly admonition. If guilty, it is my duty to impose a more severe penalty this time as punishment to him and as a warning to others.
Cases arise in the courts where circumstances point to the guilt of a party but where evidence of such mis- . conduct is difficult to secure except by paid witnesses. This is one of those cases. The courts “* * * must take such evidence as the nature of the case per
The witnesses for the complainant have been called private detectives by counsel for the respondent in an effort to discredit their testimony. While courts and juries have been justified on different occasions in looking with suspicion upon the evidence of private detectives, “ it has not been determined as matter of law that such evidence cannot be considered # * * but rather has declared that in the consideration of the same only such weight should be given to that class of evidence as the conscience of the judge or jurors shall determine the same entitled to receive.” Yates v. Yates, supra, 172. But even that rule has been applied to that class of persons who have held themselves out to the public -as engaged in the detective business. In this case, the complainant has utilized its own employees and the wives of its own employees who when they have disclosed the nature of their occupation by openly testifying in court can no longer continue such work. They are paid witnesses to be sure but they come within the rule which recognizes employees as mere interested witnesses. They are not in the private detective class since they do not make their regular livelihood in such business. But as interested witnesses they are classed with parties themselves and relatives of parties, such as the wife, mother and sister of the respondent Broomhead.
This does not mean that such witnesses do not tell the truth. It means that the court or jury is to determine whether or not the interest of the parties or their employees or relatives is such that they are liable, unintentionally or otherwise, to color their testimony
So in reviewing the testimony in the case, the law gives as great weight to the testimony of the complainant’s witnesses as it does to the respondent Broomhead himself or to his relatives and leaves to the court the duty to test the evidence of all of them by the usual rules as to credibility, namely, to determine from their appearance on the stand and from their whole testimony and from all the facts and circumstances, what witness is worthy of belief and what witness, if any, is unworthy of belief.
I am satisfied that the respondent Broomhead was not telling the truth. In many particulars his testimony was clearly false. He positively asserted that he had not been violating the jitney law at any time but had always charged for his car by the hour or charged according to the distance, charging one dollar and twenty-five cents to go from Cohoes to Troy whether he had one passenger or more and collected the fare from one person only. Yet he pleaded guilty to a former offense and paid his fine. And on the morning of September twenty-third when he was served with the order to appear before me to answer to the present charges, he admits that he had at least two passengers in his car that he had picked up at two different points. He says he was giving them a free ride, but while he says he didn’t know the lady and at first said he didn’t know the man, his subsequent testimony convinced me that he did. Nevertheless, the man is not brought to court to substantiate his story although he knew that the question of his treatment of the order served on him in the presence of that man had been presented to the court by the affidavit of the person who served the order.
He was able to identify on the witness stand the
He admits that he carried the process server on his running board for a considerable distance and didn’t even then stop his ear to let him get off, but threw open his door and told him to get off, that he didn’t want any of his junk, and claims that the opening of the door caused the paper to blow out of the car. Who can believe that if he thought it was only an advertisement he would not have stopped at once and certainly eventually to let the fellow off? He was not in such a hurry that he could not stop to take on the man passenger and again to take on the lady and according to his story he did it to give each of them a free ride. The fact is that he did know he ivas being served with the order when the car had stopped to take on the lady and he was fully informed as to what it was and the signature of the justice was .shown him, but he was so angered by it and by being caught taking on a passenger at the very time, that he kept Bafter on the running board of his car which he had started and didn’t stop to permit him to get off but carried him along some distance and then shouted “ get off,” slackening the speed sufficiently for the purpose.
His story of the advertisement is so- unbelievable that I cannot credit his version of how the order served on him got out of the car into the street. He says it got out when he -opened the door and told Bafter to get off. But he -did not need to open the door in order to tell him to get off as he admits the window in the door was open. Is it believable that he opened the door to force a poor innocent -advertisement peddler off the running board of his car while the car was running? He does not state that Bafter was annoying him in any way except that he handed this paper
Broomhead’s explanation of the opening of the door was necessary in order to explain how the order got in the street so that he could not be charged before me with contemptuous treatment of the order served upon him in addition to the other charges and so that he could make more plausible his pretense that he had no knowledge or information that the paper was an order of this court until Mr. Juber told him on the telephone about it on Sunday as narrated in the newspapers, as he stated on the witness stand, or “ until he was so advised on Monday the 26th instant,” as stated by him in his affidavit, another example of his imposition upon the court with false testimony.
The fact is that he did know about it, that he was conscious of his guilt as soon as he was served, which is the only reasonable explanation of his treatment of Rafter. It is the only reasonable explanation of his hasty trip to North Adams that very day and his subsequent concealment at his uncle’s home at Guilder-land Center. He says he went there to rest, which is absurd. He was there with a guilty conscience, to hide. He didn’t even let his family know he was going there or that he was there. He didn’t telephone his family but to his friend Juber to let him know where he was and that was on Sunday, he says, after he had been at Guilderland Center since Friday night.
Of course, Broomhead wanted to substantiate his affidavit in which he had said he had no knowledge or information that the order had been served on him until Monday, the twenty-sixth, but on his examination he let it slip that he had talked with Juber over the telephone and that Juber had told him about it. So I can readily believe that he was in Cohoes by Sunday night at least. Gramarche, his witness, says he heard Broomhead’s mother say he was back on Sunday. Having lied about not having any information as to the order until Monday and having lied about not being at Cohoes on Sunday, I can readily believe he was lying when he denied having made the statement credited to him by Gramarche.
I can believe, therefore, more readily that his trip to Massachusetts was a guilty flight from justice and that his unpremeditated sojourn at his uncle’s home at Guilderland Center was for concealment only. He found that he was able with the help of his family and friends to make a plausible but only half-true defense and was, therefore, persuaded to face the charge.
But he does not appear personally in court Monday, the return day set in the order. He obtains delay by imposition on the court with the false story that he
The credibility of all of his testimony is destroyed. No reliance can be placed upon any statement he has personally made. His denial of the charges made against him has no weight and if his story is to be believed in any part it must be because it is corroborated by the credible testimony of other witnesses.
Of course, the testimony of his wife, his mother and his sister is the testimony of interested witnesses. The story of the trip to Saratoga is not corroborated by any other witness. The affidavit of the two ladies who say that they rode with him on that afternoon of September seventeenth does not set forth the time of day that they claimed they rode with him. How was it that he was satisfied to have his family make affidavit accounting for only the afternoon of that day by a trip to Saratoga? Was it guilty knowledge that he had operated his jitney only in the afternoon of that day? Their supporting affidavits account for his time
They all say that they left Cohoes at one-thirty and did not get back from Saratoga until six-thirty and that they kept going all the time and did not stop even for gas and the car was running properly all the time, taking about five hours for a trip that could be made in his car in less than half that time. If they travelled only fifteen miles an hour, it would not take over four hours. If they went twenty miles an hour, it would take three hours. If they went twenty-five miles an hour, it would take about two hours and a half. If they travelled thirty miles an hour, it would take about two hours, bringing them back by half past three. Assuming that they left Cohoes at one-thirty, * it was possible to get back to Cohoes easily in time for Broomhead to operate his car as a jitney for the late afternoon rush and to have started for Troy about four o ’clock as charged by the complainant’s witnesses who say they boarded his car at Cohoes at that time and rode with him to Troy.
I am prepared to believe that the trip to Saratoga was taken but I cannot believe that they travelled at the ridiculously slow rate of twelve miles an hour. The witnesses have not been accurate as to the time when they reached home. The mother and sister may have been honestly mistaken as to the hour of return. I am prepared to give them the benefit of that doubt. I would likewise give respondent’s wife the benefit of a similar doubt if her other testimony and her bearing upon the stand had not convinced me that she was not truthful and frank but was very evidently trying to shield him as she thought it was necessary for her to do. Specifically I recall her testimony that he had never left the house any morning before about ten
Taking up the incident of September nineteenth, I can readily believe that much of the testimony of Broomhead’s witnesses is true, namely, all of the testimony which goes to show that he was cleaning and greasing his car on that day, starting about nine a. m. But that is far from proving that he was not engaged in operating his car as a jitney at seven-twenty-one- to seven-thirty that morning, as charged. Nobody attempts to account for his whereabouts that morning prior to nine o’clock. He could have reached from the garage in fifteen or twenty minutes the point where the complainant’s witnesses said they entered his car at seven-twenty-one and from the point where the complainant’s witnesses said they alighted from his car in Troy at seven-thirty he could, by a shorter route, have reached his garage in fifteen or twenty minutes. In less than fifty minutes he could have taken his car out and have returned with it to the garage and have gone home for his breakfast prior to eight o’clock.
Marsette, the vulcanizer, swore in his affidavit that he was in and out of the garage twelve to- fifteen times between seven a. m. and eight p. m., whereas on the stand he says it was six o’clock that he arrived there and that he was there continuously until twelve when he went to lunch, returning at twelve-thirty, after which he remained in the garage continuously until six, when he went out for -supper and returned in the evening. This discrepancy between his affidavit and his sworn testimony destroys his credibility and his explanation of his affidavit left him equally vulnerable. It is also significant to note that he was only occasionally occupied at vulcanizing and did not pretend to have any other occupation, yet he had bought an auto
To further discredit the testimony of both Hebert and Marsette, it appears from the testimony of Gamarohe, who was sworn on behalf of the respondent, that Gamarche for months had been getting to the garage at six-thirty in the morning and he had never seen either Hebert or Marsette there at that time. But even if Marsette was there that'morning at that time, which I do not believe, his work kept him constantly upstairs over the office and respondent could have taken out his car without his knowledge, just as it might have been taken out without the knowledge of Hebert. And the same is true of Paul Dussault, the proprietor of the garage, who says he got there about six o’clock and after moving the cars around on the floor he went to his breakfast, returning between eight and nine o’clock. He was out of the garage during the whole of the time when it was entirely possible for Broomhead to have taken out his car and after operating it as charged, to have returned with it before eight o’clock.
All three of these witnesses, Dussault, Hebert and Marsette, state that they saw Broomhead’s car in the garage when they reached the garage. I am convinced, however, that they are by no means sure of it and were giving Broomhead the benefit of the doubt or that they were lying about seeing the ear there when they said they saw it or that they were not there as early as they said they were. The cleaning of the car that day, which took all day, was a matter they could readily fix in their minds but I would be gullible indeed if I
Thus it appears that Broomhead has failed to establish an 'alibi for either of the times when he is charged with violating the injunction, and the question of his guilt or innocence rests between his own unsupported and utterly discredited testimony and that of the four witnesses of the complainant.
The- respondent’s car with its detachable winter top presented a sufficiently unusual appearance to be readily identified. The respondent is a man whose feature® could be readily remembered and identified. I am satisfied that the witnesses for the complainant could not easily be deceived as to his identity or that of his car, and unless their two charges were fabricated, no mistake could have been made by them in charging that the respondent Broomhead' was the man and his car was the car which was being operated on the two occasions in question.
I am convinced that the charges were not fabricated but were true. It is not e-ven difficult to understand
The witnesses Oliver and Dunn were the same witnesses who had obtained the proofs against him in the earlier proceeding and Broomhead pleaded guilty to their charge without even requiring them to come into court to testify. This time he ran away with a guilty conscience and returned only when he thought he could prove an alibi.
The testimony of all the complainant’s witnesses was not only credible in the light of all the facts and circumstances but the witnesses themselves, particularly Oliver and Mrs. Goddard and Mrs. Eaton, impressed me most favorably. Their testimony was straightforward and remained unshaken by cross-examination. They were calm and unaggressive in their demeanor. To accuse them of perjury in the light of their appearance, their past lives as revealed by -them, their intelligence and the failure to discredit their testimony, and to prefer to accept instead the clearly unreliable testimony of Broomhead alone, would be a denial of justice. This is my clear conviction after seeing the
I find the respondent guilty of violating the injunction on the 17th and on the 19th days of September, 1921, as charged, and direct that an order be entered adjudging him guilty of a criminal contempt of court and punishing him by imprisonment in the Albany county jail for a period of thirty days.
Ordered accordingly.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.