Gruntal v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
Opinion of the Court
Plaintiffs are a firm of stockbrokers, members of the New York Stock Exchange. Plaintiffs had as customers one Louis Katz and Cassie Lewin. In the months of April and May, 1928, they received from Katz and Lewin certain negotiable bonds which they sold and placed the proceeds of the sales to the accounts of Katz and Lewin. About ten days after the receipt by the plaintiffs of these bonds they were notified by one of the purchasers of the bonds that the bonds were stolen. Pursuant to the custom of stockbrokers the sales were made by the plaintiffs in their own names without disclosing the names of their customers.
The plaintiffs in seeking to have themselves declared the owners of the stolen bonds urge strenuously two propositions: (1) That although in selling the bonds for their customers Katz and Lewin they acted as agents, their agency was coupled with an interest; (2) that they are holders in due course of the bonds, having derived their title or right to hold said bonds by reason of their having to take them back from the persons to whom they had sold them and • that these persons purchased them for value and in good faith.
The plaintiffs in the original transactions involving the sale of the bonds on behalf of Katz and Lewin were simply acting as agents for undisclosed principals and acquired no more interest in the bonds than would any agent who sold goods for an undisclosed principal. It is now well settled that a stockbroker’s agency is governed by no special rules but only by the general principles of agency. (Crusius v. Louchheim, 132 Misc. 520.) In Leo v. McCormack (186 N. Y. 330) it was held that stockbrokers were agents for their customers and were governed by the same general rules of law as in any form of agency. As the plaintiffs were acting as agents for Katz and Lewin and as they have failed to prove that their principals were holders in due course, they are in no better position as far as claiming the bonds than would be Katz and Lewin. The plaintiffs had a naked power to sell the bonds, collect the proceeds, pay themselves a commission and remit to their principals the balance of the proceeds of the sale.
The fact that upon the discovery by the purchasers of the bonds that they were stolen and that the plaintiffs after notification of this substituted other bonds and received back the stolen ones does not in and of itself make them transferees for value. They could not by this means place themselves in a stronger position than they originally were. When they took back the bonds from the purchasers they were only acting as agents for their
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.