City of New York v. McCormick
Opinion of the Court
This is a motion to vacate an attachment obtained by the plaintiff, the city of New York, on the theory that certain moneys received by the defendant, while he was deputy city clerk, belong to the plaintiff and are being wrongfully and unlawfully withheld from the latter. The attachment was issued upon affidavits stating that the defendant had testified in hearings before the joint legislative committee to investigate the affairs of the city of New York that he had received gratuities, tips and gifts from various persons for whom he had performed marriage ceremonies as deputy city clerk. The action is brought to recover the moneys thus obtained by the defendant.
It is conceded that the fee of two dollars required by section 11-a of the Domestic Relations Law to be paid to the city clerk for
The city of New York bases its claim that the moneys received by the defendant belong to the city upon the provisions of section 1550 of the Greater New York Charter, which reads as follows:
" § 1550. No officer of the city government^ except the city marshals, shall have or receive to his own use any fees, perquisites or commissions or any percentage; but every such officer shall be paid by a fixed salary and all fees, percentages, and commissions received by any such officer shall be the property of the city. And every officer who shall receive any fees, perquisites, commissions, percentages, or other money which should be paid over to the city, shall, before he shall be entitled to receive any salary, make under oath a detailed return to the comptroller showing the amount of all such fees, commissions, percentages, perquisites and moneys received by him since the last preceding report, the person from whom received, and the reason for its payment, and shall produce the receipt of the chamberlain, showing the payment to him, by said officer, of the aggregate amount thereof. All sums received as above, or for licenses or permits, except as in this act otherwise expressly provided, shall be paid over weekly, without deduction by the officers or department receiving them, to the chamberlain, and a detailed return under oath shall at any time be made in such form as the comptroller shall prescribe, stating when and from whom, and for what use such moneys were received. No city officer who is paid a salary for his services from the city treasury shall receive to or for his own use any fees, costs, allowances, perquisites of office, commissions, percentages, or moneys paid to him in his official capacity; but all fees, costs, allowances, perquisites, commissions, percentages, and moneys so paid or received by any such officer or person, shall be the property of the city and shall be paid by him into the city treasury; and every such officer or person who shall receive any fees, perquisites, commissions, percentages, or other moneys which belong to the city, and should be so paid into the treasury, shall,
The city makes two contentions: (1) That the gratuities, tips, gifts and contributions received by the defendant are “ perquisites ” within the meaning of section 1550, and (2) that said moneys were moneys received by the defendant in his official capacity.
It is true that various definitions of the word “ perquisite ” are literally broad enough to include gratuities, gifts, tips or other voluntary contributions. Thus, “ perquisite ” has been defined as “ a gain or profit incidentally made from employment in addition to regular salary or wages, esp. one of a kind expected or promised ” (Webster New Internat. Dict.); as “ any profit or pecuniary gain from service beyond the amount fixed as salary or wages; hence, any privilege or benefit claimed as due * * * specif, in law: 1 a fee that a person in office may lawfully receive for service rendered beyond the requirements of his official duties ’ ” (Funk & Wagnall New Standard Dict, of the English Language); as “ emoluments or incidental profits attaching to an office or official position, beyond the salary or regular fees” (Black Law Dict.). (Italics the court’s.) The italicized portions of the foregoing definitions indicate, however, that the word “ perquisites ” carries with it the idea that the incumbent of the office is entitled to demand the payment from the person making it, as something pertaining to or attaching to the office. This appears to have been the view of the court in County of Lake v. Westerfield (196 Ill. App. 432, at p. 439), where a definition of “ perquisites ” as including every payment to an officer “ which comes to him as such officer ” (Italics the court’s) was approved.
In my opinion, the word “ perquisite ” in its natural meaning embraces only such moneys as the incumbent of an office is entitled to demand for performing any of the duties of the office and is not broad enough to embrace gratuities, tips, gifts or other voluntary contributions which he has no right to demand and the receipt of which depends entirely upon the good nature or kindly disposition of others. The purpose of section 1550 of the Greater New York Charter was to do away with the retention of fees and
The claim that the payments received by the defendant are the property of the city as “ moneys paid to him in his official capacity,” in my opinion, must also be disposed of adversely to the city. It is true that the moneys would not have been received by the defendant had he not occupied the office of deputy city clerk. A distinction must, however, be drawn between moneys received because the recipient occupied an office and moneys received in his official capacity. It is my view that the words “ moneys paid to * * * him in his official capacity ” refer only to funds which the officer is entitled to demand for performing any duties of his office, and that they do not include gratuities, tips, gifts or voluntary contributions. The same observations as to the purpose of the statute which have been made above in connection with the interpretation of the word “ perquisites ” are equally applicable in construing the words “ moneys paid to * * * him in his official capacity.”
The motion to vacate the attachment is granted.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.