New York Supreme Court, 1936

Levin v. Levin

Levin v. Levin
New York Supreme Court · Decided February 18, 1936 · Close
159 Misc. 230; 288 N.Y.S. 820; 1936 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1317

Counsel

B. Leo Schwarz [Gustave B. Garfield, Maurice V. Seligson and MaxL. Kane of counsel], for the plaintiff., Emil Levin [Herman A. Gray of counsel], for the defendants.

Levin v. Levin

Opinion of the Court

Close, J.

The defendants’ notice of motion is based upon the pleadings, the demand for the bill of particulars and the bills of particulars furnished. Consequently, they are not limited to the bare allegations of the complaint. (Civ. Prac. Act, § 476; Rules Civ. Prac. rule 112; Russell v. Societe Anonyme, etc., 268 N. Y. 173.) This being true, it is clear that the consideration for the alleged contract is indivisible. There is only one contract, viz., a contract to enter into a marriage that would concededly be void, as one of the parties was already legally married to another. There was no separate contract for society and companionship. Assuming this to be true, such a contract would under the circumstances here, be against public policy and, therefore, void. It is not necessary to spread the facts involved upon the record. The plaintiff’s position is untenable. Motion is granted.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.