Adams v. McKenzie
Opinion of the Court
Petitioners served as airport inspectors at Floyd Bennett Field until it was taken over by the United States Navy on May 26, 1941. At that time they were discharged and their names placed upon a preferred list in accordance with the provisions of section 31 of the Civil Service Law. In the present proceeding they claim that they are entitled to appointment to positions at LaGuardia Airport which they contend are presently occupied either by provisionals or by civil service employees working out of their titles. Four of the five petitioners are honorably-discharged World War veterans. Two of them are performing military duty at the present time and maintain that they are entitled to the difference between their civil and their military pay under section 246 of the Military Law.
At Floyd Bennett Field the operations had been in charge of airport inspectors who were jacks-of-all-trades and supervised electrical work, ground work and maintenance, traffic control, clerical work, etc. From the very first it was decided that the maintenance of the highest possible standard of safety and efficiency at LaGuardia Airport required highly trained specialists instead of men of general experience and training such as the airport inspectors employed at Floyd Bennett Field. At the time the work was thus subdivided at LaGuardia Airport no one anticipated that Floyd Bennett Field would later on be taken over by the United States Navy, leaving the airport inspectors employed at that field without positions. Had an attack upon the legality of the subdivision of the work at LaGuardia Airport been instituted at that time, through an appropriate legal proceeding, there can be little question that it would have been unsuccessful. No court would have substituted its own judgment for that of the aviation experts who devised the setup of personnel for LaGuardia Airport. There
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As the result of the setup created at LaGuardia Airport from the beginning of operations, there never was and is not presently, any position vacant there which any of the petitioners is fitted or qualified to fill. The work at LaGuardia Airport is being performed by qualified persons working under appropriate titles and chosen as the result of competitive examination. To appoint the petitioners to the positions presently filled by such persons at LaGuardia Airport would require the city authorities to establish new and unnecessary positions under the title of airport inspector or else to terminate the setup of personnel and subdivision of work which has existed at LaGuardia Airport since it came into being and to substitute therefor the setup which prevailed at Floyd Bennett Field until it was taken over by the Navy. This the petitioners may not ask the court to direct. This is not a case where work formerly performed by the petitioners has been absorbed by others junior to them after their discharge. The petitioners are unable to point to any employee at LaGuardia Airport who performs the duties formerly performed by petitioners.
Although some of the petitioners are honorably-discharged war veterans, this fact only gives them the right to be transferred to other positions which they are fitted to fill if such positions are vacant. A public official is not obliged to discharge other employees in order to open a position for a veteran. (Matter of Clancy v. Halleran, 263 N. Y. 258, 262.)
The provisions of the Military Law, relied upon by those petitioners who are in the military service, do not confer a right to the difference between their civil and military pay after their civil positions have been abolished in good faith because there is no further need for such positions.
The statute was designed to protect from impairment the standing of civil service employees because of military service. It was not intended to improve their rights over what these would have been had they performed no military service.
Although at one time there were two airport inspectors at LaGuardia Airport, one of them was in charge of seaplane operar
Although the court sympathizes with the petitioners in their present predicament, it is constrained for the reasons above indicated to deny their application. To do otherwise would be to overrule the competent city authorities in charge of airport operations as to matters peculiarly within their expert knowledge without any evidence whatsoever of bad faith on their part.
Motion denied.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.