Egan v. Moore
Opinion of the Court
This proceeding was commenced pursuant to article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to require the respondent trustees to withhold the use of publicly owned and supported
It appears that during the time the facilities in question were owned and operated by the University of Buffalo, a private institution, an invitation was extended to Herbert Aptheker, a ranking member of the Communist party, to use the facilities of that university to expound communism to the students and the public. Prior to the appearance of the speaker, that university was, on August 31,1962, merged with the State University (Education Law, § 355; see, also, L. 1962, ch. 980); title to the real property vested in the People of the State of New York and such became publicly owned and supported for higher educational purposes pursuant to section 352 of the Education Law. It is not asserted, however, that the respondent trustees assumed any contractual obligation in respect of Mr. Aptheker as a result of the merger. The State University is a corporation created within the State Education Department and “ under the board of regents ” (Education Law, § 352). Its “ planning functions ” and “ administrative functions ” are subject to the general supervision and approval of the Board of Regents (§§ 354, 355). It11 is an integral part of the government of the State ” (State Univ. of N. Y. v. Syracuse Univ., 285 App. Div. 59, 61) and as such is subject to the immediate control of the Board of Regents. The latter is the head of the University of the State of New York and of the State Education Department and is charged with the general management and supervision of all education in the State (N. Y. Const., art. V, § 4; art. XI, § 2; Education Law, §§ 101, 201, 207). In 1949 the State Legislature (L. 1949, ch. 360) declared the Communist party to be subversive and directed the Board of Regents “ to take affirmative action to meet this grave menace ’ ’. The Regents, after notice and hearing, listed as subversive the Communist party of the United States and the Communist party of New York State. Members of that party may not be employed in the State’s publicly owned and operated schools, colleges and other institutions of higher education (Education Law, § 3022; see, also, L. 1958, ch. 503; Matter of Adler v. Wilson, 203 Misc. 456, affd. 282 App. Div. 418, motion for leave to appeal denied 306 N. Y. 981; Lederman v. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 276
It is appropriate and timely to refer, also, to the 1962 “FBI Annual Report ” of John Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department of Justice, wherein Mr. Hoover (the official expert in this country on communism) reported (p. 25) that “ The international communist conspiracy, an avowed enemy of the democratic system of government, is constantly assaulting this Nation with its spies, its propaganda and its domestic adherents ”; and, of significance, in relation to the instant case, is the statement (p. 28) that “ Most successful of all its efforts was its speaking campaign, especially before college groups. From late October 1961 through May 1962, leaders of the Communist Party, U. S. A., made 48 speeches before groups of college students all across the nation. Approximately 43,000 persons heard these talks. Encouraged by the early success of college appearances the Party established a
The respondents’ own statement of policy conforms with State policy. They must go all the way, however, and comply with State policy, in toto. Administratively, the trustees cannot apply a different policy. The State is supreme “ over its creatures ” and this the trustees must acknowledge (Black Riv. Regulating Dist. v. Adirondack League Club, 307 N. Y. 475, 488; see, too, Matter of Cash v. Bates, 301 N. Y. 258, 261).
The argument has been advanced, nevertheless, in extenuation, that the undefined phrase “ academic freedom ” is justification enough for students to invite, and, faculty and trustees to approve, a speaker to use the university’s facilities to expound the doctrine of a subversive organization, If thereby it is meant to convey the implication that somehow our freedoms are involved, then the argument is rhetorical. There is no involvement of the survival of the freedoms of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, namely, freedom of speech, press and assembly. These could not be stifled “ ‘ while this Court sits ’ ” (Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 410). We should be mindful that the freedoms are dependent upon the survival of constitutional government and that for the latter to survive it must have the power to protect itself against unlawful conduct and whatever is harmful to the public welfare and interest (id. p. 394; see, too, United States v. Peace Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255, 261). The right to free expression is not unlimited, it ‘1 ceases at the point where it leads to harm to the government ” (Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223 F. 2d 531, 544, revd. and remanded on other grounds 351 U. 8. 115). What the argument expresses, in essence, is a disagreement with the policy that State-owned facilities may not be used for the purpose of expounding a subversive doctrine to a student body on campus. It is no idle comment that, lacking the setting of the State University, the Communist expounder would not be hailed as a master of intellectual stimulation and he would be unable to attract an audience across the street to hear him. The sole question in this case is whether the respondent trustees must deny the use of the State-owned facilities to Mr. Aptheker.
It has been argued, also, on behalf of the trustees, since Mr. Aptheker is not in the employ of the State, that section 3022 of the Education Law and section 105 of the Civil Service Law are inapplicable under the facts and the prohibition thereof does not apply to him. This contention overlooks the trustees’
The respondents have made the additional defense which is sufficient, they say, to call for a dismissal of the petition herein. It is that the petitioner is not an “ aggrieved party ” and has no “individual interest, personal to him”, sufficient to cause the matter of the respondents’ action or inaction to be made the subject of judicial review. The defense is not good. It was so held in Matter of United Press Assns. v. Valente (308 N. Y. 71, 95) where the court, said: “ The fact that petitioners were not parties * * * does not preclude them as members of the public from instituting this article 78 proceeding (Matter of Public Service Comm. v. Norton, supra [prohibition]; Matter of Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N. Y. 161, 168, affd. 343 U. S. 306, 309 [certiorari]) A writ of mandamus was sustained in People ex rel. Stephens v. Halsey (37 N. Y. 344, 347 [1867]) “on the relation of one, who, in common with all other citizens, is interested in having some act done, of a general public nature, devolving as a duty upon a public officer or body, who refuse to perform it ’ ’. Furthermore, where an ‘ ‘ important public question is raised ” by a citizen against a State officer and an adjudication was considered required, ‘ ‘ mandamus has been treated as the appropriate remedy” under somewhat similar circumstances in Matter of Kuhn v. Curran (183 Misc. 942, 943). The Court of Appeals, while reversing the last case on the merits (294 N. Y. 207, 213) said, nevertheless, that “In view of the importance to the public of an authoritative determination of that question at the present time, we do not pause to consider whether the question is presented in appropriate proceedings ”. (See, also, People ex rel. Stephens v. Halsey, 37 N. Y. 344, 347; People ex rel. Daley v. Rice, 129 N. Y. 449; Matter of Cash v. Bates, 301 N. Y. 258, 261; Matter of New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 286 App. Div. 760, revd. on other grounds 2 N Y 2d 677; Matter of Grand Jury Assn. v. Schweitzer, 11 A D 2d 761; People ex rel. Pumpyansky v. Keating, 168 N. Y. 390; Matter of
The respondents’ defenses are insufficient and are dismissed, there is no triable issue of material fact and the matter is remanded to the respondent Board of Trustees for further proceedings not inconsistent with the foregoing.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.