Levine v. New York Central Railroad
Opinion of the Court
This is a motion by defendants for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint. Plaintiffs cross-move for summary judgment in their favor upon the second cause of action.
The first cause of action alleges that said agreement obligated The ,Bi.g Four and, since 1930, Central, which assumed the agreement and operated the properties of Peoria in the place of The Big Four, ‘ ‘ at its own cost and expense ’ ’ to keep up and maintain said properties and the rolling stock and equipment in good working order. The cause of action alleges that for the years 1960 through 1966 defendants charged the cost of said maintenance to Peoria rather than to themselves, the total amount involved being $7,858,210. Plaintiffs seek judgment in favor of Peoria for that amount.
The second cause of action alleges that the 1890 agreement, and the extensions thereof, provide that The Big Four and Central “ shall and will indemnify and save harmless the Peoria Co. from any and all claims arising out of the operation and management ” of the Peoria properties by said defendants. It goes on to allege that during the years 1960 through 1966 defendants caused such claims to be paid by Peoria instead of by themselves. Judgment is sought in favor of Peoria for the total of such claims, viz. $1,317,061.
Under the agreement involved (the 1890 agreement), Peoria grants to The Big Four and its assigns, subject to specified mortgages, the right to use and operate two lines of railroad, one owned by Peoria and the other leased to Peoria, together with the rolling stock and equipment of Peoria. The Big Four obligates itself to use and operate said lines of trackage in such manner as to satisfy the requirements of law in the States in which the lines are located. In addition, The Big Four agrees to provide and furnish “ at its own cost and expense ” all additional rolling stock and equipment, labor and supplies necessary for that purpose, and also, “ at its own cost and expense ” to keep up and maintain the trackage and all rolling stock and equipment in good working order, and to restore and renew all parts thereof as may be necessary to that end. In addition,
In article second of the 1890 agreement, The Big Four agrees to ensure the payment of interest on all the bonds except that on certain income mortgage bonds, about to be issued and payable only out of net earnings, and further agrees to pay any taxes which Peoria might have to pay or retain from said interest.
In article third of the 1890 agreement, it is provided that The Big Four shall receive all earnings and income and deduct therefrom each year ‘ ‘ the expenses of operation and maintenance during such year, including taxes, assessments, insurance, rental and other like charges, and the cost of repairs, renewals and reasonable betterments ” to the lines of railroad ‘1 necessary for their economical and efficient operation ’ ’. The ‘ ‘ net earnings ’ ’, if any, resulting after such deduction, together with certain independent income from another source, are to be used by The Big Four to pay the interest on the bonds other than the interest on the proposed income mortgage bonds. 1 ‘ After reimbursing itself out of what shall remain of such net earnings and income of the year, not applied as aforesaid to the payment of interest, for any advances hereunder in any previous year remaining unpaid to it ” (with 6% interest), The Big Four is to apply any balance to the payment of interest on the income mortgage bonds, “ and pay over to the Peoria Co. any amount thereof finally remaining.”
Article fifth of the 1890 agreement provides that The Big Four “ shall and will look only to such future net earnings of said lines of railroad operated by it under these presents * * * as shall not be required for the payment of said interest on said .prior bonds and on said First Consolidated Mortgage Bonds * * * for the reimbursement to it of any sums it may advance in compliance with its aforesaid covenants and agreements.”
In Ewen v. Peoria & Eastern Ry. (34 F. Supp. 332) the claim was made that The Big Four and Central had improperly reimbursed themselves for the expenses incurred by them in maintaining the railroad in good repair and in making additions to its equipment. It was urged that article first of the 1890 agreement requires The Big Four to maintain the railroad and equipment in good working order ‘‘ at its own cost and expense ”. Judge Learned Hand, writing for the three-judge court, overruled this contention, saying (p. 336): “ All we now hold is that the covenant to maintain the road and to make additions to its equipment, did not contemplate gratuitous advances, and that the third article [of the operating agreement] allowed recoupment for so much as was properly expended.”
In view of this determination, plaintiffs do not oppose defendants’ motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of the first cause of action — which proceeds on the theory that defendants had no right to reimburse themselves for expenses incurred in the maintenance of the trackage, structures and equipment. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the case cited did not involve or pass upon the right of reimbursement for expenditures of
Therefore, standing by itself, without reference to subsequent articles of the agreement, the covenant to maintain “ at its own cost and expense ’ ’ is likewise inconsistent with a right in the covenantor to reimburse itself for maintenance payments out of the revenues and income of the railroad properties. Yet, notwithstanding this absolute covenant to maintain “at its own cost and expense ”, the Federal court in the Ewen case (supra) held that the covenant was not one that binds the covenantor to make gratuitous payments but that it had to be read together with article third which permitted reimbursement. It is clear from reading the 1890 agreement, as a whole, that all the expenditures made in the first instance by The Big Four for the purpose of the proper operation of the Peoria properties were deductible by it from the revenues and income of the operation, to the extent that the revenue and income were large enough to permit the deductions.
The absolute nature of the language of the covenants contained in article first was intended only to make it clear that Peoria was in no event to be liable to make any of the payments or to make reimbursement for payments by The Big Four. But, as article third makes clear, the payments represent proper deductions from the revenue and income of the operation of the railroad in ascertaining what amount, if any, remains to be paid over to Peoria. The payments required in article first, though not advances in the sense that Peoria is obligated to repay them, are advances in the sense that they may be recouped out of the income resulting from the operation of the railroad properties to the extent that the size of the income permits. They are referred to as “ advances ” in the sentence of article third beginning with the words “ after reimbursing itself ” and in article fifth which provides that The Big Four shall be entitled to reimbursement of any sums “ it may advance in compliance with its aforesaid covenants and agreements ”.
It is important to point out that the payment of claims is one of the normal and usual expenses of operating a railroad, and that it is just as much an anticipated expense of operation as expenses incurred in the maintenance and upkeep of the tracks and equipment. Many of the claims required to be paid involve no actual or imputed negligence on the part of the operator of the railroad, and many others involve only the negligence imputed by law to a common carrier. It is utterly impossible to operate a railroad without incurring liability for a vast amount of claims, including claims for injuries to employees, claims for injuries to persons, animals and property at grade crossings, and claims for loss or damage to merchandise, which may have occurred without any fault on the part of the carrier. Expenses necessarily and inevitably incurred and anticipated for the payment of a great variety of claims are taken into consideration in the fixation of rates, with the result that the income and revenue received for the benefit of Peoria were and continue to be thereby enhanced. No good reason is shown which warrants the conclusion that the parties to the agreement contemplated that defendants should be denied the right to deduct the amounts paid in settlement or satisfaction of claims — one of the normal and expected operating
In the approximately 76 years of operations under the 1890 agreement and the extensions thereof, the deduction from income and revenues of the amounts paid in satisfaction of claims appears not to have been questioned. Indeed, plaintiff Levine, a director and stockholder of Peoria, and also an attorney, has for years publicly expressed views irreconcilable with the theory of the second cause of action. Although, it is true, his statements are not binding on Peoria, they are some indication that the attempt to deny defendants the right to deduct payments of claims is contrary to the practical interpretation of the agreement generally accepted by all concerned for over seven decades.
The reason for the use of the words “ to indemnify and save harmless ” was, undoubtedly, that The Big Four could not say that it would ‘ ‘ pay ’ ’ all claims arising out of the management and operation, because many of them might be lacking in merit or excessive. All that it could be expected to covenant was that it would see to it that Peoria itself would not have to pay them. What The Big Four said in the agreement was, in effect, “ We guarantee that you (Peoria) will not have to pay them.” That is what the covenant “ to indemnify and save harmless” means. This does not mean, however, that The Big Four could not recoup the payments made by it from the income and revenues of the railroad insofar as they were adequate, provided there was no personal, liability for them on the part of Peoria itself. This is abundantly clear from paragraph fifth which provides that The Big Four “ will look only to such future net earnings * * * for £he reimbursement to it of any sums it may advance in compliance with its aforesaid covenants and agreements ” (italics supplied). No exception is made with respect to The Big Four’s covenant to “ indemnify and save harmless ” from “ claims arising out of the operation or management ”.
In the light of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to consider defendants ’ contentions that the second cause of action is barred as res judicata, or by reason of the Interstate Commerce Commission’s approval of the latest extension agreement.
The motion to dismiss both causes of action is granted, and the cross motion denied.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.