Liebowitz v. B. Berglass, Inc.
Opinion of the Court
OPINION OF THE COURT
Motion by defendant for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that it is time-barred is granted.
Neither party cites a case directly on point and independent research by this court has also failed to uncover such a case. However, over-all authority both in judicial dicta and Practice Commentaries by a leading scholar in the field support defendant’s argument. Dean McLaughlin in his supplementary practice commentaries supports the position that September 1, 1977 would be the outside date for someone who has attained 18 years of age before September 1, 1974 to commence an action. (See McLaughlin, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 208, 1974 Supplementary Practice Commentaries.) In Robusto v Johnson (87 Misc 2d 76) the court permitted the commencement of an action in January, 1976 where plaintiff was 18 on August 31, 1972 and the cause of action arose on September 30, 1972. The court stated: "this court having concluded that the toll for infancy terminated on September 1, 1974, he had until September 1, 1977 to commence his action.” Similar reasoning is implied in McGill v Board of Educ. (59 AD2d 888, app dsmd 43 NY2d 893).
In conclusion, where a cause of action has accrued prior to September 1, 1974 to a person who has attained the age of 18 but not 21 before September 1, 1974, the tolling of the Statute of Limitations will end on September 1, 1974 and to that date will be added the particular Statute of Limitations with the caveat that, pursuant to CPLR 208, September 1, 1977 is the outside date for commencing any action where the applicable Statute of Limitations is three years or longer.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.