Goldreyer v. Masucci
Opinion of the Court
OPINION OF THE COURT
This is a CPLR article 78 proceeding wherein petitioners seek vacatur of certain building permits issued by the respondent Building Inspector Vincent Masucci. The respondents oppose the petition. The petition is denied and the proceeding dismissed.
This is the third in a series of article 78 proceedings brought by petitioners challenging various administrative determinations made in connection with Hickory Pine’s proposed subdivision and development of a 400-acre tract of land located in the Purchase section of Harrison. For the sake of convenience, these actions have been referred to as petition I, petition II, and petition III. Petition I challenged preliminary subdivision, site plan, environmental, and special use permit determinations. Petition I was denied and dismissed (decision and order, dated Aug. 16, 1993). On reargument, the decision was modified slightly and, as modified, confirmed (decision and order, dated Feb. 16, 1994). Petition II challenged final subdivision and site plan approvals. With the exception of one or two triable issues of fact, petition II was denied and dismissed (decision and order, dated Apr. 7, 1994). The triable issues were remitted to the Trial Assignment Part for hearing and disposition.
In the instant proceeding (petition III), petitioners claim that respondent Masucci issued building permits to respondent Hickory Pine subsequent to and in violation of the automatic stay provision contained in Town Law § 282. They contend that upon filing petition II at the Westchester County Clerk’s office, the proceeding was "commenced” (see, CPLR 304), and upon commencement of the proceeding, the respondent was automatically stayed from issuing the building permits at issue herein (see, Town Law § 282; Matter of Prudenti v Town Bd., 176 AD2d 884).
The interrelationship between the "commencement-by-filing” rule contained in CPLR 304, as recently amended, and the "automatic stay upon commencement” rule contained in Town Law § 282, presents an apparent issue of first impression, to wit, can an automatic stay pursuant to Town Law § 282 be effective against a municipality without prior notice or service? This court holds that the automatic stay provided in Town Law § 282 cannot effectively bind a municipality until notice of the commencement of an action is served or otherwise effectively communicated to such municipality (see, e.g., Byrne v Long Is. State Park Commn., 67 Misc 2d 1084).
In the instant case, petitioners’ attorney alleges that she filed petition II at or before 9:15 a.m. on September 15, 1993, and within 10 minutes thereafter, telephoned Lucille Aubel, secretary to the Planning Board and advised her of the commencement of the action. The respondents allege, by affidavit of Lucille Aubel, that she received a call from petitioners’ attorney between 9:30 a.m. and 9:40 a.m., and that upon receipt of the call, Building Inspector Masucci was immediately notified that an action had been commenced. The affidavit of Vincent Masucci indicates that at the time he received the message, he had already issued the building permits to respondent Hickory Pine.
While there may be uncertainty as to precisely what time notice was provided and the permits issued, the exact timing is not material to the court’s determination. The critical issue is whether the building permits were issued before or after notice was provided. Petitioners’ contention that notice was received prior to issuance is not supported by any evidence contained in this record, and is wholly speculative. On the other hand, the sworn affidavits of Aubel and Masucci, based upon their firsthand knowledge, provide consistent and compelling evidence that the notice was received after the permits had been issued. Under these circumstances, no triable issue of fact warranting a hearing exists (see, Matter of Pickett v Town of Tusten Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 169 AD2d 906).
In accordance with the foregoing, the petition is denied and the proceeding dismissed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.