Kimmel v. State

OPINION OF THE COURT

Defendants move to dismiss contending lack of personal jurisdiction, and ask the court to strike the matter from its calendar or dismiss the action. Plaintiffs oppose the application.

A. QUESTION PRESENTED

The issue in this case, a matter of first impression, is whether an automatic dismissal occurs if the defendant appeared within the 120 days following commencement-by-filing, but the plaintiff filed no papers with the clerk so indicating.1 This court holds it does not.

B. UNDERLYING ACTION

Plaintiff Betty L. Kimmel was a female State Trooper with the New York State Police. She had been employed as a Trooper since 1980, and asserts certain harassment, discrimination, and retaliation associated with her gender. She maintains causes of action against each of the defendants based upon the atmosphere and incidents cited in her complaint.

Plaintiffs, through their attorneys, commenced an action by filing a summons and complaint with the Monroe County Clerk’s office on May 24, 1995. Copies of the summons and complaint were then sent to defendants James W. McMahon, *908David M. Luitweiler,2 Ronald K. Wall, Steve LaLonde and Linda Stevens-Wagner by first class mail.

C. THE STIPULATION AND APPEARANCE

Plaintiffs’ counsel affirms, under penalty of perjury, that she was contacted on June 6, 1995 by Charles D. Steinman, Esq., an Assistant Attorney-General of the State of New York. At that time, Mr. Steinman reportedly asked for a 30-day extension to answer or otherwise move. Plaintiffs’ counsel prepared a proposed stipulation of June 19, 1995 which was thereafter revised on June 21, 1995 to reflect the corrections and deletions of attorney Steinman. The document was signed by defendants’ counsel, returned to plaintiffs’ counsel, who in turn dated it (Sept. 5, 1995), signed it, and forwarded the agreement to the undersigned Judge.

The terms of the agreement were "so ordered” by the court. The stipulation provided, in pertinent part: "Charles D. Stein-man, Esq., Assistant Attorney General of the State of New York * * * appears generally in this action for State of New York, New York State Division of State Police, James W. McMahon * * * Ronald K. Wall * * * Steve LaLonde * * * and * * * Linda Stevens-Wagner * * * The defendants * * * acknowledge that they have been duly and personally served with the Summons and Complaint in this action and that the court has personal jurisdiction over each of them.” (Emphasis added.)

Within 120 days following commencement, the defendants served answers dated July 24, 1995 and July 26, 1995.3 The answers contained no affirmative defense relating to lack of personal jurisdiction (i.e., CPLR 3211 [a] [8]). An initial pretrial settlement conference was then scheduled with the court for August 3, 1995.

D. EXTENDED AND DETAILED PARTICIPATION BY DEFENSE COUNSEL

After a conference on August 3, 1995, and a subsequent pretrial held September 15, 1995, the court signed a scheduling order dated November 22, 1995. The order directed responses *909to discovery, and certain other relief.4 Thereafter, by notice of motion dated July 25, 1995 and heard October 20, 1995, the defendants moved to dismiss portions of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (2), (5) and (7). The motion did not contain a challenge to personal jurisdiction (i.e., CPLR 3211 [a] [8]). The matter was heard upon submission, and this court issued a decision dated January 2, 1996.5 In September of 1996, plaintiffs’ counsel again sought to progress discovery.6 Pursuant to section 17 of the Public Officers Law and letter dated December 10, 1996, defendant LaLonde rejected representation by the Attorney-General’s office, and presented a substitution of counsel in favor of private attorney Mary E. Taylor, Esq.7

At request of counsel, yet a further conference was scheduled before this court.8 By letter dated February 12, 1997, the Attorney-General’s office now claims defendants State of New York, New York State Division of State Police, James W. McMahon, Ronald K. Wall, and Linda Stevens-Wagner were not properly served.9 The court directed formal motions involving the service issue, if any, shall be submitted before February 21, 1997 at 5:00 p.m. Responses would be due no later than February 28, 1997 at 5:00 p.m. A written order was signed comprising the oral directives.

*910E. LEGAL ARGUMENT OF DEFENDANTS

The Attorney-General’s office maintains: "Approximately two weeks ago, it came to my attention that there were copies of what purported to be an unexecuted Order / stipulation in my file. There were no cover letters conveying the Order/ stipulation to opposing counsel or the Court. I also noticed that while there was a copy of a Proof of Service on David Luitweiler, there were none pertaining to any other defendant.”

Defendants now insist it is "some 21 months after the commencement of the action” without signed acknowledgments of service,10 and "17 months after the action would have been deemed dismissed”. 11 Thus, defendants ask the court to make two leaps. First, the lack of signed acknowledgments of personal service by mail, per CPLR 312-a, warrants dismissal. Second, failure to file the acknowledgments within 120 days of commencement subjects plaintiffs to dismissal by operation of law of CPLR 306-b.

The court does not agree.

F. ENFORCEABILITY OF PRIOR COUNSEL’S AGREEMENT

An agreement between counsel to appear on behalf of certain defendants, to acknowledge personal service of the summons and complaint, and to concede personal jurisdiction is enforceable. CPLR 2104 specifically provides: "An agreement between parties or their attorneys relating to any matter in an action, other than one made between counsel in open court, is not binding upon a party unless it is in a writing subscribed by him or his attorney or reduced to the form of an order and entered.” (Emphasis and underscore added.)

There can be no dispute that unless the stipulation is in open court, it must be in writing.12 And, judicial policy generally favors enforcement of stipulations.13 Moreover, courts have held an appearance by an attorney on defendant’s behalf *911amounts to a waiver of right to challenge jurisdiction.14 Here, the execution of a stipulation in writing by prior counsel was sufficient to constitute an appearance and sustain personal jurisdiction.

G. TIMELY PERSONAL SERVICE UNDER CPLR 312-a AND IMPACT ON CPLR 306-b

Commencement-by-filing "revolutionized” civil practice since becoming effective on July 1,1992.15 Since that time trial courts have confronted a number of first impression issues regarding CPLR 306-b.16 After commencement-by-filing on May 24, 1995, plaintiffs’ attorney initially sought to obtain personal jurisdiction by service using first class mail per CPLR 312-a.

CPLR 312-a permits personal service by mail if the defendant signs an acknowledgment of receipt. Failure to return a signed acknowledgment can result in assessment against the particular defendant for reasonable expenses of a process server. (CPLR 312-a [f].) Thus, the statute "encourages” completion of the acknowledgment by avoidance of expenses associated with traditional service of process costs.

Notwithstanding, nothing in CPLR 312-a prevents a stipulation as afforded by CPLR 2104 in lieu of the prescribed affirmation acknowledging receipt.17 The enforcement provision for filing of the acknowledgment is contained in CPLR 306-b.18

*912Turning to CPLR 306-b (a), that statute specifically states: "If proof of service is not filed and there has been no appearance by the defendant within the time provided in this section for filing proof of service, the action or third-party action shall be deemed dismissed as to the non-appearing party with respect to whom no proof of service has been filed, without prejudice and without costs.” (Emphasis added.)

Here, counsel entered his appearance.19 Namely, he signed a stipulation formally entering his appearance on behalf of the listed defendants. Moreover, as the settlement discussions and the pretrials would also indicate, there can be no dispute that Charles D. Steinman, Esq., and the Attorney-General acted as attorney for the said defendants.

In the memorandum decision of Matter of Owen v Comstock20 the Court concluded failure to timely file the proof of service with the Yates County Clerk was sufficient to judge the matter "dismissed”. Despite claim to an affidavit of service being mailed to the County Court Judge, the Court reasoned there was no filing pursuant to the statute and, more importantly for the case here, no merit to petitioner’s assertion respondent appeared.

In holding the respondent did not appear, the Fourth Department in Owen (supra) cited CPLR 320 (a);21 Agway, Inc. — Dansville Store v Curtis (195 AD2d 1077);2216 Lincoln Sq. Assocs. v Amrep Corp. (129 Misc 2d 697);23 and Simkins v Gruenspan (118 Misc 2d 107, supra).24 The facts of these cases are readily differentiated from the case at hand.

*913In Agway, Inc. (supra), the defendant never hired an attorney. He did nothing more than send two letters to plaintiffs counsel. The letters requested an itemized statement of his account. Unlike the case at hand, no attorney ever signed a stipulation in Agway, Inc. on his behalf acknowledging service and jurisdiction. There, the Court concluded "such letters were insufficient to constitute an informal appearance”. (Supra.)

In the case before this court, an actual appearance was entered by stipulation and order. Moreover, even the extended and detailed participation by defense counsel far exceeds the letters of Agway, Inc. (supra). In 16 Lincoln Sq. (supra), the court explained Simkins v Gruenspan25 and Renewal Prods, v Kleen-Stik Prods.26 The 16 Lincoln Sq. court said mere "participation by the attorney representing the defendant in unsuccessful settlement negotiations did not constitute an appearance” nor did executing "several stipulations for the purpose of extending its time to answer”. (16 Lincoln Sq. Assocs. v Amrep Corp., 129 Misc 2d, at 699.) 16 Lincoln Sq. went on to conclude "defendant could have interposed a jurisdictional objection in its answer or by motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 [a] (8)” (at 699).

In the current case, the stipulation constituted an appearance and waiver of service and personal jurisdiction. The agreement yielded more than additional time to answer. It waived personal jurisdiction challenges. As well, the failure to raise the CPLR 3211 (a) (8)27 challenge at the CPLR 3211 motion would be consistent with this understanding.

Here, the Attorney-General did more than engage in unsuccessful settlement negotiations or execute several stipulations for the purpose of extending its time to answer. They agreed by written provision that the Attorney-General "appears generally”28 for certain defendants, and "acknowledge^]” service and personal jurisdiction. The actions of the Attorney-General constituted actual appearance and waiver of service and personal jurisdiction issues. Even if the stipulation were somehow found to be unenforceable, the cumulation of activity by the Attorney-General before this court would lead it to *914conclude that the actions of defendants constitute an "informal appearance” leading to the same result. (CPLR 3211 [e].)

Lastly, despite review of a number of other matters before the Fourth Department involving CPLR 306-b, none would suggest denial of the instant motion.29

H. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, no aspect of CPLR 312-a or CPLR 306-b would prevent denial of this motion on facts presented. Automatic dismissal does not occur if the defendant appears within the 120-day period of 306-b, but the plaintiff fails to file papers with the court so indicating.30 The filing of the acknowledgment of service is merely a ministerial act, and should not *915vitiate the substantive appearance and waiver of personal jurisdiction formalized by the stipulated order. Therefore, defendants’ motion shall be denied. All other relief shall be denied, except that moving defendants shall pay statutory costs.