Frazer v. Western
Opinion of the Court
The following opinion was delivered for affirmance :—
I am of opinion that the decree of the chancellor should be affirmed. Western shows that he is a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, without actual notice of the insolvency of I. G. Collins at the time he conweyed the premises to E. K. Collins in 1828 in trust for his wife and children, and to be conveyed by him according to her appointment. There is no ground to subject Western to the consequences of a constructive notice of the insolvency of I. G. Collins in August, 1828, although he saw the trust deed, and could see that it was voluntary, made upon a nominal con
There is no evidence that Western had any acquaintance with the person of I. G.. Collins, or of his pecuniary circumstances, or that their situation was such as would probably lead Western to ascertain them.
The following opinion was delivered for reversal.
This case has been fully considered in the court of .chancery; (1 Barb. R. 220;) and as the chancellor and assistant vice-chancellor have only differed upon a single point, I shall do little more in relation to the other questions in the cause than to state the conclusions at which I have arrived.
1. This is a bill with a double aspect; but as one of the grounds on which the complainants proceeded was denied by the answers, and has not been supported by proof, it is only necessary to consider the case in the remaining aspect of a bill to set aside a conveyance as being a fraud upon creditors.
2. The complainant Gibbs, the master in equity, to whom the bond of Collins was executed in 1818, or Freeman, the successor in office of the obligee, who is also party complainant, must be regarded a creditor of Collins to the amount secured by the bond. It is unnecessary, therefore, to inquire whether the bill could be maintained by the other complainant, Frazer, who was'the surety for Collins.
3. I have been unable to read the evidence without coming to the conclusion that Collins was insolvent at the time he executed the trust deeds to his son in 1828, and that he continued to be insolvent until the time of his death in 1831. There was no attempt to answer the proofs of the complainants upon that point.
4. The trust deeds were not made in pursuance of an ante-nuptial agreement, nor upon any valuable consideration; but were voluntary conveyances, made for the benefit of the grantor and his family, and were clearly fraudulent and void as against those who were then creditors of the grantor.
6. The bill should have been filed on behalf of the complainants and all the other creditors of Collins who might come in and prove their debts and contribute to the expenses of the suit. But this is an objection of mere form, and not of substance, which might be cured by amendment; and as the amendment would not make a new case, or one to which there could be any different answer on the part of the defendants, I see no reason why it might not be allowed at the hearing.
7. If the legal estate under the trust deeds still continued in the trustee, it follows that Mrs. Collins, the cestui que trust, only conveyed an equitable interest in the Staten Island property to Western; and then, as the complainants have the prior, and consequently the better equity, their claim must prevail. Western cannot protect himself on the ground of bona fide purchase for a valuable consideration without notice.
But as it is not material in the view which I entertain of the case to examine that question, I shall assume that by virtue of our statute of uses and trusts the equitable interest which Mrs. Collins had at the first in the property, was turned into a legal estate on the death of her husband in 1831; and, consequently, that Western, who purchased from her in 1833, is in a condition to set up the defence on which he relies; and if, in truth, he is a bona fide purchaser without notice, in the legal sense of those terms, the defence must prevail.
8. That Western paid a valuable consideration for the land is admitted ; and there is no proof that he had actual notice of any defect in the title of his grantor. This brings us to the principal question in the cause, which is, whether Western had constructive notice that the trust deed through which he claims title was fraudulent and void as against the creditors of Collins.
On this point I am unable to agree with the chancellor. It
The doctrine of implied notice was laid down by baron Alderson, in Whitbread v. Jordan, (1 Younge & Collyer, 303, 328,) in these terms :—“ I apprehend that when a party, having knowledge of such facts as would lead an honest man, using ordinary caution, to make further inquiries, does not make, but, on the contrary, studiously avoids making such obvious inquiries, he must be taken to have notice of those facts which, if he had used such ordinary diligence, he would readily have ascertained.” And in Kennedy v. Green (1 Mylne & Keene, 609) the rule was thus stated by lord Brougham :—“ Whatever is notice enough to excite attention, and put the party on his
In Moore v. Bennett, (2 Chan. Cas. 246; 1 Eq. Cas. ab. 331, pl. 7, S. C. ; and see 2 Vern. 385, note 4,) the purchase was made from one who held under a deed containing a power of revocation by will, which power had been executed by devising the property to a third person; and although the purchaser under the deed knew nothing of the will, he was intended to have notice of it as well as the power to revoke. As he knew of the power to revoke, it was his duty to inquire whether it had been executed. And the court laid it down as a principle, that where the purchaser can not make out a title but by a deed, which leads him to another fact, he shall be presumed cognizant of that fact; for it is crassa neglegentia that he sought not after it. This doctrine was approved and followed by lord Hardwicke in Mertins v. Jolliffe, (Amb. 311,) and I am not aware that it has ever been questioned.
In Ferrars v. Cherry, (2 Vern. 383; 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 331; pl. 5,) the vendor had previously made a post-nuptial settlement, under which he had only a life estate; his wife had a
Let us now apply these principles to the case in hand. The settlement or trust deed under which the defendant, Western, claims title was, as we have already seen, fraudulent and void against the complainants, or one of them, as creditors of Collins, the grantor; and the question is, whether the creditors shall have the property, or whether the defendant shall hold it as a bona fide purchaser without any such notice as should have put him upon inquiry. Let us see how much he knew. He not only claims under the trust deed, but he admits in the answer that it was produced to him pending the negotiation for the purchase; and the certificate or conveyance which he took was annexed to the deed. From the deed itself he learned that it was a conveyance in trust, which did not originally vest any legal interest in Mrs. Collins; and he seems to have supposed that she still had nothing more than an equity. This may be inferred from the form of the certificate or conveyance which he took; and from the fact stated in his answer, that for the purpose of perfecting his title, he presented the
I am of opinion that the decree of the chancellor should be reversed, and that the decree of the assistant vice-chancellor should be affirmed.
BSr° Rugóles and Gray concurred in this opinion.
The other five judges were in favor of affirming the decree of the chancellor; but were not agreed on the grounds.
There was no written opinion by the five judges.
Jones, Wright and Johnson, thought there was not sufficient proof of the insolvency of I. G. Collins at the time he made the trust deed.
Jewett, Gardiner and Jones, thought that Western was not chargeable with notice of the insolvency of I. G. Collins.
January 14, 1848. Decree affirmed. Five to three.
And so it seems that the case settles no principle. No five, nor even four, of the judges agreed with the chancellor. "FlFk
Decision.—Decree affirmed. For affirmance : Jewett, Gar-diner, Jones, Johnson and Wright. For reversal: Bronson, Ruggles and Gray.
Note.—It seems that the law of this case stands as given in the opinion of the chancellor, (1 Barb, Ch. JR. 235,) a majority of the judges of this court not being able to agree upon the ground or grounds of affirmance. (It may be useful to refer to the law of constructive notice, as contained in the dissenting opinion of Bronson, J.)
The chancellor held, that the law sanctions a conveyance founded upon the consideration of blood or marriage merely. The legal presumption therefore is, that such a conveyance is valid, and not a fraud upon the rights of any one. The mere fact that the purchaser from the holder of such a title, has notice that it was not founded upon a pecuniary consideration, is not sufficient to make it his duty, at his peril, to inquire whether the title of the grantor was not fraudulent. On the contrary, he has a right to act upon the legal presumption that such a deed of gift, or voluntary settlement was honestly made, until some other fact is brought to his knowledge to raise a suspicion in his mind that the conveyance was intended to defraud some person.
Also held, that although there was some evidence in this case which rendered it probable that I, G. Collins was unable to pay his debts in August, 1528, when
Also held, that the legal title of the premises in 1828, under the law then in force, was vested in E. K. Collins, the trustee; and the cestui que trust, or her grantee, previous to 1830, had only an equitable interest in the property. But under the provisions of the revised statutes, (1 JR. 8. 727, § 47,) this equitable interest was turned into a legal estate in the premises in fee, especially after the death of her husband, and Western acquired the legal title to the premises, under the conveyance from Mrs. Collins in May, 1833.
And that since the reversal of Chancellor Kent’s decision in the case of Roberts v. Anderson, by the court of dernier resort, (3 John. Ch. R. 372; 18 John. Rep. 515, S. C.,) it is no longer an open question in this state, that a bonafide purchaser of property from a previous grantee, to whom it had been conveyed for the purpose of defrauding creditors, is entitled to protection against the claims of the creditors, who were intended to be defrauded by the first conveyance.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.