In re the Commissioners of the Washington Park
Opinion of the Court
These cases present questions of difficulty and importance, involving, as they do, a conflict between the powers of public officers or bodies, to whom the right of eminent domain has been delegated by the legislature, and the rights of individuals, over whose property these powers are exercised. There is a strong equity in the claim made by the appellants, and which has beeti. pressed upon us with much force and ability, that the election to take their property when once exercised in such manner as to bind the owners, should be equally binding upon those who are empowered and elect to take it; and that the owners should not be exposed to repeated applications for this purpose, which might result, not only in keeping them in perpetual suspense as to their ownership, but might enable the other party to abuse the power intrusted to it, by repeatedly making and withdrawing applications until it should obtain an appraisal satisfactory to itself, and thus deprive the owners of that just compensation for their property which is guaranteed to them by the Constitution of the State. On the other hand, it must be considered whether the apprehension of such an abuse of power is sufficient ground, in the case of a public improve
The decisions of the English courts sustain the positions contended for by the property owners in the present case, and have maintained the doctrine as well in public street improvements in a city as in cases of railway and market corporations, that where, by act of parliament, commissioners for improving a street, or the managers of a railway company, are authorized to purchase private property for the purposes of the act, or to acquire title to it by appraisement, after giving notice to the owner requiring him to treat or submit to an appraisement, the mere giving of the notice is an election to purchase the land described in the notice; and that this election, being binding upon the owner of the land, is also binding upon the street commissioners or railway company. In 1831, in the case of The King v. The Commissioners for Improving Market Street, Manchester (4 B. & Adol., 335, note), the commissioners had been authorized by the act to purchase certain lands for the purposes of the improvement; and the act provided, in the usual form, that they might give the owners notice that the lands described in the notice were wanted for the purposes of the act, and that if the owners
These cases fully established the proposition contended for
But for a long period, extending beyond that covered by the English decisions, a different doctrine has been held in this State, at least in respect to public improvements. It is useless to attempt to reconcile our adjudications with the doctrine of the English courts. They proceed upon different principles, and do not recognize any contract obligation between the owner and public officers or municipalities as resulting from the election of the latter, under authority of law, to take specific lands for public purposes. It must be conceded that they, in fact, afford less protection to the land owner, and a larger discretion to those to whom the right of eminent domain is delegated, than do the English decisions.
Under the act of 1813 (2 Rev. Laws of 1813,408, §§ 177 and 178) the corporation of the city of New York was empowered to order streets opened or enlarged, etc. When lands were required for the purpose, the corporation was authorized to apply to the Supreme Court for the appointment of commissioners of estimate and assessment, and on such application, the court was empowered to appoint three
Under that act, it is apparent that either'-the order of the corporation for the making of the improvement, or the appointment of the commissioners, was a final determination, binding upon the land owner, as to the right of the city to take the land within the lines of the street or public place ordered to be opened or enlarged, etc., and that no means were provided by the act by which the land owner could question the right of the corporation to take and acquire title to that property. It is true that, upon the coming in of the report of the commissioners, the court was to hear any matter which might be alleged against it; but no power was given to the court to reject the report and refuse to confirm it on the objection of the owners of property taken, that the improvement was not needed, and that their land, if within the lines, was unnecessarily taken. (Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend., 151.) On the contrary, although ample provision was made for repeated revisions of the report, the law positively required that it be ultimately confirmed.
It is clear that, before confirmation of the report, the owners of the property embraced in the opening, widening, etc., of the street or public place, were as finally concluded by the action of the corporation, as to its right to acquire title to their property as were the owners who received notice
It is urged, on the part of the appellants, that those decisions are not applicable, for the reason that, under the act of 1813, the appointment of commissioners did not change the title to the land, and that such title did not vest in the city until the final confirmation of the report; whereas, it is contended, that under this act the change of title takes place either on the mere vote of the park commissioners entered upon their minutes, pursuant to the first section of the act of 1872 (chap. 45), or upon the appointment of commissioners of appraisal pursuant to section 15 of the general railroad law, as incorporated in the act of 1872.
We are clearly of opinion that the mere vote of the park commissioners does not divest the title of the land owner, and is not of itself a condemnation of the land, but only a necessary preliminary to such condemnation. Before the land can be condemned the park commissioners must treat with the owners for its purchase, and the process for acquiring title in case of failure to agree is prescribed. They may locate and lay out approaches, taking for the purpose parts of existing streets. The general clause, that all streets, tracts, pieces or parcels of land so acquired, selected or located by the commissioners shall be deemed to have been taken by the city for a public park, and shall be deemed to be such, is distributive, and its proper construction is that private property, when acquired by purchase or proceedings under the act, and existing streets when selected, etc., shall be deemed to have been taken for the purposes of the park, etc.
The appointment of commissioners has no greater effect under this act than under the railroad act. Section 15 of the railroad act authorizes the appointment of commissioners of appraisal after a hearing of the parties interested, and this
The case is, therefore, analogous to that of a street improvement, under the act of 1813. The only difference being, that in the one case the act declares that the title is acquired on final confirmation of the report, and in the other, to this must be added payment or deposit of the compensation.
A long series of decisions has established that in these street cases the corporation may be permitted to discontinue .proceedings at any time before rights resulting therefrom have become vested in the property owners. They further hold-—differing in. this respect from the English cases — that no such rights are vested until the report of the commissioners is finally confirmed, and there is a final award in the nature of a judgment in favor of the property owners for their compensation.
The first case I find upon the subject is that of The Corporation of New York v. Dover Street (18 Johns., 505). Commissioners had been appointed and their report set aside and new commissioners appointed, who refused to act; and application was made by the corporation, which was opposed by owners of lots to be taken, who claimed a vested right to compensation, on the ground that the corporation having ordered the improvement, they were bound to carry it out; that having ordered the property of individuals to be taken, they could not deprive them of compensation. The court treated the case as if no commissioners had been
As to the city of Hew York, the doctrine of these decisions has been incorporated in the statute, and application to the court for leave to discontinue dispensed with. The act of 1839 (chap. 207, § 7) declares that the mayor, etc., shall be authorized, at any time previous to the confirmation of the report by the court, to discontinue all further proceedings relative to the improvement, without the necessity of an application to the court for leave to do so. And, according to the charter of 1873 (chap. 355, § 107) the board of street opening and improvement may, at any time before'confirmation of the report, discontinue proceedings, with power to cause new proceedings to be taken for the appointment of new commissioners.
The decisions to which reference has been made, are wholly independent of these enactments, and seem to reserve to the courts some discretion in the matter of allowing a discontinuance of the proceedings. How far their discretion might be exercised, either in the way of refusing leave to discontinue in cases where the right is not given by statute, or in refusing to entertain new proceedings, manifestly in fraud of the constitutional right of the citizen to a just compensation for his property, when sought to be taken for public use, it is not necessary now to consider. The point involved in the case now before us is, whether, when the application for le: ve
All .concur.
Appeals dismissed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.