Barnett v. Selling
Barnett v. Selling
Opinion of the Court
For all the purposes of this appeal it must be assumed that replevin, as a substitute for the action of detinue, now obsolete, will lie, although the defendant has parted with the possession of the property and the same is beyond the reach of the process of the court so that in no event can a return of the property be had either in virtue of the claim and demand of the plaintiff or any judgment that maybe given in the action (Nichols agt. Michael, 23 N. Y., 264.) The subdivision 3 of the section 179 of the Code, under which the order of arrest was made in the case, was amended in 1851, by adding the last clause. Before that amendment an order of arrest was permissible in actions of this character
To authorize an order of arrest therefor there must be a concealment, removal or disposal of the property or some part thereof with intent either to defeat the process of the courts or to deprive the plaintiff of the benefit thereof, that is the property. An intent to put the property beyond the reach of the owner by selling it to a bona fide purchaser when such a transaction would avail for the purpose, or by so changing its form that it could not be identified, or by concealing it, or by any other act, will authorize the order although the fraudulent actor may not contemplate an action at law to recover the specific property, when as is alleged and appears by the affidavits on which the order was made, possession of property has been acquired fraudulently and under circumstances justifying a reclamation of it by the owner and the fraudulent purchaser has sold the property with intent to perfect the fraud and put the property beyond the reach of the owner the intent to deprive the owner of the benefit thereof contemplated by the act is established and the case is not only directly within the letter of the statute, but is also within its spirit, any other interpretation would deprive the last words of all meaning, as they would add nothing to the other provision of the statute.
Every act done with intent to evade the process of the court and deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of his action is provided for and made the ground of an arrest in the preceding clauses, and the last paragraph was added to cover a very different fraudulent intent.
The decision of the courts of original jurisdiction may not be entirely harmonious, and yet in view of the fact that some of them have been made under the statute, as it was before
The giving of the check by the drawer was but the loan of the. money represented by it to the payee. It was but the written authority of the lender to the depository of the money to pay the amount to the defendant, and when it was delivered to the drawee and the money paid thereon, it had accomplished its purpose and was functus officio, except as a voucher in the hands of the payee in his .settlements with the drawer. A verbal order acted upon by the depository or debtor of the drawer would have been as effectual and served the same purpose as the written order. It is not necessary to say that trover might not have been brought for the check within the principle of Murray agt. Burley (10 J. R., 182), but a check when it has performed its office, can hardly be the subject of replevin, and if the plaintiff has it in his possession, the sheriff cannot return that it has been eloined or cannot be found to deliver to the plaintiff. If the tobacco had by any means come to the possession of the plaintiff the action of replevin would not lie, although trespass or trover might for
All concur.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Solomon Barnett agt. Henry Selling
- Status
- Published