Strusburgh v. . Mayor, Etc., City of New York
Cases that cite this one
28 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Tifft v. City of Buffalo (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1898)
- Langan v. City of Syracuse (New York Supreme Court 1958)
- Adriaansen v. Board of Education (New York Supreme Court 1927)
- Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (N.Y. 2013)
- City of Rochester v. Chiarella (N.Y. 1983)
- Independent Church of the Realization of the Word of God, Inc. v. Board of Assessors (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1979)
- Brink v. Kansas City (Mo. 1946)
- Lewis v. City of Lockport (N.Y. 1938)
- Adrico Realty Corp. v. City of New York (N.Y. 1928)
- People Ex Rel. Wessell, Nickel & Gross v. Craig (N.Y. 1923)
- Miner v. Clifton Township (S.D. 1912)
- Deshong v. . City of New York (N.Y. 1903)
- Dale v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1902)
- In re Edison Electric Illuminating Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1897)
- Keller v. City of Mount Vernon (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1897)
- Hoffeld v. . City of Buffalo (N.Y. 1892)
- Trimmer v. . City of Rochester (N.Y. 1892)
- Tripler v. Mayor, Aldermen & Commonalty (N.Y. 1891)
- Burchell v. Mayor of New York (New York Supreme Court 1890)
- Pooley v. City of Buffalo (Superior Court of Buffalo 1888)
- Pooley v. City of Buffalo (The Superior Court of New York City 1888)
- Smith v. Mayor (The Superior Court of New York City 1888)
- In re Pennie (New York Supreme Court 1887)
- Jex v. Mayor, Aldermen & Commonalty (N.Y. 1886)
- Knapp v. . the City of Brooklyn (N.Y. 1884)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Three propositions may be regarded as established in the law as to taxation and assessments, by the courts of this State: First, An action in equity to vacate an assessment and restrain its collection cannot be maintained merely because the assessment is for any reason invalid or illegal. (Heywood v. City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 534; Guest v. City of Brooklyn, 69 id. 506.) This has its foundation principally in public policy. It would lead to great embarrassment and inconvenience if the collection of taxes and assessments were to be delayed by such actions. Second, An action at law cannot be maintained "to recover back money paid upon an illegal assessment which the assessors had jurisdiction to impose, and which is not void upon its face, so long as the assessment remains unvacated and unreversed. (Swift v. City of Poughkeepsie, 37 N. Y. 511; Bank of Commonwealth v. The Mayor, 43 id. 184; Marsh v. City of Brooklyn, 59 id. 280; Peyser v. The Mayor, 70 id. 497; Wilkes v. The Mayor, 79 id. 621.) This is so because the action of the assessors is regarded as judicial, and because the assessment is regarded as in the nature of a judgment which cannot be attacked collaterally. The money paid upon the assessment in such a case is treated as if collected by virtue of a valid judgment which can be retained until the judgment is vacated or reversed. Third, An action can be maintained to vacate an assessment which is a lien upon land, and thus a cloud upon title, when the assessment is in fact invalid, and the invalidity does not appear upon the face of the assessment, and will not necessarily appear in any .proceeding taken by a purchaser, under the tax. sale for non-payment of the assessment, to recover possession of the land. This is so, because in such a case the action comes under one of the recognized heads of equity jurisprudence.
Upon the facts alleged in the complaint in this action, if the *456 assessment remained unpaid, it is conceded that an action could be maintained by the plaintiff to vacate it as a cloud upon Mr title; M-t by payment, it has ceased to be a cloud, and hence no aqtiin is needed, or can be maintained, to vacate it on that ground.
The assessment has not been vacated, and hence, if this were merely an action at law to recover back the money paid upon the assessment, as it was assumed to be in the court below, it could not be maintained. But this action is in equity, and'the relief prayed is for judgment declaring the assessment invalid to the extent of the over-payment claimed by the plaintiff, and then to recover the amount of such over-payment. Why may not such an action he maintained ? There is no case to be found in the hooks holding that it cannot he. There can be no objection that both kinds of relief are sought in the same action. In that respect, it is analogous to an action in equity to reform a written instrument and then enforce it as reformed, and such actions have been frequently sanctioned by this court. Here is a case where it is conceded that the plaintiff is equitably and justly entitled to the sum which he seeks to recover. The only obstacle in his way is the nnvacated assessment. That obstacle, without any fault of his, he cannot overcome or remove in an action or proceeding at law. Ho degree of vigilance which could have been expected or required of M'm i would have enabled him before payment to discover the illeIgality in the assessment. Unless, then, he can have equitable ’relief, there will he a wrong without a remedy — an absolute failure of justice. Upon general principles of equity, then, we think he should have the equitable relief he seeks, against the obstacle interposed, in aid of the legal relief which he demands.
But there is a distinct head of equity jurisprudence under which the plaintiff can maintain his action. He paid this money under a mistake; a mistake not induced by or due to any negligence or fault on his part, so far as we cab perceive from the facts alleged in the complaint; and against this mistake, equity has jurisdiction to relieve. It has complete juris-
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.