Warn v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
Warn v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff recovered a judgment for damages against the defendant in an action for personal injuries sustained while in the defendant’s service as a car inspector.
The ground upon which the defendant has been held liable for the result of the accident is that it neglected to observe or enforce its own rules and regulations concerning the inspection of cars in passenger trains. The defendant doubtless owed a duty to the plaintiff and its other employees to use reasonable care and vigilance in the enforcement of all reasonable rules and regulations intended for their protection against accident. The plaintiff testified that up to the time of the accident he was not aware that there existed any rule or regulation as to the method of inspecting care. There was undoubtedly a well-defined method of doing the work, which had
But the plaintiff has recovered in this case upon the theory that all the time there was existing among the defendant’s standing rules, which had been promulgated and published many years, a regulation relating to the inspection of cars, which applies to this case and which was disregarded at the station to the knowledge of the defendant, and in fact had never been applied or enforced. If the learned counsel for the plaintiff is right in this position, then clearly the judgment ought to stand. The rule thus invoked as the basis of a charge of negligence against the defendant is as follows, being Ho. 36 of the printed rules : “ A blue flag by day and a blue light by night placed on the end of a car denote that car inspectors are at work under or about the car or train.
The car or train thus protected must not be coupled to or moved until the blue signal is removed by the car inspectors. When a car or train standing on a siding is protected by a blue signal, other cars must not be placed in front of it so that the blue signal will be obscured without first notifying the car inspector that lie may protect himself.”
If this rulo had any application to the passenger train that the plaintiff was inspecting when injured, it certainly was not observed on that occasion, and indeed never had been observed. It is not very plain how a blue light on the end of the train on the occasion in question could have prevented the accident or operated as any protection to the defendant, since the force that moved the train did not come from the rear, but from ■ suddenly backing the train towards the east. Every one having charge of the movements of the train knew perfectly well that the cars were being inspected at the time, and a blue light on the end of the train would not have given them any more knowledge than they airead}' had. The depot master wanted to cut certain cars out of the ■ train. He supposed at first that these cars were at the rear of the train, but on discover
But we are not concerned with the question whether the blue light would or would not have been of any benefit or protection to the plaintiff. The sole question in the case is whether the rule had any application to .the train in question, and wre think it had not. It will be seen that the rule is made up of three distinct clauses or sentences. The first simply defines the meaning of the blue light and the blue flag when used. It does not provide that either shall be attached to the rear end of a car on a passenger train. The second provides that when a car or train is thus protected, it must not be coupled or moved until the signal is removed. The third sentence provides for the case of a car or train on a siding, and forbids running other cars in front of it so as to obscure the signal without first notifying the inspector, to the end that he may protect himself. "When all is read together, the rule obviously relates to cars or trains on sidings or in the yard, and not to regular passenger trains coming into the station and departing frequently in a few minutes. There is nothing in the language of the rule or in its evident purpose that requires the signal to be placed upon such train or the cars composing it, and negligence cannot be predicated of an omission to do so. It follows that the judgment in this case rests upon a wrong construction óf the rule, since the only negligence imputed to the defendant consisted in the omission to place a blue light on the rear car of the train on the night of the accident, and this was upon the assumption that the rule required it.
The legal question was raised by the defendant by motion for a nonsuit and requests to charge, which were denied and exceptions taken.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.
All concur, except Martin, J., not voting, and Vann, J., not sitting.
Judgment reversed, etc.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Elias Warn v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company
- Status
- Published