Tierney v. . Fitzpatrick
Cases that cite this one
22 later published cases cite this decision.
- Fender v. Foust (Mont. 1928)
- Wooton v. Keaton (Ark. 1925)
- Stockert v. Dry Dock Savings Institution (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1913)
- Schmidt v. Schweitzer (New York Supreme Court 1912)
- A.B. Medical Services, PLLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (Civil Court of the City of New York 2005)
- In re the Arbitration between Rosen & Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1964)
- In re the Estate of Anderson (New York Surrogate's Court 1954)
- In re the Estate of Kiley (New York Surrogate's Court 1949)
- In re the Estate of Jagodzinska (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1947)
- In re the Estate of Weinstein (New York Surrogate's Court 1941)
- Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank (New York Supreme Court 1939)
- In re the Estate of Landau (New York Surrogate's Court 1937)
- In re the Estate of Osborn (New York Surrogate's Court 1934)
- Marrow v. Moskowitz (N.Y. 1931)
- In re the Estate of Collins (New York Surrogate's Court 1931)
- In re a Construction of the Last Will & Testament of Weiss (New York Surrogate's Court 1925)
- Morris v. . Sheehan (N.Y. 1922)
- Moran v. Ferchland (New York Supreme Court 1920)
- Walsh v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank (New York Supreme Court 1919)
- In re Bunt (New York Surrogate's Court 1916)
- Gick v. . Stumpf (N.Y. 1912)
- Smith v. . Keller (N.Y. 1912)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The principal issue litigated in this action was whether a tentative trust in favor of the plaintiff evidenced by the deposit of money in a savings bank by the defendant’s testator as trustee for the plaintiff had become irrevocable under the doctrine of Matter of Totten (179 N. Y. 112).
To show that it had never .been the intention of the defendant’s testator to establish any trust at all, the defendant was allowed, over the plaintiff’s objection and exception, to give evidence of declarations made by the depositor after the money had been placed in the savings bank to the effect that the reason he had opened the account there in trust for the plaintiff was that he already had as much money in the bank as he was permitted to have in his own name, and that he adopted this course in order to get his interest and not lose it.
This declaration was not a statement made contemporáneo *435 ously with some act, and which might be regarded as properly receivable as characterizing such act. It was a declaration in reference to a past event introduced for the purpose of rebutting the inference of the establishment of a tentative trust arising out of the act of the declarant in making the deposit expressly in trust for the plaintiff.
Such a declaration is not admissible for such a purpose. “ Statements made by the transferror of realty or of personalty, after transfer of title, are not receivable as admissions against the transferee.” (2 Wigmore on Evidence, § 1085.) There are few rules in the law of evidence which are of more frequent application than this. It is abundantly sustained by authority in this and other states. A recent instance of its application in the cage of personal property can be found in Wangner v. Grimm (169 N. Y. 421, 431), where the general rule in Mew York is stated to be that the former owner of a chattel or chose in action who has transferred his interest to another cannot by subsequent admissions affect the right of the owner or holder. It "Has been applied by the Supreme Court in cases involving the title to savings bank deposits in Scheps v. Bowery Savings Bank (97 App. Div. 434) and Kelly v. Home Savings Bank, (103 App. Div. 141), in the latter of which it was expressly held that statements made by the depositor after the deposit were incompetent for the purpose of defeating the title of one claiming to be the donee of the money deposited.
The declarations of the plaintiff’s testator in the present case, which were received by the trial court in disregard of this rule, bore so directly upon the determination of the issue submitted to the jury that we are unable to say that the evidence did not affect the result. We are of opinion, therefore, that the error entitled the plaintiff to a new trial.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide' the event.
Cullen,' Ch. J., Haight, Yann, Werner, Hiscook and Chase, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed, etc.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.