In re the Will of Samson
Cases that cite this one
21 later published cases cite this decision.
- In re the Estate of McKeon (New York Surrogate's Court 1960)
- O'REILLY v. Jackson (Mo. 1954)
- In re the Construction & Division of the Trust for the Benefit of Fussell (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- In re the Accounting of Marine Midland Trust Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1969)
- In re the Will of Powers (New York Surrogate's Court 1960)
- Ballenger v. McMillan (Md. 1954)
- Patchell v. Groom (Md. 1945)
- In re the Estate of Strohmer (New York Surrogate's Court 1933)
- In re the Estate of Luongo (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
- In re the Estate of Walker (N.Y. 1985)
- In re the Estate of Johnson (New York Surrogate's Court 1965)
- In re the Construction of the Will of Welsh (New York Surrogate's Court 1956)
- In re the Accounting of Marine Trust Co. (New York Surrogate's Court 1946)
- In re the Estate of Watson (New York Surrogate's Court 1937)
- In re the Estate of Loglier (New York Surrogate's Court 1936)
- In re the Estate of Ives (New York Surrogate's Court 1936)
- In re the Estate of Hook (New York Surrogate's Court 1935)
- In re Judicial Settlement of Account of Babylon National Bank & Trust Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1934)
- In re the Estate of Glaser (New York Surrogate's Court 1934)
- In re the Estate of Hall (New York Surrogate's Court 1932)
- In re the Estate of Duval (New York Surrogate's Court 1932)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The will of J. Melvin Samson, who died in 1929, gave the residue of his estate to “ my next of kin * * * according to the statute for the distribution of the effects of persons dying intestate.” He left him surviving no widow, descendant, brother or sister. A brother and a sister had predeceased him, leaving issue, and the only collaterals remaining as next of kin were two nieces, daughters of the deceased sister, and eight grandnephews and grandnieces, sons and daughters of three deceased nieces who were daughters of the deceased brother. The Surrogate divided the estate into two equal shares. One he directed to be distributed to the two nieces, the other share to the grandnephews and grandnieces. The Appellate Division, in reversing, directed a division into five equal shares, one share to each of the surviving nieces and the three shares to which, if hving, the three deceased nieces would have been entitled to the grandnephews and grandnieces per stirpes.
Section 98 of the Decedent Estate Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 13), as it existed in 1929, provided: Subdivision 5. “If there be no widow, and no children, and no representative of a child, the whole surplus shall be distributed to the next of kin, in equal degree to the deceased, and their legal representatives; and if all the brothers and sisters of the intestate be hving, the whole surplus shall be distributed to them; if any of them be living and any be dead, to the brothers and sisters Hving, and the descendants in whatever degree of those dead; so that to each Hving brother or sister shaU be distributed such share as would have been distributed to him or her if aU the brothers and sisters of the intestate who shall have died leaving issue had been Hving, and so that there shall be distributed to such descendants in whatever degree, collectively, the share which their parent would have received if Hving; and the same rule shall prevail as to aU direct lineal descendants of every brother and sister of the intestate whenever such descendants are of unequal degree.” Subdivision 10: *361 “ Where the descendants or next of kin of the deceased, entitled to share in his estate, are all in equal degree to the deceased, their shares shall be equal.” Subdivision 11: “ When such descendants or next of kin are of unequal degrees of kindred, the surplus shall be apportioned among those entitled thereto, according to their respective stocks; so that those who take in their own right shall receive equal shares, and those who take by representation shall receive the share to which the parent whom they represent, if living, would have been entitled.”
Decedent’s next of kin were of unequal degree. The nearest class of survivors was the one which included the two nieces. In that class belonged also the three deceased nieces. If all had been living, each of the five would have taken an equal share (Subd. 10). Under subdivision 5 the whole surplus must be divided among the two survivors and the representatives of the three deceased. If the two survivors take in their own right, each shall take the same proportion. The grandnephews and grandnieces being in a degree of kindred to the deceased unequal with the nieces, they as representatives of their parents share in the proportionate parts to which those parents as nieces would have been entitled.
The two surviving nieces take in their own right. They do not represent any one but take directly as members of the nearest class of relationship to the intestate. The “ respective stocks ” (Subd. 11) are determined by the nearest surviving blood relatives. (Hyatt v. Pugsley, 23 Barb. 285, 300, 301.) In Luhrs v. Eimer (80 N. Y. 171) the sister was the nearest blood relative who was not disabled by alien citizenship and, therefore, she took directly and in her own right. Here, no brother or sister survived and the “ stock ” consisted of the class to which the living nieces belonged rather than the class of brothers and sisters all the members of which were dead. The clause in subdivision 5 which reads “ and the same rule shall prevail as to all direct lineal descend *362 ants of every brother and sister of the intestate whenever such descendants are of unequal degree,” cannot mean, when nieces survive and all brothers and sisters have predeceased the intestate, that the brothers and sisters constitute the “ stock.”
The result reached by the Appellate Division is supported by all the authorities in this State for more than a century. The law as announced in those decisions has become a rule of property. (Pond v. Bergh, 10 Paige Ch. 140; Kelly v. Kelly, 5 Lans. 443; Hyatt v. Pugsley, 23 Barb. 285; Matter of Devoe, 107 App. Div. 245; affd., 185 N. Y. 536; Matter of Prote, 54 Misc. Rep. 495; affd., 133 App. Div. 928; Matter of Rowe, 103 Misc. Rep. 111; affd., 197 App. Div. 449; Jessup Redfield’s Surrogate’s Practice [1925 ed.], pp. 1688, 1692, 1695.)
The order should, therefore, be affirmed, without costs.
Cardozo, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Kellogg and Hubbs, JJ., concur; Pound, J., not voting.
Order affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.