Winnowski v. Polito
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision.
- Clarke v. Longo (New York Supreme Court 1986)
- Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Powell (8th Cir. 1949)
- Carter v. Travelers Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1985)
- Banellis v. Yackel (N.Y. 1980)
- Country-Wide Insurance v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (N.Y. 2006)
- Burmaster v. State of New York (N.Y. 1959)
- Morris Mandelbaum v. United States of America, and Frank Savage (2d Cir. 1958)
- Murphy v. Carnesi (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Nelson (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Phoenix v. Bolton (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1977)
- Coons v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1960)
- Davidson v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1957)
- Gospodarek v. Murray (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1947)
- People v. Paterno (New York County Courts 1946)
- Winnowski v. Polito (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1945)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
These companion actions which were tried together but never consolidated, arose simultaneously and are for the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs Harriet Winnowski and Nora Witko and the damages to their respective husbands for medical expenses and loss of services when the defendant’s automobile driven by his fourteen-year-old son ran on the sidewalk and struck them.
The plaintiffs had recovered judgments in the City Court of Albany which were affirmed upon appeal by the Albany County Court. Later, upon appeal to the Appellate Division, third department, the judgments were reversed and the complaints dismissed on the ground that the prima facie cases created by the presumption of authorized use with owner’s permission (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 59) had been overcome, when the defendant, his wife and the infant driver each testified that no permission to drive on this or any other occasion had been given, but that, on the contrary, the boy had been expressly forbidden to drive the car at any time. (St. Andrassy v. Mooney, 262 N. Y, 368.) This testimony was not contradicted for the very good reason that the plaintiffs were not in a position to do so. The trial court, weighing this testimony of the vitally interested witnesses in the light of all the circumstances, came to the conclusion that the statutory presumption of implied permission was not overcome. In so doing he was well within his prerogative as the trier of the facts. (Piwowarski v. Cornwell, 273 N. Y. 226.)
*162 Here, the defendant double parked his automobile on a busy thoroughfare in a shopping district in the city of Albany, opposite another car which was between it and the curb. At the same time, he left the key in the ignition switch, the gears enmeshed and the front wheel turned toward the curb. With him at the time was his wife and fourteen-year-old son. The defendant and his wife then got out of the car and went into a nearby store leaving the boy sitting in the rear seat. During their, absence the boy moved to the front seat taking a position behind the steering wheel. He testified that while thus sitting, a policeman directed him, notwithstanding his protest that he could not drive and did not have an operator’s license, to move the car to an open space at the curb. He thereupon released the brake, stepped on the starter, and the car, being in gear, ran over the curb, striking the plaintiffs, who, at that moment, were walking along the sidewalk. The policeman alleged to have given the directions to move the car was not called as a witness.
While it is not easy to formulate a universally applicable definition as to the meaning of implied permission mentioned in the statute, it must be recognized as a basic proposition that when one leaves his motor vehicle in a busy street in such a position that a reasonably prudent person should anticipate that in the event of an emergency or other necessity, it must be moved, it imposes upon the owner responsibility for the negligent acts of the person left in charge.
The judgments of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the actions remitted to the Appellate Division for determination upon the questions of fact raised in that court, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division to abide the event.
■ Loughran, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ., concur; Lehman, Ch. J., dissents.
Judgment accordingly.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.