Wolf v. v. La Rosa & Sons, Inc.
Cases that cite this one
10 later published cases cite this decision.
- Well Built Motor Repairs, Inc. v. Utog Federal Credit Union (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York 1962)
- Olson v. 480 Park Avenue Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1961)
- Agnelli v. L. Silverman Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. (New York Supreme Court 1961)
- Consolidated Mutual Insurance v. Lawrence Di Giovanna & Sons (New York Supreme Court 1957)
- Beverly v. Acme Scaffold Co. (New York Supreme Court 1957)
- Resnick v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1955)
- Ingraldi v. Chazen (New York Supreme Court 1954)
- Dick v. Sunbright Steam Laundry Corp. (N.Y. 1954)
- Borgia v. Loketch, Inc. (New York Supreme Court 1951)
- Messaro v. Long Island Rail Road Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1948)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I dissent. The purpose of section 193-a was to facilitate interpleader practice so that claims related by questions of law and fact to both controversies would be disposed of at one trial, thus providing a simplified procedure without in any way changing the basic law of liability, the test of which is found in the phrase “ who is or may be liable ”. It is said this proceeding must fall as liability over is not established by reason of law for the answer in effect is alleging non-liability for negligence and the contract clause is not expressed in such unequivocal terms as to amount to an indemnity. The liability for tort was anticipated by the contract and when in its performance a person was injured, the one responsible should be called upon to excuse his act or be liable for its consequences'. It may be that the relationship of joint tort-feasor exists and affords a good excuse for nonjoinder by way of interpleader but this should not. operate as a bar to inter-pleader for liability over, which here depends upon the intention of the parties as gathered from the terms of the contract. In a motion of this sort directed to the sufficiency of pleading the allegations thereof must be accorded every reasonable inference. If we do so here, then the question exists as “ who is or may be ” liable and this being so, it is proper within the fair meaning of section 193-a, to interplead the third party so that all issues between them may be disposed of in one trial.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.