Loughran v. City of New York
Cases that cite this one
48 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Parker v. Port of New York Authority (City of New York Municipal Court 1959)
- Smith v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1972)
- Mary P. Klein and William Klein v. United States (2d Cir. 1964)
- Harris v. City of Detroit (Mich. 1962)
- Purcell v. New York World's Fair 1964/1965 Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1970)
- Parker v. City and County of Denver (Colo. 1953)
- Hutchinson v. Sheridan Hill House Corp. (N.Y. 2015)
- Cash v. City of Cincinnati (Ohio 1981)
- Schmidt v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1970)
- Caldicott v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1969)
- Monllas v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1967)
- Julia G. Jediny and John Jediny v. The City of New York and 71 Vesey Corp., Doing Business as Barclay Cafe (2d Cir. 1966)
- Helms v. James Dickey Post No. 23, American Legion, Inc. (Ohio 1966)
- Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst (Ill. 1957)
- Scuteri v. 7318 13th Ave. Corp. (New York Supreme Court 2016)
- The People v. Thomas Barnes (N.Y. 2015)
- Tuttle v. State (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2000)
- Young v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
- Trincere v. County of Suffolk (N.Y. 1997)
- Mahota v. City of Hudson (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1992)
- Evans v. Pyramid Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1992)
- Giniger v. Held (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1987)
- Tiperneni v. State (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1986)
- Akins v. Glens Falls City School District (N.Y. 1981)
- Muallem v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1981)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Plaintiff, while walking at night along the paved pathway of Washington Square Park, a small' public park established and maintained by the City of New York, stepped into a hole and fell. For the consequent injuries suffered, suit was brought against the city; there was a verdict in plaintiff’s favor. In the Appellate Term and in the Appellate Division, the city has prevailed in its contention that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that there was no evidence that the hole was four inches in depth or that it constituted a “ trap.”
For the past twenty years at least, this court has declined to recognize any such principle as that urged by the city. On the contrary, we have held that there is no rule that the liability of a municipality in a case of this sort turns upon whether the hole or depression, causing the pedestrian to fall, is four inches *322 — or any other number of inches — in depth or constitutes “ a trap.” (See, e.g., Norbury v. City of Buffalo, 246 N. Y. 605; Wilson v. Jaybro Realty & Development Co., 289 N. Y. 410; Dowd v. City of Buffalo, 290 N. Y. 895; Lynch v. City of Beacon, 295 N. Y. 872; Pratt v. Village of Seneca Falls, 295 N. Y. 690.) As we but recently observed, there is no requirement that “ a hole in a public thoroughfare * * * be of a particular depth before its existence can give rise to a legal liability.” (Wilson v. Jaybro Realty & Development Co., supra., p. 412.) A municipality’s liability depends on whether or not, having in mind the circumstances of each case, it has neglected and failed to keep its public thoroughfares — whether the sidewalk of a street or the pathway in a park — in a condition reasonably safe for pedestrians.
In our view, the evidence contained in the record before us was sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury. The determination dismissing the complaint was, therefore, erroneous and must be reversed. Since, however, the affirmance by the Appellate Division of the Appellate Term’s decision reversing the judgment of the City Court was on the law alone, the Appellate Division was not called upon to, and did not, pass upon the facts and, accordingly, we are required to remit the case to that court for determination upon any questions of fact there raised (Civ. Prac. Act, §§ 606, 626).
The judgments of the Appellate Division and of the Appellate Term should be reversed, and the case remitted to the Appellate Division for determination upon the questions of fact raised in that court, with costs to abide the event.
Judgments reversed, etc.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.