McGrath v. American Surety Co.
Cases that cite this one
14 later published cases cite this decision.
- Ryan-De Witt Corp. v. Poirier & McLane Corp. (New York Supreme Court 1958)
- Treasure State Industries Inc. v. Welch (Mont. 1977)
- Novak & Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1977)
- A & P Sheet Metal Co., Inc. v. Edward Hansen, Inc. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
- Scales-Douwes Corp. v. Paulaura Realty Corp. (N.Y. 1969)
- Scales-Douwes Corp. v. Paulaura Realty Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1968)
- Cerp Construction Co. v. J. J. Cleary, Inc. (New York Supreme Court 1968)
- United States ex rel. General Electric Co. v. Southern Construction Co. (District Court, W.D. Louisiana 1964)
- Erbe v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1961)
- Jefferson v. Sinclair Refining Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1961)
- Schmidt v. Duggan (New York Supreme Court 1958)
- Frommeyer v. L. & R. CONSTRUCTION CO. (District Court, D. New Jersey 1956)
- Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Incorporated v. Continental Casualty Company (2d Cir. 1955)
- Daniel-Morris Co. v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. (N.Y. 1955)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
This appeal concerns whether the amended complaint states a cause of action. A plumbing subcontractor owes $8,500 to plaintiff for labor and services performed in the construction of a veterans ’ hospital at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. A Federal statute known as the Miller Act (U. S. Code, tit. 40, §§ 270a, 270b) requires that in the performance of such public work for the Federal Government, every general contractor shall
Plaintiff comes within the language quoted from section 270b, that is to say, he is a person having direct contractual relationship with the subcontractor but not with the general contractor. The Miller Act conferred upon him a cause of actioti. on the payment bond required to be given by the general contractor to the Federal Government.
The bond.in suit is not that bond, viz., it is not the payment bond given by the general contractor under the Miller Act. Defendant-appellant is the surety on a bond given by the subcontractor which indemnifies the general contractor against liability to creditors of the subcontractor under the Miller Act. If the order appealed from were correct, it would mean that the contractor and subcontractor considered that the laborers and materialmen of the subcontractor were not sufficiently protected by the Miller Act, and consequently set out to enlarge their rights by the procurement of the additional bond in suit. That is manifestly not what occurred. The rights of these laborers and materialmen of the subcontractor were definitely fixed and considered to be protected adequately by the Miller Act. The object in giving the bond in suit was to protect the contractor against this very liability imposed upon him by Federal law.
This conclusion is not altered by the circumstance that the bond upon which the action is hr sed is conditioned upon
Here, however, the reason for giving separate payment and performance bonds was not to adjust to this distinction in Fosmire v. National Sur. Co. (supra), fit was to "render cer-' tain that the general contractor would be indemnified against liability created by the Miller Act for payment of materialmen and laborers of its subcontractor, and against failure of the subcontractor to complete performance of the subcontract. If a subcontractor encounters financial difficulty, not only are his laborers and materialmen liable to go unpaid, but also he will probably fail to finish the construction work covered by his subcontract. In that event, the general contractor will be required by the Miller Act to meet the demands of the subcontractor’s unpaid laborers and materialmen, and will also be required to complete the work which the subcontractor has neglected to perform. It follows that unless the general contractor were to exact separate payment and performance bonds from his subcontractor, a single bond might be exhausted either by indemnification against demands of unpaid laborers or materialmen of the subcontractor under the Miller Act, or by the cost of completing the construction work. The object in
The instant case thus falls within the Fosmire precedent. Just as there the court discerned that the intention was to protect the State rather than unpaid creditors of the contractor, from the circumstance that otherwise the security for performance of the contract to the State might be undermined by paying claims of laborers and materialmen, so, here, the object in giving two bonds was to assure that exhaustion of the performance bond would not impair the obligation of the surety to indemnify the general contractor against payments which it might be required by the Miller Act to make to creditors of the subcontractor. The object of this payment bond was not to supersede nor to supplement rights of action of unpaid materialmen or laborers of the subcontractor under the Miller Act, but to indemnify the general contractor against its liability to satisfy such claims without exhausting its protection against' failure of the subcontractor to perform the work. The purpose was to protect the general contractor and not to add to liability created by the Miller Act in favor of third parties.
The order appealed from should be reversed, and defendant-appellant’s motion to dismiss under rule 106 should be granted for insufficiency in law, with costs in all courts. The question certified is answered in the negative.
The order of the Appellate Division and that of Special Term should be reversed, with costs in all courts, and the matter remitted with directions to dismiss the complaint. The question certified is answered in the negative.
Lewis, Oh. J., Conway, Desmond, Dye, Fuld and Froessel, JJ., concur.
Orders reversed, etc.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.